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ABSTRACT 
 
Safety-oriented Resilience Evaluation in Chemical Processes. (December 2011) 
Linh Thi Thuy Dinh, B.S., University of Technology, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam; 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Sam M. Mannan 
 
In the area of process safety, many efforts have focused on studying methods to 
prevent the transition of the state of the system from a normal state to an upset and/or 
catastrophic state, but many unexpected changes are unavoidable, and even under good 
risk management incidents still occur. The aim of this work is to propose the principles 
and factors that contribute to the resilience of the chemical process, and to develop a 
systematic approach to evaluate the resilience of chemical processes in design aspects.  
Based on the analysis of transition of the system states, the top-level factors that 
contribute to Resilience were developed, including Design, Detection Potential, 
Emergency Response Planning, Human, and Safety Management. The evaluation 
framework to identify the Resilience Design Index is developed by means of the multi-
factor model approach. The research was then focused on developing complete sub-
factors of the top-level Design factor. The sub-factors include Inherent Safety, 
Flexibility, and Controllability.  
The proposed framework to calculate the Inherent Safety index takes into account all 
the aspects of process safety design via many sub-indices. Indices of Flexibility and 
Controllability sub-factors were developed from implementations of well-known 
methodologies in process design and process control, respectively. Then, the top-level 
Design index was evaluated by combining the indices of the sub-factors with weight 
factors, which were derived from Analytical Hierarchical Process approach. A case 
study to compare the resilience levels of two ethylene production designs demonstrated 
the proposed approaches and gave insights on process resilience of the designs.  
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IT  process temperature index 
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S  number of degrees of freedom 
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λij  relative gain array element 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION AND  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the operation of an industrial process, three system states can be distinguished: 
normal, upset and catastrophic (Figure 1). The process systems should be maintained in 
the normal-state region. However, unwanted disturbances always exist, and tend to force 
the system state out of the normal-state region. If the system has the ability to detect 
disturbances and manipulate operating variables accordingly (a function of a process 
control system), it is likely to stay in the normal state. But the detection may fail, actions 
may be neglected, and even manipulation may be unable to keep the system state 
normal. These may cause unwanted events which make the system state upset or 
catastrophic. Upset state is the state that can create low impacts (i.e. a product not having 
proper specifications, small spills, and leaks). Catastrophic state is the state that may 
lead to high impact to people, environment or business (i.e. runaway reaction, fire, and 
explosion). From the upset state, the system can be recovered to a normal state through 
effective recovery methods. 
If an upset system is not managed properly and is not able to recover to its normal 
state, then larger events (e.g. massive flammable or toxic material spills, BLEVEs) may 
follow and the system may cross over into a catastrophic state. This state may still be 
recovered to normal if action takes place within a certain reaction time. How fast and 
effective this recovery is will depend not only on recovery plans, but also on the 
resilience of the system design itself. 
Most studies in the area of process safety aims to prevent the system state from 
transitioning downward (the right side of Figure 1). Increasing effort has been spent on 
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process safety, yet incidents still occur (Figure 2). Those incidents may be caused by 
technical and human failures and could cause considerable damage to process plants. 
Moreover, there are always other unmanageable threats to chemical plants. Some of 
these include natural causes (e.g., hurricanes) and intentional human acts (e.g., terrorism 
and sabotage). In large-scale and complex systems, such unexpected situations may 
occur even if risk management is fully carried out. When these situations occur, 
minimizing damages and getting operations back to normal are priorities for operators 
(the left side of Figure 1). This is the idea of the resilience concept in the industrial 
processes. 
 
 
Figure 1. Transition of a system state between normal, upset, and catastrophic regions 
 
 
Resilience engineering helps to recover system states after unwanted events happen 
rather than prevent them from occurring. Incident prevention is a subject of study in 
other process safety areas (e.g., risk assessment). However, it is impossible to foresee 
System 
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3 
 
 
and avoid all threats. Therefore, resilience is needed as an additional safety measure. It 
should especially be recognized as an important characteristic of the process industry. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of incidents 1995 – 2005 
 
 
1.2 Literature review 
The concept of resilience has been researched for many years in non-chemical 
disciplines, such as biology, psychology, organizational science, computer science, and 
ecology. In chemical engineering the concept remained relatively unknown. In general it 
is defined as “the ability to bounce back when hit with unexpected demands,” which is 
vague. 
Some researchers tried to derive more focused definitions to support their 
quantification approaches. Only a few publications closely related to process industry 
were found. 
In management system, Carvalho et al.1 proposed a qualitative resilience assessment 
of management system using a micro-incident analysis framework and applied it for 
nuclear power plant operation. The framework analysis provides an anticipation of the 
Source: HSEES database
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actions that are needed to improve the resilience and safety of organization. Costella et 
al.2 proposed a new method for assessing health and safety management systems from 
the resilience engineering perspective.  Four major principles of resilience engineering 
were identified: flexibility, learning, awareness and top management commitment which 
were used as assessment criteria during the evaluation of health and safety management 
systems. 
In engineering systems, some quantitative methodologies have been developed to 
assess resilience. Slocum3 used experimental disturbances to assess resilience along a 
known stress gradient. In this work resilience was measured as the recovery rate of the 
system from a known stress gradient applied. Even though experimental disturbances 
provide important information about the system and can be used as resilience “probes” 
by evaluating the recovery rate, it should not be used as a sole evaluation of the stress 
caused on the system because it also depends on other factors. Mitchell and Mannan4 
developed a concept of system resilience which was defined as “the amount of energy a 
system can store before reaching a point of instability”. If the input thermodynamic 
values change, then the absorbed exergy loads change. The authors borrowed this idea 
from material science to construct so-called “exergy stress and strain curves” to track 
those changes. The curves allow system resilience to be displayed, compared, and 
qualitatively assessed. The idea was demonstrated in four simple test systems from 
process engineering, including a steam pipe, water pipe, water pump, and heat 
exchanger.  
Another related research area is flexibility of chemical processes which was 
developed by Morari et al. in the 1980s and Grossman et al. in 1990s. Morari5 
categorized process resilience into two categories based on operation modes: steady state 
and dynamic state, and treated them in different ways. In the steady state, process 
resilience is identical to process flexibility 6, i.e. the ability of a plant to handle different 
feedstock, product specifications, and operating conditions. Saboo et al.6 introduced a 
new resilience index applied to heat exchanger networks to measure the largest 
disturbance that the network can tolerate without becoming infeasible. The index 
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quantification was then extended by Karafyllis and Kokossis7 and Skogestad and Wolff 8 
as a controllability measure to determine the ability of the system to reject disturbances 
and prevent saturation in the manipulated variables. 
In the dynamic state, process resilience is simply quantified by the quality level of its 
control system.5,9 A similar idea is put forward by Morari and Woodcock, but is 
specifically related to the resilience (or flexibility) of heat exchanger networks with 
respect to inlet temperature variations.6 
In the industrial processes, specifically chemical processes, resilience is the ability to 
minimize damages and get operations back to normal from adverse events rapidly. The 
more the resilience of an industrial process is, the lower the consequence is, and the 
sooner the recovery is. As a result, the risks (which comprises consequence and 
occurrence frequency) to people, environment and business are decreased. However, the 
resilience concept has not fully been adopted into the process industry, despite its clear 
potential benefits related to safety environment, and costs. There seem to be hurdles 
which limit the application of the concept, and which should be tackled to unveil its 
potential.  
 First, the current difficulty in studying resilience is that it is conceptual. To 
theorize, manage – even engineer – resilience, it is necessary for basic principles 
and contributing factors of resilience be identified.  
 Second, it is difficult to know when a process is designed according to resilience 
principles and measure the effects of changes due to the resilience approach. To 
implement resilience into practice, a method of estimating the resilience of 
different chemical process or design alternatives is needed.  
The objective of this work is to propose the principles and factors that contribute to 
the resilience of a chemical process, and develop a systematic approach to evaluate the 
resilience of chemical process designs for relative comparison purpose. The following 
questions will be addressed: 
 What are the principal features of positive resilience in a process operation when 
it is subjected to unexpected events? 
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 What are the contributing factors that minimize the damages and restore the 
system in a shorter time? 
 How good resilience is this design compared to another? 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows: Chapter II 
describes the problem statement for this research, discusses state transition of systems 
and then proposes an approach for evaluating resilience. Chapter III introduces 
principles to make systems more resilient and factors that contribute to resilience 
evaluations. Chapter IV focuses on sub-factors and quantitative methods of one main 
resilience contribution factor, resilient design. Literature review and proposed 
approaches to quantitatively calculate the sub-indices of resilient Design index are 
shown in Chapter V, VI, and VII. A case study of ethylene production processes 
demonstrates the quantitative approach in Chapter VIII. Last, the closing chapter 
discusses the conclusion, application, and future work. 
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CHAPTER II  
PROBLEM STATEMENT  
AND PROPOSED APPROACH 
 
2.1 Problem statement 
The problem statement for this research work can be described as follows. Given are 
chemical processes either in design or operation stage with information on process flow 
diagram, mass and energy balance, basic control systems, reaction, inventory, chemicals 
involved, safety management and culture and possible disturbances. Although many 
types of information are needed, their required levels of details are low. For example, 
only key control loops that are slow-response and likely significantly affect safety 
criteria and production specifications are needed; only heat of reaction is required for 
reaction information. 
It is desired to develop a conceptual theory of safety-oriented resilience in chemical 
processes and a systematic approach to resilience evaluation of the chemical processes 
by a scalar resilience index. Specifically, the theory development regards to identifying 
resilience principles and contribution factors for better understanding the concept and 
indicating direction to develop the evaluation approach.  
There are different types and ranges of possible disturbances. Some can be 
considered as unexpected input deviations. For example (Figure 3), the situations that 
flow rate of A is disturbed, D is introduced to the reactor instead of A, or cooling water 
is lost (i.e., flow rate of water reduces to 0) can create the unexpected input deviations. 
The above unexpected input deviations may lead to another state of disturbances, 
upset state. One possible outcome is a runaway reaction; that means, the disturbances in 
upset state may create another state of disturbances, catastrophic state. If a runaway 
reaction occurs and cannot be controlled, a reactor can be ruptured. Consequently, an 
explosion or fire can occur. The scope of this research is to apply for all of those 
multilevel disturbances. 
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Figure 3. Examples of unexpected input deviations 
 
 
2.2 Relationship between measures and process resilience 
In an industrial process, at certain conditions even a small disturbance can upset the 
system, which can then become a catastrophic state. A resilient system can prevent such 
highly undesirable transitions through appropriate design, technology, human and 
management activities and well planned emergency procedures, which can reverse an 
incipient mishap and eliminate potential hazardous side effects. Factors or activities 
which can avoid the transition are called measures (which in terms of risk reduction are 
called barriers) because they block cause-consequence chains. The importance of the 
effects of barriers on the safety level has been noted in many studies.10-13 In the context 
of resilience, measures will be discussed, because measures can not only stop a 
development, but also reverse it. 
Figure 4 shows the effect of resilience measures on the transition of system states. If 
the measures between disturbance and upset states are effective, the system state goes 
back to normal. If those measures fail and upset still occurs, there will be protective 
measures in place which prevent harm to humans and equipment loss. The modeling 
concept used here is that those measures cannot only prevent loss (as some other process 
safety measures do) but also help the system to bounce back to a state of normal 
operation (which is unique to resilience measures). This model also reveals another new 
concept, resilience, a family of many different measures, not a single one. These 
Chemical A
Chemical B
Chemical C
Cooling 
water
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different measures work and tie together to improve the ability of the system to tolerate 
derailing conditions, and to bounce back from disturbances or unexpected events instead 
of being broken. In general, although there are many different unexpected situations led 
to different consequence levels and response strategies, resilience measures are needed 
to prevent unwanted transitions and accelerate the desired transition back to a normal 
state. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. System bouncing back to normal state with presence of resilience measures 
 
 
2.3 Multi-factor approach 
It is assumed here that the complexity of resilience is derived from the interaction of 
several simple measures.  Then, the evaluation framework is constructed based on a 
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multi-level, multi-factor approach in which the complex (overall) objective (e.g. 
resilience or resilient design) is composed of many objectives and/or factors. Each factor 
contributes a resilience level due to its interaction and combination with other factors. 
For the evaluation framework, all of the factors that contribute to resilience are 
basically arranged in a hierarchical tree (Figure 5). At the bottom of this tree, we desire 
to have one number which represents the resilient degree of a chemical process. It is 
named the “Resilience Index.” The first level of the tree demonstrates the main 
contributing factors/ aspects to resilience, which can be considered resilience variables. 
Each of those aspects is represented by its sub-factors in level 2 of the tree. The value 
evaluation of sub-factors in level 1 is usually not simple because they themselves 
involve many other aspects. Therefore, we may need level 2, 3, or m, to evaluate values 
of the level 1 sub-factors. The upper levels are used as inputs for the lower levels. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Hierarchical framework of evaluating resilience index 
 
2.4 Proposed methodology to evaluate process resilience 
The algorithm (Figure 6) is developed to capture the above multi-factor approach. To 
obtain one unique resilience index, the following steps need to be performed. 
Variable 1 
Overall 
Resilience 
Index 
Variable 2 Variable 3 ……….. Variable n Level 1 
…
…
… 
Level m 
… … … … … … 
………….. 
… … … 
……….. 
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 Review the various concepts of resilience in different areas, and decide what 
definition of resilience will be used in this study.  
 Identify strategies in the chemical process which represent the core concepts of 
resilience.  
 Describe the basic resilience principles based on the strategies of resilience found 
in the chemical process.   
 Identify the main factors that contribute to obtain the resilience principles as well 
as the process resilience after identifying the basic principles of resilience.  
 Quantify the indices of each resilience contribution factor for obtaining final 
resilience index since resilience is the product of many process features or 
contribution factors. 
 Identify the weights between the factors or sub-factors on different levels.  
 Obtain the Overall Resilience Index (IR) by adding together the multiplying 
results of the first level indices and their weighting factors (Equation 1).  The 
weighting factors can be directly assigned by the designer to emphasize some 
aspects above others or calculated using Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
method.  
IR = ∑ (ai * Ii) Eq. 1 
where ai: Weighting factor of the factor i 
  Ii: The index of the factor i 
Resilience index aims to be used as a screening test of a chemical process or plant. It 
is designed to give an indication of the level of resilience for comparison purpose, not 
for estimating resilience level of a single process. In Equation 3, there is an assumption 
of the independence of all resilience factors. 
The resilience index indicates a quantitative assessment of resilience of a process or 
design. This index can be applied for three main purposes:  
 Obtains a score to each chemical process or design, which serve as a tool for 
relative comparison of several processes or alternative designs in terms of 
resilience. 
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 Permits identification of the impact of individual elements to the resilience of a 
chemical process or design. 
 Provides the direction to improve resilience by improving the sub-factors 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Research algorithm 
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CHAPTER III  
RESILIENCE PRINCIPLES AND 
CONTRIBUTION FACTORS 
 
3.1 Strategies and principles of resilience 
Resilience can be viewed as a kind of forward, pro-active defense. From the general 
definition, a resilience strategy can be identified and developed. Resilience strives to 
control the situation by minimizing the probability of failure, the consequences and the 
restoration and recovery time. This can be considered a triple resilience strategy. 
To execute the strategy and achieve resilience, the following basic principles are 
proposed: minimization of failure, early detection, higher flexibility, higher 
controllability, minimization of effects, and better administrative controls and 
procedures (ACP). By analyzing the state transition, it can be shown those principles 
need to be in places and work as layers to perform the resilience strategy (Figure 7). 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Resilience principles 
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To demonstrate how the principles contribute to achieve resilience, a leak of 
flammable gas is exemplified in the following description of the principle. When a 
flammable gas is leaked (i.e., process is in failure state), an explosive cloud can be 
formed. With an ignite source an explosion occurs (i.e., process is in an upset state), 
which may result in other flame and explosion and cause severe consequences to the 
process, operators, and environment 
3.1.1 Minimization of failure 
Failure is a state that does not meet a desired or intended objective, or which potentially 
creates a hazardous situation to people (e.g., toxic-gas release) and damage to equipment 
(e.g., leak, rupture, and suddenly increase of temperature). It is not healthy if safety only 
depends on operational measures and safeguards or mitigation measures. The 
Minimization of Failure principle is to prevent something bad from happening by 
preventive measures.  
Inherently safer design, properly using protective equipment, and appropriate safety 
management should be performed to the maximum extent. In the example, some of 
preventive measures are choosing gaskets that minimize leak rates of hazardous 
substances, minimizing stockpiles of toxic substances, exercising careful maintenance 14, 
and replacing the flammable gas by a non-flammable one 
3.1.2 Early detection 
When the preventive measures cannot prevent a failure to occur, the role of principle 
Early Detection comes into place. The most dangerous disruption and most difficult 
situation to bounce back from is when disturbance is not detected until it is too late. No 
corrective actions will be initiated for failures that remain undetected 15. Hence, accuracy 
and early detection is desired for all disturbances. In most cases, early response can be 
achieved by early detection resulting in a more effective response since operators have 
more time to consider and respond to the urgent situation.  
Many authors (among others, Frese, 199116; Zapf and Reason, 1994 17; Sellen, 1994 
18; Kontogiannis, 1997 and 1999 19,20) have clearly stated detection is necessary before 
the rest of a recovery process can take place. The idea of the detection of the deviation 
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being part of a recovery process was found in the literature.21 Early detection of a 
disruption becomes a major determinant of resilience.22, 23 The benefits of early detection 
in rapid response have also been mentioned in the area of emergency response 
management system.24  
For the example, the leak should be detected as soon as possible to prevent the gas 
cloud formation, which may lead to worse situations. The detection is usually made by 
gas sensors 
3.1.3 Flexibility 
A process is called flexible if output variation can stay in desired range when input is 
changed due to disturbance within a defined range. More details on the flexibility 
concept are discussed in Section 7.1.  
The Flexibility principle for resilience is to design a more flexible process that can 
operate under various disturbances. It is not necessary to return to the previous 
conditions under disturbance as long as the constraints and specifications are met. 
Flexibility was considered as one of the attributes of resilience in previous work of 
Costella et al.2, Sheffi23, Saboo et al.6, Morari5. Increasing flexibility can help a process 
not only respond to input fluctuations but also withstand significant disruptions. Some of 
common applications of flexibility are to design a plant producing the same product 
from various types of feedstock, a heat exchange network meeting output temperature 
specifications when input conditions are changed, and construction materials resistant to 
various types of corrosion and a wide range of physical conditions.  
Refer to the gas leak example, a flexible design will allow to bypass the leaked 
equipment segment or to reduce gas pressure to minimize leak rate while production is 
maintained online. Both measures can prevent the hazard situation from escalading to 
cloud formation. 
3.1.4 Controllability 
Controllability is an ability of the system to achieve a specific target state.25 A process is 
called controllable if the output parameters to be controlled can be tuned to target points 
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in acceptable time when unexpected input deviate the parameters from the set points. 
More details on the controllability concept are discussed in Section 6.1.  
Flexibility should be distinguished from controllability. The Controllability principle 
for resilience is to design a more controllable process. While the Flexibility principle 
allows processes to operate at various conditions, the Controllability principle allows 
changing the operation from one condition to another. Therefore, both Flexibility and 
Controllability are needed to achieve the resilience strategy. 
Skogestad and Postlethwaite26 introduced the term input-output controllability to 
address the ability to achieve acceptable control performance in which the controlled 
outputs and manipulated inputs are kept within specified bounds from their set points 
under any uncertainties. Controllability was also considered as dynamic resilience or as 
an attribute of resilience in the work of Morari.5,9 The better the controllability is, the 
better the disturbance rejection capacity of the process is.27 
In the gas leak example, the flexible design allows the process to operate in bypassed 
or pressure-reduced conditions. However, whether operators can perform the changes 
and how long to do that depend on controllability of the process. The cloud formation 
can be stopped only when the new condition is obtained. The sooner is new condition 
reached, the less is flammable gas released. 
3.1.5 Limitation of effects 
Despite the low probability of failure, the precise moment when an even may occur 
cannot be known. If it is not possible to rule out failure or to prevent mishaps, it is 
important to limit them from becoming worse. The more severe the consequences are, 
the longer it will take for the process to recover. The Limitation of effects principle is to 
use safeguard or mitigation measures to limit the consequence of an upset event. 
For the example, equipment can be designed in a small volume so that it can leak 
with only low amount, which would be easy to stop or control. Another measure of the 
limitation of effects principle can be a building fire wall between sections to restrict the 
spread of fire. A blast wall to protect control room is necessary in some cases. 
  
3.1.6 Administrative controls and procedures
The upset-state or catastrophic s
minimized or prevented by design aspects such as flexibility and controllability. 
However, for certain unexpected disturbances, a solution in the form of a resilient design 
may be infeasible. Moreover, not eve
Therefore, the resilience principle should involve management systems through 
Administrative Controls and Procedures. 
The principle is not a layer b
the states during the transition from normal to catastrophic states. It is made as early as 
in design stage and continuously updated in operation stage.
Administrative controls, such as training and
another safeguard to prevent and recover from process deviation and accidental release. 
Training and certification of personnel on critical procedures should be a permanent 
activity. If operators have the right mental pi
neglect alarms, they may even cope with a developing incident by improvising
 
 
Figure 8. Development of resilience strategies and principles from resilience definition
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In the example, proper maintain procedure can even prevent leak from happening. 
As other measures, good emergency response plans help to fast stop the leak, isolate the 
unit, shut down the plant, evacuate the community to minimize the consequences to 
equipment damage and human loss. 
In summary, the resilience definition in the context of industrial processes was used 
to develop the resilience strategy which in turn is a basis to develop the resilience 
principles. They are summarized in Figure 8. 
3.2 Resilience contribution factors 
3.2.1 Development of contribution factors 
It is challenging to implement these principles when evaluating a process for its 
resilience because there is a lack of systematic attempts to identify factors that contribute 
to resilience in unexpected situations. Resilience levels of a plant can only be determined 
if the extent to which factors or attributes that contribute to the resilience of the plant are 
validated and exercised.  
There have been many definitions of organizational resilience and, hence, the 
associated factors or attributes. Those definitions were found in numerous studies on 
how organizations dealt with situations that pushed them to the boundaries of 
competence. Woods (2006)30 proposed a set of factors which contribute to the resilience 
developed in prior research, including buffering capacity, flexibility, margin, tolerance, 
and cross-scale interaction. These factors have been applied in the electric power and 
telecommunication studies. However, like with other extreme events in chemical 
engineering, these factors are difficult to evaluate. 
In this work, factors or criteria to evaluate the resilience of a process are developed 
from the resilience principles. The factors must affect the associated principles directly. 
The major factors that are essential to resilience in global terms are discussed next.  
From the Flexibility and Controllability principles of the process, the Design factor is 
developed. Process resilience is affected very significantly by the design of the process. 
For example, take the case study in which a batch reactor has a runaway reaction that is 
caused by the inability of the reactor to cool the accelerating rate of heat produced. If 
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protective measures, such as the use of sufficient pressure relief systems and tanks 
designed to withstand high pressure and temperature, are in place, then the tank will not 
rupture or explode, and the system may be back to normal soon after it is cleaned out. 
Other design features known to increase resilience is increasing the range of 
heating/cooling capacity to improve flexibility, and fitting the right instrumentation to 
improve controllability. Several layers of safety systems, whether complementary or 
redundant, should be considered to enhance resilience as well. For example, in the BP oil 
spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, in the well there was a blowout preventer that was 
designed to seal off a well in the event of an emergency, but that device had not been 
working properly since the explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon oil rig on April 20th 
2010.31 The BP oil spill disaster could have been recovered more quickly if the design 
would have included a redundancy in which the blowout preventer would perform its 
ultimate function of closing the well, or had other layers of timely ultimate protection 
beside this device.  
For implementing the principle Early Detection, Detection Potential factor is 
introduced. Technically, in the run-away example mentioned previously, a special 
sensor, in combination with a suitable signal-processing device, may warn that a 
disturbance is emerging before any temperature or pressure deviation is noticeable. 
However, apart from technical features, here, organizational yardsticks become essential. 
The quality and implementation of a detection system has the crucial role not only to 
detect disturbances in time to activate proper safety measures but also, and perhaps even 
more importantly, to observe the level of resilience improvement or deterioration. 
Moreover, Detection Systems have also been recognized by Sheffi22 as significant 
elements in building resilience, more specifically for the resilient enterprise through the 
vigilance concept.32 According to Brizon and Wybo, vigilance is one of the key 
processes that participate in the resilience of industrial systems. The research of 
Hollnagel33 also agrees with this and mentions “monitoring” as one of the key capacities 
of resilient engineering. The actions in the process industry to install process safety 
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lagging and leading indicators after the 2005 BP Texas City explosion disaster can be 
seen as part of this. 
A dedicated and well-designed detection system is not enough for a positive 
resilience. Without the proper management of the alarm system by operations personnel, 
crucial, quick and accurate detection, assessment and resolution of abnormal operating 
conditions may not be achieved. The human aspect plays an important role in the 
response to emergencies and in recovery processes (i.e., the identification and 
application of appropriate countermeasures).15, 21 Operations personnel missing or 
misinterpreting alarms can contribute to a more difficult situation for a process to restore 
and recover from. Operators should be aware of the significance of every stage of the 
process and the safety procedure to be followed. They should be trained to recognize 
abnormal conditions or states that may occur. The Human factor also has an important 
role in detecting the unexpected situation, minimizing the failure and limiting the effects 
which are the resilience principles. 
The final principle of resilience considers Administrative Controls and Procedures 
which is involved because carrying out a process under good safety management and 
good procedures makes the plant more resilient. For example, proper understanding of 
the process chemistry and thermochemistry by management and adequate operational 
procedures, including training, can help the plant recover quickly from incidents 
involving unexpected violent reactions and to prevent more severe consequences. A 
factor used to evaluate this component of resilience is the Safety Management factor. 
Employee training is a core aspect of this factor. Operator training supported by process 
simulation can frequently be improved by showing operators how to respond to upset 
conditions or process deviations. 
Since unexpected situations combine many elements, they are challenging to plan for 
a respond too. Emergency Response Planning is another important factor that contributes 
to the characteristic of resilience. The Emergency Response Planning should be well 
prepared since a rapid and proper response usually results in a shorter recovery time. A 
situation will be mostly unexpected with regard to time and can be unexpected also with 
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regard to nature. In principle it is impossible to have planned actions in the latter case; 
however, thorough planning and preparation for the other cases will lay the foundation 
for a collaborative response. Building joint processes, getting to know all organizations 
involved in a response, and assigning specific roles are necessary to recover quickly. 
Moreover, responding – the ability of knowing what to do and being able to do it –was 
also demonstrated as one of the key capacities of resilient engineering.33 Chemical 
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) has shown that many communities and 
companies need to be more knowledgeable and better prepared. 
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that resilience is the product of many 
process features covering technical and organizational margins of safety. Five major 
factors including Design, Detection Potential, Emergency Response Planning (ERP), 
Human, and Safety Management, have been selected to contribute to resilience in this 
work (Figure 9).  
 
 
 
Figure 9. Contributing factors of process resilience. 
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employees, and better emergency response procedures. These factors are essential 
elements in determining response time, and also reflect the fact that intrinsic resilience is 
affected by many different factors, including the technological, human and management 
factors. These factors are not sharply defined and tend to intermingle. 
In quantitative viewpoints, Figure 9 means that resilience index of a chemical 
process is achieved if the indices of the factors contributing to resilience are obtained. 
The scope of the remaining chapters of this dissertation is limited to develop and 
demonstrate the evaluation method for Design factor. By just evaluating resilience 
design index, a better resilient design can be chosen by relative comparisons of different 
design alternatives or elements to improve resilience of a design can be identified.  
3.2.2 Example demonstrating contribution factors 
These types of resilience factors can be demonstrated in the following example and case 
study, which support the above selection of the main contributing factors. 
Consider a simple example: a leak in a gas-phase heat exchanger (HX). The accident 
may occur due to a disturbance of the gas flow rate into the heat exchanger. If increased 
to a certain rate, the gas flow causes acoustic noise and unobserved tube vibration. Later 
the tube cracks due to prolonged vibration and fatigue. The gas in the high pressure area 
causes an increase the pressure in the downstream equipment that is connected to the 
tube side fluid. In the down-stream section, a pipe that was designed to operate at 
atmospheric pressure cannot withstand the higher pressure, and explodes. 
In Design aspect, if the system was designed to eliminate or absorb vibration, then 
the failure is prevented. Also, if the down-stream section of the process was designed to 
withstand the higher pressure or to have a relief valve, the operator may have enough 
time to control the gas flow rate back to normal or isolate that HX to replace a new tube 
or fix the cracks. The recovery time will be faster when the explosion does not occur.  
In Detection Potential aspect, if the process was designed with the control system to 
be able to detect abnormal pressure or temperature profiles due to the leak and control 
the pipe pressure, then the explosion can be prevented although leak occurred. The HX 
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can be bypassed and process will continue to be in normal operating condition, rather 
than being shut down due to the explosion.   
Human aspect may play a more important role to early detection for the resilience. If 
the operator can hear the acoustic noise due to vibration in a visual walk and was trained 
to suspect the vibration, then the HX can be bypassed for inspection and maintenance. 
Therefore, leak can be even prevented. 
With a good ERP, operator is trained to respond to the detected issues by changing 
the gas flow (when vibration occurs), limiting the pressure increase in the pipe (when 
leak occurs), safely stopping the blowout flow in the relief valve (when gas is blown 
out), or closing the gas flow after the explosion. 
Safety Management is an integral part to achieve resilience. A regular visual walk 
may result in the human detection on the acoustic noise. A Hazard and Operability 
Analysis (HAZOP) conducted in an earlier stage would have indicated where the 
acoustic noise could potentially come from. Besides, scheduled maintenance activity of 
the safety management may help to reveal the signs of prolonged vibration in the HX 
before leaks occur. 
If any of those contribution factors are effective, the HX will be back to normal 
operation quicker without any leak, or with a leak but without an explosion. The system 
may accept the disturbance (gas flow rate increase), but management can make the HX 
resilient. 
3.3 Case Study 
3.3.1 Problem description 
Consider the case where a release of flammable materials leads to an explosion 
following a runaway reaction and rupture of the reactor as a result of an increase in 
temperature. It is desired to show how the principles and contribution factors can prevent 
the hazard scenario from developing and assist in getting the system back to normal 
quicker, meaning the system is more resilient. 
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Figure 10. Sequence of the reactor run-away and flammable material release event. 
 
Explosion/ fire 
Runaway reaction 
Flammable material 
released 
Reactor ruptured 
Various possible erroneous 
actions e.g. steam added at 
too high rate, switch over 
to cooling water too late, 
too much reactants, scale 
up, and change of the ratio 
of the reactant, etc. 
 
Cooling water system 
unable to control heat of 
reaction 
Harm to human and 
environment 
Various possible technical 
failures e.g. inadequate 
design-no heat/ mat. 
balance, agitator stopping 
(electric failures, engine 
failures) etc. 
 
Inadequate transfer of 
research information, 
inadequate training/ 
operating procedure, 
human error 
 
Various possible, 
erroneous actions e.g. 
inadequate maintenance 
of cooling circuit 
 
Reaction heat-up rate too 
fast 
Insufficient venting 
system e.g. no rupture 
disc, inadequate design 
Ignition 
source 
Employees present at the 
side of reactor 
Inadequate hazard 
assessment e.g. 
failure to identify 
hazards 
Employees unaware of 
hazards 
Employees attempt to 
salvage product e.g. timing 
of steam, cooling water 
favorable 
Inadequate transfer 
of research 
information 
Inadequate safety 
management 
A
A
A
25 
 
 
3.3.2 Measures and factors contributing to resilience 
To analyze the measures and factors that contribute to resilience, the transition of states 
is analyzed. The scenario will be considered at different levels of Disturbance, Upset, 
and Catastrophic consequences. Figure 10 shows the analyzed results of the state 
transition which is, in a simple way, the sequence of the events for this example. 
Above all, the most effective tool to boost resilience is to prevent something bad 
from happening, which is based on the fact that there will be no recovery time if no 
unfortunate incident occurs. In this case study, conditions favorable to possible technical 
and erroneous failures can be prevented by adequate transferring of research 
information, hazard assessments, thorough knowledge of the reaction chemistry and 
thermochemistry, adequate hazard awareness, knowledge of the causes of overpressure, 
adequate operating procedures, including the order of ingredients, and carefully checked 
addition rates. Then, depend on a specific scenario, certain measures and factors can be 
applied to achieve positive resilience for this incident scenario. Those suggested 
measures and factors are summarized in Table 1. 
Analyzing this case study demonstrates that the measures which cut short the chain 
of undesired events of the case study or contribute to a positive resilience of different 
scenarios fall into Design, Detection, Emergency Response Planning, Human, or 
Management categories. 
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Table 1. Measures, principles, and contribution factors for resilience of the case study. 
Disturbance System state Measure Principle Contribution 
Factors 
Erroneous 
actions such as 
an incorrect 
change in the 
feed ratio, an 
operator loading 
too much, 
loading in the 
wrong sequence 
or loading 
incompatible 
materials. 
Upset: 
Reaction heat-
up rate too 
high 
Design processes, equipment and procedures to 
neutralize potential human error using inherently safer 
design e.g. interlocks 
Minimization 
of Failure; 
ACP 
Design; Safety 
Management 
Lock software based on values monitored Controllability Design 
Add chemicals to the vessel at a predetermined rate in 
order to control the rate of the reaction.  
Controllability; 
Flexibility 
Design 
Issue clear and precise process instruction sheets 
covering the action to be taken in the event of 
erroneous actions, e.g., incorrect feeding of reactants, 
delays in processing, under or over-charging, etc. 
ACP Safety 
Management; 
ERP 
Operators check product composition in order to 
recognize abnormal conditions early. 
Early Detection; 
ACP 
Human; 
Safety 
Management 
Technical 
failures such as 
inadequate 
designs 
involving the 
heat/ material 
balance, the 
stopping of 
agitators due to 
electric failures 
and engine 
failures. 
Upset: Water-
cooling 
system unable 
to control the 
heat of the 
reaction 
Design adequate heat transfer systems Minimization 
of Failure 
Design 
Design adequate control and safety back-up systems, 
e.g., a software action linked with heat excess alarms 
in case of power loss, agitator failure, and coolant 
failure. 
Controllability; 
Minimization 
of Failure; 
Early Detection 
Design; 
Detection 
Potential 
Operators recognize abnormal conditions and perform 
proper actions. 
Early Detection; 
ACP 
Human; ERP; 
Safety 
Management 
Issue clear and precise process instruction for 
abnormal conditions, e.g., loss of agitation, loss of 
cooling water. 
ACP Safety 
Management; 
ERP 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
Disturbance System state Measure Principle Contribution 
Factors 
Water-cooling 
system unable 
to control the 
heat of the 
reaction or the 
reaction heat 
rate is up too 
high.  
Upset: Runaway 
reaction: 
Fit a high temperature indicator and alarm system 
(e.g., high pressure alarm) to the vessel in give 
early warnings of potential runaway.  
Use smart signal processing to recognize abnormal 
temperature or pressure conditions. 
Early Detection Detection 
Potential 
Cut off the feed and heating from vessel when a 
predetermined maximum safe temperature or rate 
of temperature rise is reached,  
Controllability;  
 
Design; ERP 
Add chemicals to cancel the effects of the catalyst. 
Neutralize, quench with water or other diluents, or 
dump the contents into a vessel which contains a 
quench liquid programmed to be activated at a 
high pressure threshold. 
Limitation of 
Effects 
Design; ERP 
Issue clear and precise instructions for the 
operators to follow.  
ACP Safety 
Management  
Runaway 
reaction.  
 
Catastrophic: 
Reactor 
ruptured/exploded. 
Provide sufficient relief systems, such as a suitable 
vents and bursting disc/ relief valves to be used 
when the safe working pressure of the vessel is 
exceeded. 
Minimization 
of Failure; 
Design; 
Use a tank designed to withstand high pressures 
and temperatures.  
Flexibility Design 
Recognize abnormal conditions and execute 
appropriate actions. 
Early Detection; 
ACP 
Human 
ERP 
Safety 
Management 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
Disturbance System state Measure Principle Contribution 
Factors 
Reactor 
ruptured.  
Catastrophic: 
Flammable 
material released. 
Design a suitable catch pot that can collect what is 
released and withstand the pressure of the 
discharge from the reaction vessel. 
Limitation of 
Effects  
Design 
Use a vent scrubber that is designed for treating 
atmospheric emissions in cases of high pressure in 
any catch tank that requires the release of products 
into the environment. 
Limitation of 
Effects 
Design 
Flammable 
material 
released.  
Catastrophic: Fire/ 
Explosion. 
Area and equipment are classified to prevent 
ignition sources 
Limitation of 
Effects 
Design 
Reduce ignition probability by ignition source 
control by restricted access and permit to work  
system 
ACP Safety 
Management 
Install a device, e.g., a water spray, to rapidly cool 
the space above the reactor, so the hot reaction 
products do not self-ignite after mixing with air 
and generate a secondary vapor cloud explosion. 
Limitation of 
Effects 
Design 
Emergency response actions by operation, deluge, 
water spray, and fire brigade 
ACP ERP 
Fire/ Explosion Catastrophic: 
Harm to people. 
Keep the number of people in the vicinity of the 
reactor to a minimum. 
Limitation of 
Effects; ACP 
Safety 
Management 
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3.4 Summary 
Analyzing transitions of system states revealed that resilience is characterized by 
multiple factors or measures. These measures work and interact together to improve the 
ability of chemical processes to bounce back. The principles of resilience were proposed 
to be Flexibility, Controllability, Early Detection, Minimization of Failure, Limitation of 
Effects, and Administrative Controls/ Procedures. These principles act as guidelines to 
help develop the multiple contribution factors for numerically evaluating resilience. The 
first-layer of factors that contribute to resilience was proposed to be Design Factor, 
Detection Potential factor, Emergency Response Planning factor, Human factor, and 
Safety Management factor. 
This section has investigated the resilience concepts in industrial process problems, 
and the roles of different factors to achieve resilience of different processes. In the 
ensuing sections, the scope of the remaining chapters of this dissertation is limited to 
develop and demonstrate the evaluation method for Design factor. The applicability of 
the multi-factor approach (Section 2.3 and 2.4) in evaluating the resilience of different 
chemical design alternatives will be provided. By just evaluating resilience Design 
index, a more resilient design can be achieved or elements to improve resilience of a 
design can be identified. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESILIENCE DESIGN FACTOR 
 
In Chapter II, multi-level multi-factor approach was proposed to evaluate resilience of a 
chemical process quantitatively. According to this approach, process resilience index can 
be obtained with known indices of resilience contribution factors. Based on literature 
reviews and expert opinions, the specific factors contributing to process resilience 
developed and identified in Chapter III.  
Among five main contribution factors to resilience of a chemical process or plant, 
resilient Design factor is chosen to demonstrate the applicability of the multi-factor 
approach in evaluating resilience index in design aspect. This chapter is a further step in 
identifying sub-factors contributing to resilience of different design alternatives, and 
then developing the equation to calculate resilience Design index. 
4.1 Sub-factors of the Design factor 
A resilient design is a design that has the ability to deal effectively with disturbances. 
Factors that need to be considered include the structure of the design (e.g. how many 
reactors are to be used and of what type they should be, the addition or removal of a 
recycle or heat exchanger 5), the parameters (equipment sizing), and the control structure 
(what variables are to be measured, estimated, controlled or manipulated).  
To improve resilience, a process needs to be inherently safe, flexible, and 
controllable. A resilient design is overarching and integrates all of these issues to limit 
undesired consequences of disturbances.  
4.1.1 Controllability 
Controllability, one of resilience principles, is the ability of a system to achieve a target 
state by determining whether it can be controlled effectively, either by feed-back or by 
feed-forward.25 
A process should be controlled by the use of physical principles (i.e. the dynamics of 
the process should be favorable). If a process is difficult to control, one should look for 
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ways of changing the process or the principles of control before an investment in 
complex control system is made.  
Effective control is essential to minimize the hazards associated with particular 
reaction systems. Controllability can be attributed to the characteristics inherent in the 
system through the control structure (what variables are to be measured, estimated, 
controlled or manipulated). One problem there is how to select the appropriate set of 
manipulated variables to control a specified set of outputs via feedback.5  
The development of measures in the controllability index is also important for the 
synthesis of control structures. Controllability was also considered as dynamic resilience 
or as an attribute of resilience in the work of Morari.5  
4.1.2 Flexibility 
Flexibility, another resilience principle, is clearly one of the components needed to be 
considered or integrated in a process design to achieve resilience since it is related to the 
capability of a process to cope with varying conditions and to achieve feasible operation 
over a wide range of uncertain conditions (e.g. different feedstock, product 
specifications, and changes in process parameters). Flexibility was also considered as 
one of the attributes of resilience in the work of Morari.5 
4.1.3 Inherent safety 
Although we designed a flexible and controllable system which can withstand in a wide 
range of temperatures, pressures, and flow rates, there are still unexpected situations 
resulting a leak or rupture of a unit/ system or even a control system. For these types of 
problems, to be resilient, flexibility and controllability are not enough. In these 
scenarios, the ability of a plant/ unit to recover quickly may depend on another design 
aspect, inherent safety design. An inherently safer design is a more resilient design, 
because inherently safer designs are created to eliminate hazards and prevent incidents 
from occurring.  
Inherent safety can be considered a proactive approach to resilience because 
eliminating hazards eliminates the time and costs for recovery and restoration. A change 
in the plant design, such as a lower inventory of hazardous materials in the process, use 
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of safer materials, less hazardous processing conditions, or the use of a semi-batch plant 
rather than a batch plant, makes it possible for the plant to avoid or significantly reduced 
hazards and operating problems with fewer opportunities for error.  
Thus, the sub-factors of Design factor are Inherent Safety, Flexibility, and 
Controllability. In other words, a resilient design can be determined by these 3 elements 
(Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 11. Contribution factors of resilient design. 
 
In qualitative viewpoints, Figure 11 means that a more inherent safety, controllable, 
and flexible design is a more resilient design.  
4.2 Resilience design index 
A quantitative measure of resilience which is useful for design studies and satisfactory to 
both the practicing design engineer and the academic theoretician does not appear to 
exist at present. In seeking to engineer resilience, after identifying the factors that 
contribute to resilience there is a clear need to consider how these factors may be 
measured. Without this measure, it will be virtually impossible to make rational 
decisions on the "best" design in today's complex economic and physical environment.5 
4.2.1 Quantitative formulation 
In quantitative viewpoints, Figure 11 means that resilience design index can be obtained 
if the inherent safety, controllability, and flexibility indices can be calculated. Hence, the 
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Resilience Design Index (IRD) is calculated by Equation 2, where the Total Resilience 
Design Index is the sum of the Flexibility Index (IF), the Controllability Index (IC), and 
the Inherent Safety index (IIS).  
IRD = aIS * IIS + aF * IF + aC * IC  Eq. 2 
Where ai is the weighting factors 
This resilience design index aims to be applied in the early stage of a chemical 
process design to choose a more resilient design among different alternatives. Resilience 
design index is not designed to be extremely accurate and can give an indication of the 
level of resilience. In Equation 2, there is an assumption of the independence of all sub-
factors of Design factor. 
4.2.2 Weighting factors 
To represent the relative importance between the sub-indices of the RI, weighting factors 
are introduced in Equation 2. To obtain the weight of each attribute, Analytical 
Hierarchical Process (AHP) can be used.34 The main uniqueness of AHP is its inherent 
capability of weighting a great number of different nature factors. Although the purpose 
of this section is to identify the weighting of a few sub-factors of resilience design 
factor, the use of AHP is deemed suitable when considering its potential application for 
the overall resilience factor in the future. It is a multi-attribute evaluation method that is 
capable to extract the comments of experts and uses them as input to calculate the 
quantified weight of each attribute by pair-wise comparison with a nine-point scale. The 
advantages of pair-wise comparison are (1) it is systematic; (2) the results contain a 
greater degree of robustness since each factor is addressed (n-1) times in a set containing 
n factors; and (3) there is a way for consistency control.35 
Using Saaty’s AHP technique, the following steps need to be done to obtain the 
weights of contribution factors in Equation 2 after the hierarchy has been structured in 
Figure 11.  
 Construct a pair-wise comparison matrix by asking the experts a series of 
questions (Table 2) to compare each element or sub-factor against one another based on 
a 9-point scale using pair-wise comparison method to indicate their relative importance. 
34 
 
 
The measure of intensity of importance is determined by a scale of 1 as ‘equal 
importance’ to 9 as ‘absolute importance’. The selection of a number is done in 
accordance with the respondent’s experienced opinion depending on the problem at hand 
(i.e. type of process); the purpose and criteria of the process designers; and the company 
policy.  
 
 
Table 2. Questionnaire used to direct pair-wise comparison judgments 
With respect to the overall goal “contribution to resilience of a chemical design”, 
compare each of the following pair of the factors, and mark the place along the 
segment 
Q1. How important is Inherent Safer Design when it is compared to Flexibility? 
 
 
Q2. How important is Inherent Safer Design when it is compared to Controllability? 
 
 
Q3. How important is Flexibility when it is compared to Controllability? 
 
 
 
 
 Calculate the eigenvector of the comparison matrix. An element of the 
eigenvector is as follows:   
 = 1 .  	∑ 	

	  
Eq. 3 
Where eij = element located in row i and column j of the comparison matrix, and ekj = 
element located in row k of any normalized column j (i, j, k = 1, 2…n) 
Inherent  
Safety Design Controllability 
1 3 5 7 9 
Inherent  
Safety Design Flexibility 
1 3 5 7 9 
Flexibility Controllability 
1 3 5 7 9 
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 Obtain relative weights of the factors in Equation 2 with regard to resilience of a 
design. According to Saaty, their weighting factors are the eigenvectors of their 
comparison matrix.34 Hence, ai  = wi 
 Calculate the consistency ratio (CR) to measure the consistency of pair-wise 
comparisons since the responders sometimes make judgments inconsistently and 
discrepancies might occur between the results of the comparison. The CR is obtained by 
the following equation: 
CR =  
Where RI is random consistency index provided by Saaty’s method 
 CI, consistency index, is identified by using the eigenvalue, λmax 
CI =  −  − 1  
 Where n is the matrix size 
The CR is acceptable, if it does not exceed 0.10. If it is more, the judgment matrix is 
inconsistent.  
In the case the comments of multiple experts are obtained, there are two different 
mechanisms to evaluate a single weight for each factor: (1) compute the mean weight for 
each factor; (2) compute the “mean” comparison matrix, then compute the weights using 
the routine AHP technique described above. The latter is preferred due to its priority to 
direct expert assessments rather than to inferential assessments, and therefore reflects the 
expert’s judgment more authenticable.35 
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CHAPTER V  
INHERENT SAFETY INDEX 
 
5.1 Inherent safety concept 
Inherent safety approach uses basic design measures to achieve hazard elimination, 
prevention, and reduction.36 A plant considered as an inherently safe plant if its material 
and operating condition is harmless or its hazardous materials is in small inventory to 
cause no harm if released.  
However, in the real industry, there always exists large inventory of hazardous 
materials under dangerous operating conditions. It is more practical to think of inherent 
safer processes instead of inherent safe processes. Inherent safer processes carry less 
inherent risk as compared to conventional process.36 
5.2 Literature review 
The most widely applicable principles of inherent safety are minimization, substitution, 
moderation, and simplification firstly introduced by Kletz.28 These principles are also 
applied for this work, to evaluate an inherent safer design and then inherent safer index.  
Due to the benefits of inherent safer design to remove or reduce hazards, there have 
been several researches in developing a systematic methodology for the evaluation of 
inherent safety index. Some of those methodologies was based on other well-known 
indices such as Dow Fire and Explosion Index, Mond Index and do not attempt the 
aggregation of individual indices under a unique index.37-39 Several researchers did 
attempt to obtain an overall index for inherent safety assessment. Lawrence proposed the 
overall inherent safety index for a chemical synthesis route in 1996.40 Then, the index 
for chemical route selection was extended and applied for more overall inherent safety 
index for process synthesis by Heikkila.41 Khan et al. proposed a risk-based approach for 
inherent safety evaluation in 1998.42 In 2003, Gentile et al. proposed the fuzzy-based 
inherent safety index, which used fuzzy logic system to evaluate inherent safety index 
based on if-then rules.43 In 2005, Khan and Amyotte36 developed an integrated inherent 
safety index which used a structured guideword based approach. Abedi and Shahriari44 
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added some missing important criteria and the consideration of the interactions between 
different factors more explicitly on the basis of Heikkila’s study and Dow F&EI in 2005.  
The methods for assessing inherent safety of chemical processes vary in goal, scope, 
structure and the way the safety aspects are considered. Since the desired results of 
inherent safety evaluation in this research is a unique index. The following paragraphs 
review in detail the advantages and disadvantages of the inherent safety evaluation 
methodologies with the attempts to obtain an overall inherent safety index.  
The first method, Dow F&EI, was designed for identifying of contributed equipment 
in an incident for process or plant involved in processing, and handling flammable 
chemicals. Then, the Mond Index method is a modification of the Dow F&EI method. 
The risks and hazards of a chemical plant can be identified well by the Dow and Mond 
F&EI methods, but the aspects relevant to inherent safety were not evaluated.44 
Lawrence’s method was designed for identifying and selecting inherent safety chemical 
synthesis route, which is very reaction oriented and does not consider properly the other 
parts of inherent safety process. To fill the gaps of Lawrence’s method, Heikkila et al. 
proposed a method which considered many other aspects relevant to inherent safety 
process. Heikkila’s method was intended for evaluating inherent safety index of different 
process alternatives. This method is quite suitable for the early design stage of the 
process with low information requirements and subjective process. Some of the 
subjective factors in Heikkila’s method were later improved by Fuzzy logic based index 
developed by Gentile et al. However, this method becomes difficult to apply for the 
problems involving the evaluation of more than one linguistic variable at the same 
time.44 The integrated inherent safety index by Khan and Amyotte was identified based 
on hazard potential identification as well as economic evaluation. 
After reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of different methodologies, 
Heikkila’s model41 was considered as a basis methodology to evaluate inherent safety 
index in this work since the scope of this work is the same to that of Heikkila (which for 
comparison of two or several alternative processes with low information requirements). 
Heikkila’s method was a development of several common indices such as Dow F&EI, 
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Mond index, Lawrence’s index and based on the principles of inherent safety as well as 
well-accepted engineering knowledge.  
Heikkila’s method41 for process synthesis is reviewed in details as follows. The 
method was proposed in 1996..The objective of this index development was to be 
applied during preliminary process design. Heikkila’s index consists of chemical and 
process inherent safety indices. The chemical safety index contains several sub-indices 
of chemical interaction, flammability, explosiveness, and corrosiveness. The process 
inherent safety index has two sub-indices, process conditions including inventory, 
process temperature, process pressure and process system including process equipment, 
process structure. All of the sub-factors in Heikkila’s study are carefully selected based 
on well-accepted engineering knowledge. 
For each one of the selected sub-factors, a possible range of variation is selected and 
divided into several sub-ranges that receive a score between zero and six. The scores 
represent the positive or negative contribution on the inherent safety level. The higher 
the score is, the more hazardous the situation is. 
5.3 Proposed approach 
Figure 12 shows the hierarchical model which is applied to calculate ISI in this work. 
The selection of sub-factors of inherent safety factor was based on the studies by 
Heikkila with the consideration of an additional important criteria, process complexity, 
and the interactions between different factors more explicitly pointed out by Abedi.44 
This model is constructed based on a multi-level, multi-attribute approach.  
As Heikkila’s methods, in this model, the inherent safety index is also splited into 
two sub-indices related to material and process. The material index includes the 
inventory hazard index which used to be a sub-factor of process index in Heikkila’s 
method. This modification is performed due to the consideration of the interaction 
between IMH and IIH suggested by Abedi in which the material hazard index is 
compounded by the magnitude of the inventory index.44 The process index includes all 
the selected sub-factors in Heikkila’s method with the addition of the complexity index 
involving amount of equipment, number of DOFs, interactions requiring operator 
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invention and number of external disturbances. This complexity index is chosen based 
on the last principles of inherent safety, simplication, and was also suggested as one of 
inherent safety attributes by Abedi and Shsriari.44 The detail of this index will be 
discussed more in Section 5.4.2.  
 
 
 
Figure 12. Hierarchical model of Inherent Safety sub-index44 
 
 
 
With this evaluation model and its selected sub-factors, four widely inherent safety 
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material present in the process has covered the first principle of minimization. If there is 
a fire, explosion, or tank rupture, small inventories are favorable. The sub-factor of 
material hazard including flammability, explosiveness, toxicity, corrosiveness and 
reactivity places an important role to fulfill the second principle, substitution. An 
inherent safer process or more resilient process is a process with less hazardous 
materials. The sub-factors of process condition and process reaction demonstrate the 
third inherent safety principle, moderation. The process condition including process 
temperature and pressure covers the fact that an inherent safer process carries out a 
reaction under less hazardous conditions, or storing or transporting a hazardous material 
in a less hazardous form. The process reaction demonstrates the hazard of the heat 
released by the reaction between materials existing in the process as well as their 
reactivity characteristics which are another moderation concern. An inherent safer 
process carries out a reaction with less heat released. The last principle is simplification. 
The important criterion is the level of complexity of a unit in a chemical process plant. 
When it is not possible to make plants safer by minimization, substitution, 
moderation, or simplification, there is a need to measure the possibility that a piece of 
equipment is unsafe which is demonstrated by process equipment sub-factor in Figure 
12. The selection of safer equipment alternatives is preferred since the type of equipment 
used in a process has an important role for the process safety. This sub-factor considers 
the safety of all major pieces of equipment such as pump and vessels etc. but not piping, 
valves as separate entities, and without interactions through the process with other 
equipment. The effects of those interactions to the safety of the process are reflected 
through the process structure and process complexity sub-factors. The process structure 
describes the inherent safety of the process configuration; in the other words, it describes 
how well certain unit operations and other process items work together in a total process 
perspective.41 The complexity factor describes how easy the process can be operated 
from human interaction perspective, and from the equipment / system and their 
interactions. Numbers of components (i.e. equipment), number of input and output 
streams, number of interaction, and number of external disturbances have been 
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considered in the complexity factor. From an operational perspective, other issues such 
as the degree of freedom (DOFs), the number of measurement readings are also assessed 
in the process complexity. It is understood that the operation is less complex when less 
degrees of freedom are available for the operator.45 
Since the scope of the quantitative section to obtain resilience index as well as 
inherent safety index is for different alternative process designs, the other issues such as 
process layout, onsite transportation are not considered in the calculation of inherent 
safety index in this work. 
The advantages of this method are well coverage of the risks and hazards as well as 
the aspects relevant to inherent safety existing on a chemical process, low information 
requirement which are suitable in the design stage.  
5.4 Inherent safety index and sub-indices assessment 
The IIS calculations are made on the basis of the worst situation. The approach of the 
worst case describes the most risky situation that can occur. A low index value 
represents an inherently safer process. In the calculations, the greatest sum of the 
flammability, explosiveness and toxic exposure sub-indices are used. For inventory, 
process temperature and pressure, the maximum expected values are used. The worst 
possible interaction between chemical substances or pieces of equipment and the worst 
process structure gives the values of these sub-indices. 
In general, the Inherent Safety index (IIS) is calculated by Equation 4, where the 
Total Inherent Safety index is the sum of the Material Index (IM) and the Process Index 
(IP). 
IIS = IM + IP Eq. 4 
These two indices are calculated for each design alternative and the results can be 
used to compare with each other if desired. The methodology to obtain each sub-index 
value is described in the ensuing sections in detail.  
 
Table 3. Inherent safety sub-indices and their score range.41 
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Sub-factors Symbol Score 
Flammability IFL 0-4 
Explosiveness IEX 0-4 
Toxicity ITOX 0-6 
Corrosiveness ICOR 0-2 
Inventory IIH 0-5 
Heat of main reaction IHMR 0-4 
Heat of side reaction IHSR 0-4 
Chemical interaction IINT 0-4 
Process temperature IT 0-4 
Process pressure IPR 0-4 
Process equipment IPE 0-4 
Process structure IPS 0-5 
Process complexity ICOX 0-5 
 
 
Another issue of multi-factor approach is the weighting between sub-indices of 
inherent safety index. In Heikkila’s method, the importance of the specific sub-index 
was reflected by the score ranges which were made on the basis of the expert judgment 
collected by Lawrence.40 And in this work, the scoring systems for calculating all 
inherent safety sub-indices (Table 3) are taken from Heikkila’s study.41 That means the 
weighting factors have been considered and integrated into the current work to calculate 
inherent safety index by using the scoring systems suggested by Heikkila. Basically, the   
minimum score for each sub-factor is set to zero, while the maximum scores are set in 
order to reflect the importance of the specific sub-index to the process safety. A wider 
range means greater impact for the overall safety evaluation. The most important factor 
on inherent safety are inventory and toxicity with the greatest score range. The one has 
lowest impact to inherent safety is corrosiveness with the score range of 0-2. The most 
other sub-indices had the score range of 0-4. The process structure is also considered as 
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an important factor with the maximum score of 5. The process complexity is a new 
factor which has not been introduced in Heikkila’s method. This factor demonstrates 
how the process’s is constituted and operated easily from the interactions of other 
process equipment together and from operational perspective. The number of potential 
errors increases when the number of connections increases.45 The importance of the 
process complexity is considered to be the same as the process structure resulting in its 
score range of 0-5. 
5.4.1 Material index 
The material index is based on the material, inventory, and reaction hazard indices in 
which the material hazard index is compounded by the magnitude of the inventory. 
Therefore, IM is calculated as the addition of reaction hazard index and the product of 
material hazard index and inventory hazard index (Equation 5).44 
IM = IMH · IIH + IRH Eq. 5 
5.4.1.1 Material hazard index 
The Material Hazard Index is the greatest sum of flammability, explosiveness, toxic 
exposure, and corrosiveness sub-indices.41 
IMH = (IFL + IEX + ITOX) max + ICOR, max Eq. 6 
The flammability index is identified based on the value of the flash point and the 
sub-ranges from nonflammable up to very flammable (i.e., flash point < 0oC and boiling 
point ≤ 35oC) 
The Explosiveness index is determined based on the difference between the upper 
and lower flammability limits and the sub-ranges from non-explosive up to the 
difference of UEL and LEL of 70-100vol%.  
The toxicity index is evaluated based on the Threshold Limit Values (TLV) and the 
sub-ranges between lowest toxicity (TLV >10000 ppm) up to really toxicity (TLV ≤ 0.1 
ppm).  
The corrosiveness index is found out on the basis of the required construction 
material. The lowest score of ICOR is for carbon steel, and the highest one is for needed 
material better than stainless steel. 
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5.4.1.2 Inventory hazard index 
The score for the evaluation of inventory index is based on the sub-ranges of process 
vessels from volumes between 0-1 ton up to volumes larger than 1,000 ton. The mass 
flows and residence time in the process are used to estimate the inventory of each design 
alternative.41  
5.4.1.3 Process reaction index 
It is important to know how exothermic the reaction is. Hence, the process reaction 
index consists of both the maximum values of indices for the heat of the main and side 
reactions, and the maximum value of chemical interactions, which describes the 
unintended reactions between chemical substances present in the process area studied  
IRH = IHMR, max + IHSR, max + IINT, max Eq. 7 
The values of indices for the heat of main and side reactions are assigned based on 
the heat of reaction and its sub-ranges from endothermic or thermally neutral reactions 
with heat of reaction ≤ 200 J/g up to extremely exothermic reactions with heat 
generation ≥ 3,000 J/g. If there are several main reactions (in a series reaction) or side 
reaction, these indices is determined on the basis of the greatest heat release.41 
The interaction hazard index evaluated the hazard associated with the consequences 
of chemical incompatibility among chemical substances. It is assumed that fire and 
explosions are most hazardous consequences of an interaction with the score 4.  
5.4.2 Process index 
5.4.2.1 Process condition index 
The process condition index is the sum of process temperature and pressure sub-
indices.41  
IPC = (IT + IPR) max Eq. 8 
The process temperature index is identified based on the maximum temperature in 
the process area under investigation and the sub-ranges from the harmless range to 
people of 0-70 oC up to the range of larger than 600 oC. The temperatures below 0oC are 
also considered as a hazard with the assigned IT of 1 due to mechanical problems and 
freezing.   
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The process pressure index is determined based on the maximum pressure in the 
process area under normal operation and the sub-ranges from the lowest range of 0.5-5 
bar for the score of 0 up to 200-1000 bar for the score of 4.   
5.4.2.2 Process equipment index 
This index is assigned based on the score system developed from engineering practice 
and recommendations on layout recommendations, and quantitative accident and failure 
data by Heikkila. Furnaces and fired heaters which have the highest impact to safety of 
the process receive the score of 4, while the equipment that handle nontoxic and 
nonflammable chemicals receive the score of 0. The process equipment index is 
determined on the basis of worst case of different equipment in the process under 
investigation.41 
5.4.2.3 Process structure index 
The process structure index is evaluated based on the scoring system involving incident 
reports and database, sound engineering practice, accepted engineering standards as well 
as expert knowledge suggested by Heikkila. Basically, this sub-factor falls into one of 
six following groups of equipment and systems. The first group for process and 
equipment solutions recommended by safety standards has the score of 0. Process cases 
selected with basis in sound engineering practice and known reliable are in the second 
group with the score of 1. The third group for the process cases that lacks information 
regarding hazardous operation receives the score of 2. The fourth group receives the 
score of 3 and is for the configurations which are probably questionable on the basis of 
safety even accidents have not occurs yet. The fifth and sixth groups are for the process 
cases with documented minor or major incident respectively.41  
While the scoring system is ready, the problem is to identify which group the 
investigation process belongs. With no explicit way, one has to depend on experience 
based data such as incident reports and databases, engineering standards and practice. 
And when problem solving is based on experience which is difficult to define as explicit 
rule, it is possible to apply case-based reasoning (CBR). CBR is a methodology which 
uses directly solutions of old problems to solve new problems.  
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Using this CBR approach, incident reports and databases are analyzed, the process 
cases which are similar to the investigation process in any levels (process, sub-process, 
system, subsystem, equipment, and detail) are retrieved and serve as case-bases to 
compare with the investigation process. Input data using retrieval parameters such as raw 
material, product, reaction type etc. 
The process structure index is determined on the basis of worst case of different 
levels of reasoning.  
5.4.2.4 Process complexity index 
While the process structure index demonstrates which process configurations and 
operations are safe from system engineering point of view on the basis of experience 
based data such as incident reports and databases, engineering standards and practice, 
the process complexity index describes how easy process items work together, how they 
should be connected and controlled together from an operational perspective on the basis 
of process characteristic itself. All the interconnections among different equipment, a 
source for disturbance and interaction, are added to the process complexity. The process 
structure and complexity index seem overlapped, but actually they are different. The 
latter one helps to evaluate new process which does not has experience based data and 
therefore could not evaluate in the process structure index.  
A system is complex when it has many interacting elements of a variety of kinds, in 
such a way that no evidence can be found of the characteristics of single elements in the 
overall result.46 The number of components in the technical system,  number of 
connections between the components of the system, number of common modes,  and 
type of component and the connections can affect the process complexity level.46 For a 
design or unit in a chemical process, the amount of equipment is an important factor 
indicating the level of complexity in a system. The number of input and output streams 
becomes important when the interaction of different equipment is assessed. Fewer 
degrees of freedom (DOFs) result in more simplified operation, which in practice is 
realized by the introduction of automation (less opportunity for human error).45 
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To evaluate the complexity of a chemical process, Koolen45 has suggested a 
complexity value as a function of complexity factors including amount of equipment 
accessible by the operator (M), number of degrees of freedom (DOFs) (S), number of 
measurement readings (O), number of input and output streams including energy streams 
(P), interactions in the process requiring operator intervention (Q), and number of 
external disturbances (for the unit) requiring action from an operator (R). A summation 
of complexity factors with their weighting factors obtains the following formula:  
Complexity value (COX)= m·M+ s·S + o·O + p·P + q·Q + r·R Eq. 9 
where m, s, o, p, q, r are the weighting factors per item. 
Equation 9 is simplified by using 1 as the weighting factor for all terms in this work. 
Thus, the complexity value is now calculated by the following equation:  
Complexity value (COX) = M+ S + O + P + Q + R Eq. 10 
Finally, to obtain a complexity index from the complexity value, a scoring method is 
proposed in this work. This method requires at least two processes for the inherent safety 
or resilience evaluations. Due to the score range of the process complexity index of 0 to 
5 (lower is better), the highest complexity index which is a value of 5 is assigned to the 
highest complexity value. Then, the process complexity index is determined based on 
the scoring system in Table 4. 
After all sub-indices have been identified, the inherent safety index (IIS) can be 
obtained by Equation 4. Then, the inherent safety index of the process k is normalized 
for resilience evaluation as: 
 =  () ∙ 10114  Eq. 11 
The factor 10 is involved to normalize the index range from 0 to 10 so that it is 
evaluated at the same scale to the other factors. The factor 114 is appeared in the 
normalized equation since it is the maximum value of IIS which is corresponding to the 
score of 10. 
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Table 4. Determination of the process complexity index ICOX 
Process complexity value (COX) Score of ICOX 
1 − #$%&'()* + 0 
,-.6 0 − ,-.3 0 1 
,-.3 0 − ,-.2 0 2 
,-.2 0 − ,2 -.3 0 3 
,2 -.3 0 − ,5 -.6 0 4 
,5 -.6 0 − (-.) 5 
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CHAPTER VI  
CONTROLLABILITY INDEX 
In this chapter, an approach to controllability assessment is developed, based on well-
established theory of process control. Under impacts of disturbance, it is desired to 
bounce back the changes by keeping operating conditions at the previous state or at a 
new steady state. The controllability index measures the ability of the process to obtain 
desired operating conditions using control systems. 
6.1 Controllability concept 
Process control has been developed to become an indispensable part of process operation 
for a long time. Some plants have better “built-in” disturbance rejection capabilities than 
others, that is, their controllability with respect to disturbance rejection is better. 
There have been two research areas of controllability: steady–state and dynamic 
control. This work of resilient evaluation is based on steady-state controllability concept. 
Controllability is referred to as an ability of a chemical process to achieve acceptable 
control performance in which the controlled variables (outputs) can steadily reach target 
values by manipulating other variables when disturbance (inputs) occurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Controllability concept 
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Figure 13 depicts those changes to demonstrate the controllability concept. Suppose 
impacts results in unexpected input deviates from set point with respect to time, 
operators are allowed to tune controllers to cope with the input changes. In general, both 
the inputs and outputs are objects of the control systems such as temperature, pressure, 
and flowrate of process and utility streams. If the outputs can be easily controlled to 
reach target points, the process controllability is considered high (i.e., good). Although 
time t involves, the controllability in this work considers how easy the outputs can be 
steady at desired targets (steady-state control), rather than investigate how long the 
transition can be done (dynamic-control). 
In literature of process system engineering, various controllability definitions and 
expressions have been suggested. For example, some of them are: 
 Controllability was defined as an ability of the process to achieve and maintain 
the desired equilibrium values by Ziegler and Nichols  in the 1940’s.47 
 Controllability was referred to as “state controllability” to address the capability 
of a system changing from a given initial state to an arbitrary final state within 
finite time by Kalman in the 1960’s.26 
 A more general definition of controllability as the possibility of a system to 
achieve the specified aims of control was introduced by Rosenbrock in1970.25In 
the other words, the system is more or less controllable according to the ease or 
difficulty of exerting control. 
 Controllability also introduced under the term dynamic resilience to address the 
input-output controllability of the process without any confusion with state 
controllability.9 A drawback with the name “dynamic resilience” is that it does 
not reflect its relation to control.48 
 Controllability was mentioned as “input-output controllability” to address the 
ability to achieve acceptable control performance in which the controlled outputs 
and manipulated inputs are kept within specified bounds from their setpoints 
under any uncertainties by Skogestad and Postlethwaite. 26 
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Compared to those definitions, controllability concept in this work is similar to some 
extents. However, the purpose of evaluating controllability for resilience assessment in 
this work is unique. 
6.2 Literature review 
Controllability analysis plays an important role in integrated approaches to design and 
control dynamical systems.49 There are two types of controllability evaluation methods. 
One type is based upon linear model analysis, whereas another type needs physical 
chemical insights and thus provides nonlinear information. To evaluate the 
controllability in process design stage, a common controllability analysis is based on 
steady-state consideration or linear model analysis.  By steady-state consideration, one 
can cut through to the essence of some very complex problems and solve them in a 
simple and straightforward manner. The possibility of this method in assessing how easy 
a plant is controlled has been proved in some research.8,26,50,51 
There exist several available tools for evaluating linear controllability, including 
right half plane (RHP)-zeros and time delays, RHP-poles, partial disturbance sensitivity, 
relative order and phase lag, disturbance sensitivity, relative gain array, singular value 
analysis and condition number. A review of those tools was done by Wolff et al.8 Morari 
and coworkers made significant contribution to this research area with the following 
work: the effect of RHP zeros on dynamic resilience,52,53 the effect of dead time on 
dynamic resilience,54 the effect of model uncertainty on dynamic resilience,55 and the 
relations of pole direction to state controllability.  
In this section, the review is focused on theories of some methods for evaluating 
controllability including relative gain array (RGA), singular value analysis, and 
condition number. These methods are commonly used tools in controllability analysis 
and are the basis of the proposed approach in this work. 
6.2.1 Relative gain array analysis 
Control systems are preferably designed in pairs of controlled variables and manipulated 
variable either in feed-back or feed-forward configurations such that those pairs are 
independent and the relationship of each pair is as less nonlinear as possible. However, 
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the interaction between them is unavoidable because of dependency characteristics of 
process flows. The interaction levels relate to how easy the process is controlled. 
Therefore, interaction analysis is an important way to perform control analysis. 
Among available techniques, Relative Gain Array (RGA) is well developed for 
interaction analysis. It requires little effort in its application but can yield a great deal of 
very useful and practical information.50 The relative gain which was first introduced by 
Bristol56 is one of the most widespread techniques to appear in the process control 
literature.50 One important advantage of the RGA is that it is independent of input and 
output scaling.27,57 
Bristol’s relative gain is a systematic approach to the analysis of multivariable 
process control problems. Consider a process of multivariable control systems with n 
manipulated variables (inputs) and n controlled variables (outputs). The ijth element of 
RGA is defined as the ratio of the open loop gain from input j to output i when all other 
loops are open and the closed loop gain from input j to output i when all other loops are 
perfectly controlled.27,50,58 
The numerator is a partial derivative with all the manipulated variables held constant 
except xj. The denominator is evaluated with all of the control variables held constant 
except yi. The values of λij provides two important pieces of information:58 
 A measure of process interactions. 
 A selection criteria for the most effective pairing of controlled and manipulated 
variables. 
Based on the equation above, relative gain elements ( ijλ )can be quantified by 
calculating all the partial derivatives for all possible pairings. However, a more 
convenient way is to derive from evaluation of process open-loop gain matrix K which is 
defined as 
( )
( ) )(
)(
loopclosedgain
loopopengain
xy
xy
yji
xji
ij
−
−
=
∂∂
∂∂
=λ  Eq. 12 
y = K · x Eq. 13 
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It was proved that RGA element (λij) is equal to multiplication of the open-loop gain 
matrix element (Kij) and the corresponding element 4	56 of the inverse transpose matrix 
of the gain matrix.56 
To calculate Kij, Nisenfeld and Schultz59 proposed an approach based on on-line test. 
Measurement is performed with an assumption that perfect steady-state operation is 
achieved. Only one controlled variable yi of loop i is allowed to change at a time by 
manipulating all variables xj. This measurement is repeated for every loop i. Then the 
gain matrix can be calculated from this relationship: 
Another way is to employ a simulation model. For a multivariable process, a step 
change (∆xj) is set for the input while holding all other input j' ≠ j constant. The resulting 
changes in the controlled variables (∆yi) are recorded. From this information the gain 
matrix element Kij can be obtained by the formula:26 
The latter approach can be performed at design stage using simulation model of the 
design while the former operation of existing plant. For this reason, the proposed 
approach will use the idea of the latter one. 
The overall recommendation from RGA analysis is to pair the controlled and 
manipulated variables so that corresponding relative gains are positive and as close to 
one as possible. From the RGA analysis, a decision in pairing the controlled and 
manipulated variables can be made. Particularly, RGA values can fall into five following 
ranges: 
 	 = 1.The closed-loop and open-loop gains between yi and xj are identical. So, 
yi and xj should be paired. 
 	 = 0. It indicates that xj has no effect on yi and they need not be paired. 
	 = 4	 ∙ 4	56 Eq. 14 
4	5 =  7∆9∆:	;<5=> ?>@? 
Eq. 15 
4	 =  7∆9∆:	;@A=?< 
Eq. 16 
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 0 < 	 < 1. The closed-loop gain is larger than the open-loop gain. Within this 
range, the interaction between the two loops is greater when 	 = 0.5. 
 	 > 1. The pairings with positive RGA-values and closer to one are favorable. 
Plants with large RGA-values are difficult to control.8 
 	 < 0. This is a case in which the open-loop and closed-loop gains between yi 
and xj have opposite signs. The closed-loop system may become unstable. Hence, 
yi and xj should not be paired 
For the evaluation of resilience, there is a need to represent the controllability in one 
scalar. Hence, condition number which can be derived from K will be used. The 
condition number is calculated via ensuing singular value analysis (SVA). 
6.2.2 Singular value analysis 
One important property of process gain matrix K is its singular values which are 
nonnegative numbers. SVA can be used to analyze the robustness of a control system 
and to determine the best multi-loop control configuration.26 A procedure to calculate 
SVA of the gain matrix K is as follows. 
Consider a process model:  y = K · x 
Singular values of K are the positive square roots of the eigenvalues of the matrix 
product K TK. To determine the singular values, K matrix is decomposed.58 
K = W ∑ V T 
where W and V are unitary matrices: WW T = I; and VV T = I 
          ∑ is the diagonal matrix of singular values;  
 
 ∑  =  DE 00 0F       where 
 
         σ1, σ2… σr are called the singular values of K 
Nowadays, using computer software such as MATLAB, singular values of K can be 
easily computed. The meaning of singular value comes from its condition number which 
is discussed in the next section. 
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6.2.3 Condition numbers 
Condition number of a matrix provides information on sensitivity of the matrix 
properties to the changes of its element values. Condition number is therefore a measure 
of interaction analysis.26 To be able to evaluate controllability in one single number as 
early as in design stage, condition number is definitely a suitable measure. 
The condition number is determined from the singular values decomposition of the 
steady – state gain matrix which is the ratio of the largest and smallest nonzero singular 
values:27,58 
G =  HHI Eq. 17 
where σ1 is the largest and σr is the smallest singular values 
One disadvantage of the condition number (as well as SVA) derived from gain 
matrix is that it dependent of input and output scaling. It is essential to eliminate this 
dependency when it comes to evaluate and compare resilience of more than one process. 
From condition number the controllability of the system is evaluated on how well 
controllable the system is. A system with a small condition number will be more 
controllable than a system with a higher condition number. A large condition number 
indicates an ill-conditioned plant which is believed to be too sensitive to disturbance. 
Plants with a larger condition number are more likely to be more sensitive to 
disturbances, and this result in a poorer resilience performance.51 
6.3 Problem statement 
Given process designs with simplified control systems, it is desired to develop an index 
that can indicate how effective the control is. This index is called controllability index of 
the resilience evaluation. 
Because the evaluation is preferred at design stage and there is no plant available for 
testing, simulation software is an integral tool. However, it does not mean the approach 
is not applicable during operation stage where more information about the process is 
available. 
For the purpose of resilience comparison, the controllability index must be 
independent on scaling or unit of measurement. In addition, it can be normalized to a 
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scale that is equal to other Design sub-factors (Inherent Safety and Flexibility) to 
calculate the Resilience index. 
6.4 Proposed approach 
In this section, an approach is developed to address the controllability aspect for the 
resilience evaluation of the plant. The reviewed process control theories are the basis to 
develop an index for quantifying how good the control performance is to bounce back 
effect of disturbances on operating conditions. The key of the proposed approach is to 
combine advantage of scaling independence found in relative gain array and the 
convenient simplification of the condition number. It is important that these tools are 
also independent of the controller in order to reflect the control performance limitations 
of the plant. 
6.4.1 Controllability evaluation 
Although there exist several available tools for evaluating linear controllability8, new 
approach to assess controllability needs to be developed in this work based on two 
reasons. First, controllability index is parameter scalar, which is satisfied using condition 
number. Second, it is crucial that the variables of being scaling-independent to make the 
comparison in controllable aspects of different alternatives. RGA with its main 
application of best pairing controlled variables with manipulated variables is 
independent with scale; but it does not meet the first criterion. On the other hand, the 
condition number which derived from gain matrix and its singular values satisfy the first 
criterion only. 
The proposed methodology is structured around a newly define term relative gain 
matrix, different from relative gain array and gain matrix to describe the relationship 
between input and output change. Next, a procedure called Singular Value Analysis is 
applied to determine minimum singular value, maximum singular value. Then, a 
measure of controllability called Condition Number (CN) is obtained for each design. 
Condition numbers indicate more-resilient design in terms of controllability among 
alternatives. 
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6.4.1.1 Definition of proposed relative gain matrix 
To avoid the scaling dependence, the controlled variables and manipulated variables are 
given in dimensionless form  
J = 9 − 9,L9,L  
.	 = :	 − :	,L:	,L  
Eq. 18 
 
Where xj,0 is the steady-state or optimized values of the manipulated variable xj 
     yi,0 is the steady-state or optimized values of the controlled variable yi 
     xj is the changed/ new values of the manipulated variable xj 
     yi is the values of the controlled variable yi with respect to xi obtained while 
holding all other manipulated constant. 
Assume one is dealing with a process with a (multivariable) n-loop control system. 
The input-output relation to address the effect of relative change in manipulated 
variables on relative change of controlled variables can be expressed as 
Y = K·X Eq. 19 
Where Y is an n-element vector of relative change of controlled variables, X is an n-
element vector of relative change of manipulated variables 
M =  
NO
OO
PJJQJR…JTU
UU
V
 ,  W =  
NO
OO
P..Q.R….TU
UU
V
 
K is the n × n relative gain matrix (not relative gain array – RGA – which is 
commonly found in the literature) to address the gain between relative values of Y and X 
X = Y4 ⋯ 4⋮ ⋱ ⋮4 ⋯ 4]]^ 
6.4.1.2 Determination of relative gain matrix K 
The simulation approach is employed to calculate matrix K. A steady-state model needs 
to be built in simulation software (e.g., Aspen Plus). The simulation model considers all 
mass and energy balances. In the simulation, unit specifications are set up in such a way 
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that control loop is opened. For example, in a heat exchanger heat duty is specified 
instead of process stream outlet temperature. With this way, the outlet temperature is 
calculated accordingly whenever the inlet temperature changes, due to interaction. This 
steady-state scenario is referred to as a base case (Xi0; Yi0).  
Suppose the control loops are paired so that controlled variable Yi is primarily 
controlled with manipulated variable Xj. A step change of only manipulated variable Xj is 
made for loop j while all other manipulated variables are kept constant. The values of 
controlled variables are calculated and recorded from the simulation results. For this 
scenario, the measure is obtained as follows: 
M =  
NO
OO
OO
PΔJΔJQΔJR ⋮ ΔJTU
UU
UU
V
 ,  W =  
NO
OO
OO
P 00⋮∆.	⋮00 TU
UU
UU
V
 
Because Y = K · X, a column of the matrix K is calculated: 
NO
OO
OO
OPΔJ/∆.	ΔJQ/∆.	ΔJR/∆.	
⋮
ΔJ/∆&a TU
UU
UU
UV
=
NO
OO
OO
OP4	4Q	4R	
⋮
4	TU
UU
UU
UV
 
The step changes are repeated for every loop j, then the whole matrix K is derived: 
4	 = ∆J∆.	 
If step changes are performed with various levels (e.g., ±0.1%; ±0.2%; ±0.5%…), 
then sensitivity of controllability measure to disturbance impact can be obtained. 
The proposed measure has several important properties: 
 Relative gain matrix takes into account of the interaction of multivariable in 
control system 
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 Relative gain matrix is dimensionless and thus not affected by choice of units or 
scaling of variables 
 Relative gain matrix can be easily and straightforward calculated using 
simulation sensitivity analysis tool. Thus, it requires little effort in its application 
and can yield a great deal of very useful, practical information. Other interaction 
methods require detailed, dynamic models which in turn require a large effort 
6.4.2 Controllability index evaluation algorithm 
This work evaluates steady-state controllability via an analysis of the relative gain 
matrix.  The proposed steps to calculate the controllability index are described in Figure 
14. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Algorithm to assess the controllability index 
 
 
Simulation of  base cases
Disturbance analysis (sensitivity analysis)
Calculation of relative gain matrix K
Calculation of singular value of the relative gain matrix
Calculation of condition number of the relative gain matrix
Calculation of controllability index
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First, the calculation procedure starts with the simulation of base cases in a process 
simulator (e.g. Aspen Plus, Pro/II, Hysis, etc.). From the simulation, mass balance, 
energy balance, and operating conditions (temperature, pressure, flow rate, 
concentration) are determined. Optimization has been performed to minimize or 
maximize the objective function (e.g. cost) subject to a number of restrictions (called 
constraint) when needed. Then, the “best” scenario with (Yi0; Xjo) from among the set of 
candidate solutions is assigned the base case. 
Second, sensitivity analysis tool of the software is used to simulate interaction by 
changing the values of one manipulated variable (Xj) at a time in small ranges and 
recording the values of other variables (Yi). Only variables of the evaluated control 
systems (including controlled variables and manipulated variables) need to be tracked. 
Third, relative gain matrices K of the control systems are obtained from the 
sensitivity analysis by the following expression. 
4	 =  (J − JL)/JL(.	 − .	L)/.	< Eq. 20 
 
where Kij = element of the ith row and the jth column of the matrix, or the ratio of the 
relative change of controlled variable i to that of manipulated variable j. 
 Yi, Yi0 are dimensionless controlled variables   
 Xj, Xj0 are dimensionless manipulated variables. 
The gain matrix indicated the interaction of the control loops. In this research, 
multivariable control systems are analyzed at a plant-wide level (i.e. not limited to every 
equipment boundary). However, not all of the control loops are analyzed. Pairs of 
controlled and manipulated variables that have a fast response were neglected to 
simplify the interaction analysis. The exclusion of such control loops does not affect the 
conclusion of the controllability evaluation.50 In the simulation, the fast-response control 
loops are closed loops and excluded from the controllability analysis while the others 
involved in the relative gain matrix calculation are open loops. 
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Fourth, singular values of the gain matrix are calculated. For practical cases with a 
large number of controlled and manipulated variables, numerical computing software 
(e.g. MATLAB, Maple) can be used for the quick and accurate calculation.  
Next, the condition number of the gain matrix is derived from the maximum and 
minimum of the found singular values using the definition:  
G = bc:defe Edgfhci jchfbddefe Edgfhci jchf  Eq. 21 
Finally, to obtain a controllability index from the condition numbers, a novel scoring 
method is proposed in this work. This method requires at least two processes from the 
resilience evaluations or a standard condition number of a known process for 
comparison. The controllability index, on a scale of 0 to 10 (lower is better), assigned 
the averaged value of the condition numbers CN a value of 5. Considering N condition 
numbers from N processes, the averaged condition number is defined as: 
G = ∑ G]G  Eq. 22 
where CNk is the condition number of process k  
A system with a smaller condition number is considered more controllable and 
therefore more resilient. Using a linear scale, the scoring of the controllability index (IC) 
of process k is defined as: 
(k) = l10 7 G2 ∙ G;              mni G ≤ 2G10                               mni G > 2Gp 
Eq. 23 
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CHAPTER VII  
FLEXIBILITY INDEX 
In this chapter, an approach is developed to measure the ability of a process to 
accommodate impacts. In other words, this chapter evaluates the ability to bounce back 
and keep production online under operation disturbance. 
7.1 Flexibility concept 
There are several different viewpoints of flexibility definitions in different problems 
(e.g., dynamics, steady state, uncertainty design). In this work of resilient evaluation, 
flexibility is referred to as an ability of a chemical plant to satisfy all performance 
specifications and safety criteria while unwelcomed variations of operations occurs due 
to external impacts. The performance specifications are, for example, product 
concentration, production rate, temperature and pressure of output streams. Safety 
criteria are requirements to avoid hazards of equipment failure; for example, operating 
conditions must not exceed design temperature and pressure to avoid mechanical failure 
(crack, leak, and rupture) and potential run-away reactions.  
Figure 15 demonstrates the flexibility concept. Suppose impacts results in input 
changes to a process within a defined range, operators are allowed to tune controllers to 
cope with the input changes. Inputs can be temperature, pressure, flowrate of certain 
process streams and/or utility streams. The outputs are the performance specifications 
and safety criteria. If the output variation stays in desired ranges, the process is 
considered flexible.  
In process system engineering, flexibility has been usually arisen in context of 
process design with uncertainty. For example, some of the flexibility definitions are: 
 Flexibility is an ability of a design to operate at a wide range of operating 
conditions and parameter variations while satisfying product quality and 
quantity.5 
 Flexibility of chemical plants is an ability to achieve feasible operation over a 
given range of uncertain variations of external and internal parameters.60 
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Figure 15. Flexibility concept 
 
 
Compared to the definitions of those pioneers, flexibility concept in this work has 
implementation. This work is oriented to process safety. It additionally investigates the 
ability of the process to operate under impacts of safety-related issues such as leak, spill, 
and rupture which may result in loss of stream or utility flow rates. Those types of 
impacts have never been mentioned in literature. Pistikopoulos61 categorized impacts (in 
term of uncertainty sources) into four types: model-inherent, process-inherent, external, 
and discrete uncertainties. The safety-related impacts do not perfectly fall into any of 
those categories; therefore, they can be referred to as another category. 
7.2 Literature review 
Flexibility levels of a process design have been quantified in a scalar called 
flexibility index. There are many definitions and determination methods for flexibility 
index. The three approaches of Morari and Grossmann’s groups are systematic and 
commonly cited on the literature. They are best described in graphs of impact 
(uncertainty) space. 
Morari5 proposed an index to evaluate flexibility of design of heat exchanger 
networks. The author defined resilient processes as those which satisfy all physical 
constraints (nonnegative exchanger loads) and performance specifications (target T, P, 
product specifications, etc.) for every value of the uncertain variables in the uncertain 
range despite undesired changes to the process (e.g. environmental disturbances in 
supply temperatures, fouling of heat transfer surfaces). Although the author used the 
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term “resilience,” that work was actually referred to flexibility aspect. Developed from 
this definition, the index was characterized in some sense of the largest disturbance that 
the network can tolerate without becoming infeasible. In the space of impact variables 
(θ) in Figure 16, the round envelop is an actual flexibility region that cannot be 
determined explicitly. Inside this envelops, all physical constraints and specifications are 
satisfied. The rectangles are varying ranges of the impacts. The flexibility index is 
characterized as the largest rectangle inside the flexibility region. It is a function of the 
distance S between vertex of rectangle and boundary of the region.6 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Flexibility index of Saboo and Morari6 
 
 
As for the second approach, Swaney and Grossmann62 scaled down the investigated 
rectangle range of impact variables (the largest rectangle in Figure 17) until it inscribes 
the flexibility region and at least one of the vertices lies on the flexibility boundary (the 
smaller rectangle in Figure 17). The scaling is based on a fixed nominal point (A) which 
usually corresponds to a base-case operating condition. The flexibility index was defined 
as a ratio between the sides of inscribing rectangle and original rectangle, i.e., the ratio 
of AB/AC. This approach is the basis for the method developed in this work.   
S 
θ1 
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In the two previous approaches, the values of impact variables must be given in 
continuous ranges. If they are described in discrete sets, stochastic flexibility index is 
more suitable for those cases. Stochastic flexibility was defined as the probability that 
operation is feasible.63 It was quantified by a ratio between the areas of flexibility part 
(the shaded area in Figure 18) and the rectangle of investigated region of impact variable 
values. The rectangle is derived from the upper and lower bounds of the impact values. 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Flexibility index of Swaney and Grossmann62 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Stochastic flexibility index64 
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Although their methods are systematic approaches, there are still some limitations. 
They are practically good for a small part of a chemical process (e.g., heat exchanger 
network, reactor unit) but not a whole plant because of the requirement of all process-
modeling equations and the increasing computing costs exponentially with number of 
external impacts. Also, safety related issues were out of their scopes.  
Therefore, a new method is needed for the resilience evaluation problem that 
involves the whole process with a large number of physical constraints. In this research, 
a new approach is proposed to develop based on the integration work of Grossmann with 
a powerful aid of process simulator software (e.g., Aspen Plus). 
7.3 Problem statement 
In a design stage of a process, design parameters such as equipment sizes and process 
structure are to be determined. In a follow-up operation stage, those design parameters 
are not changed (unless the process is retrofitted) because the process is already built. 
Only control parameters such as stream flow rates, temperature, and pressure are 
allowed to change to achieve production objective. The common problem with 
flexibility design in the literature is how to determine the design parameters in the design 
stage under uncertainty of inputs such that the operation is optimum (e.g., profit is 
maximized). 
Different from flexibility design, the objective of this chapter is to develop a method 
to evaluate flexibility of a given design (flexibility analysis). The problem is stated as 
follows: 
A design of a chemical process (d) is given. That means, equipment sizes and 
process structure are known and unchanged. 
Control variables (z) are allowed to vary in given bounded ranges. Flow rate, 
temperature, and pressure are considered control variable because they can be varied to 
control the process. They can be tuned by certain means. For example, flow rates are 
adjusted by control valves; pressure is controlled by throttle valves, pumps, compressors; 
temperatures are controlled using heat exchangers. Flow rates can be changed by 
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adjusting openings of valves; and state variables (temperature and pressures) can be 
indirectly controlled through operating valves.  
These changeable variables are degrees of freedom to accommodate the process with 
unexpected changes of external impacts, such as: environmental conditions, leaks, 
ruptures. Ranges of the impacts are expressed in terms of process flow rates, 
temperatures, and pressures. For example, rupture is described by a zero flow in the 
ruptured pipe. 
The process is flexible when it can be kept in operation under effects of the impacts 
while all the performance specifications and safety criteria are met. The problem is to 
quantify the flexibility of the design in form of one scalar index which is a function of 
ranges of external impacts that the process can tolerate 
7.4 Proposed approach 
7.4.1 Theory 
The following theory is based on the work of Swaney and Grossmann.62 A simple 
calculation algorithm will be proposed in the next section. However, the theory behind 
the algorithm is complicated with some assumptions. 
In mathematic view point, the process is described by sets of constraints: 
 Physical constraints :  
 
 Specifications:  
 
Physical constraints are shown in Equation 24, for example, mass and energy 
balance, phase equilibrium, kinetics equations, and so on. Specifications have two types: 
product specifications (e.g., optimum concentration, production rates) and safety criteria 
to avoid safety-related issues such as run-away reactions, leaks, rupture and other 
mechanic failures. The process is feasible operable when all of these constraints and 
specifications are met. 
 
fm(d,z,θ) = 0 Eq. 24 
gn(d,z,θ) ≤ 0 Eq. 25 
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Figure 19. Feasible region and inscribed hyper-rectangles of impact ranges. 
 
 
In the space of impacts θ (Figure 19), the state of process operation is normal if the 
impacts are at nominal values (q] , qQ]). When impacts values increases or decreases, the 
operating points move away from the nominal value. Assume external impacts vary 
independently of each other. Flexibility index is a measure of a rectangular operating 
region inscribing the feasible region R. 
To quantify the index, the problem must be formulated. Let Region R be the set of 
impact values θ such that there is at least one control state z in which the operation 
satisfies all the constraints and specifications. 
 
Eq. 26 
There are many rectangles inscribing in region R and touches the boundary as shown 
in Figure 19. Hence, the first step is to standardize the way of changing θ such that there 
is only one rectangle touching the boundary, which defines a unique index. 
The largest rectangle in the figure is the given ranges of impact values. If we call T 
the searching rectangle, then the standardization means T is a scale-down of the large 
rectangle based on the nominal point (Figure 20). In other words, when scaling is 
performed, the rectangle vertices are always on the lines connecting the nominal point 
and vertices of the largest rectangle. 
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Figure 20. Scaling standardization of the hyper-rectangles of impact ranges. 
 
 
Let δ be the ratio between sizes of T and the large rectangle. The size of T depends 
on value of parametric δ. T increases as δ increases. When T is largest, touches and 
inscribes the boundary of R, the value of δ is maximum and therefore is the flexibility 
index. Mathematically, flexibility index IF is the solution of the optimization problem rs = ec:δ Eq. 27 
subject to: 
Feasible operating conditions: ∀q ∈ w (x){∃{|}(~, {, q) = 0 ∩   (~, {, q ≤ 0, ∀, } Eq. 28 
Parametric region of T: (x) = {q|(q] −  x∆q5) ≤  q ≤ (q] +  x∆q) Eq. 29 
Constraint shown in Equation 24 is the feasibility operating conditions. It means that 
for all θ inside T, there is at least one control state z such that all physical constraints and 
specifications are satisfied. 
The above formula is a complete formulation to determine flexibility index. It is very 
difficult to solve. To be solvable, the above logic language is translated into 
conventional optimization formulation by transforming the variable θ to q with the 
relationship: q = q] + xq  Eq. 30 
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The formulation above becomes a two-stage optimization programming:  =  min∈6 x∗qwith =  q−∆q5 ≤  q  ≤  ∆q Eq. 31 
where δ*(θ) is determined from the optimization problems: x∗(q) = maxx Eq. 32 
Subject to   m(, , q) = 0, ∀e Eq. 33 g(, , q) ≤ 0, ∀ Eq. 34 
The idea of this transformation is to introduce vector δθ ̃ which originates from the 
nominal point and always touch the boundary of T (not only vertices of T). The direction 
of the vector is defined by θ ̃ and its length depends on δ. In the inner-stage problem 
(Equations 32 – 34), δ increases to scale up T. When its arrow touch boundary of R (δ is 
maximum), we obtain δ*. In outer-stage problem (Equation 31), the found δ’s from 
various direction q are compared for the minimum, which is the value of flexibility 
index. 
The problem is now easier to solve but its size is large because we need to 
investigate infinite values of direction q (0 ≤ q≤ 360o). To reduce the size, an 
assumption that Rectangle T touches boundary of R only at a vertex of T is applied. The 
benefit is the reduction of search space from infinitive to a manageable finite set and 
only q in the vertex directions to be investigated. In Figure 21, there are four vertices 
because is T is a rectangle. If T is a hyper-rectangle in p-dimension space, the number of 
vertices is 2p. 
The assumption is actually true when Region R is one-dimensional convex (i.e., if a 
vertical or horizontal straight line cuts R boundary at two points or less). The assumption 
is difficult to be verified since we do not explicitly know f functions. However, even the 
conditions are not satisfied, the solution in engineering problems is still very likely to lie 
at a vertex.62 
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Figure 21. Searching direction of transformed impact variables. 
 
 
7.4.2 Implementation 
The final formulation above is not ready to be applied in flexibility analysis for 
resilience evaluation because it is very difficult (if not impossible) to define all physical 
constraint fm(d,z,θ) = 0 for a whole plant. A novel approach is proposed with the 
powerful aid of process simulator (e.g., Aspen Plus) to easily verify these constraints.  
In this work, whole process is simulated in Aspen Plus in various scenarios of 
external impacts and control variables. Those scenarios are generated in systematic way 
to search for the operating condition that associates with the flexibility index. The 
algorithm is shown in next section. 
The benefits of this approach are to eliminate hassle determination of all functions 
fm(d,z,θ) = 0, to obtain rigorous and quick calculations. However, it requires adequate 
knowledge of using process simulation software. 
7.4.3 Flexibility index evaluation algorithm 
Based on the theory (Section 7.4.1) and proposed implementation (Section 7.4.2), a 
calculation algorithm is proposed in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22. Flexibility calculation algorithm 
 
 
First, the whole process is simulated in a base case with determined design parameter 
d and nominal values of control variables zN and impact parameters θN. There are more 
than one way to specify performance of a unit in the simulation. However, the way to 
allow sensitivity analysis in the next steps should be chosen. For example, to investigate 
the effect of changing utility duty on process stream temperature in a heat exchanger, 
heat duty should be specified in the simulation. Other parameters such as temperature, 
pressure, vapor fraction related to the heat exchanger are calculated accordingly.  
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Second, based on the base-case process model, sensitivity analysis is performed to 
simulate 2p cases with of impact values θK being at their bounds. This task can be easily 
performed using the Sensitivity Analysis tool in Aspen Plus.  
The third step is analyzing those simulation results. In every case, if all specifications 
and safety criteria are met, then the index of that case is δ* = 1. For cases where not all 
specifications are met, Sensitivity Analysis tool is employed to simulate scenarios of 
various values of control variables zn. Then the specifications and safety criteria are 
verified. If the specifications and criteria are met, the index is still maximum: 
x∗(q) = |q − q]|∆q = ∆q∆q = 1. Eq. 35 
If not all specifications are met, vector of impact values θk need to be changed 
towards vector θN in the next step. Although there may be only one impact violating the 
constraints, all the impact must be reduced at the same scale ratio (rectangle T is scaled 
down). Those steps are repeated until all constraints on specifications and safety are met 
or θk reaches θN in which index equals to zero (δ* = 0). 
The minimum index found among all simulation scenarios is the flexibility index of 
the process. The index is bounded in the range of 0 and 1.  
For the case that hyper-rectangle T completely inscribes in region R without scaling-
down step, the index is assigned to 1 although T can be scaled up and still inscribes in R. 
the value of flexibility index using this method is dependent on the range of impacts to 
be investigated. 
To evaluate resilience, the flexibility index of process k is converted so that it is in 
the same scale with the other indices and the lower of IF is the better: 
(FI)k = 10·{1 – (IF)k} Eq. 36 
The factor 10 is involved to normalize the index range from 0 to 10 so that it is 
evaluated at the same scale to the other factors (inherent safety index and controllability 
index). 
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7.4.4  Safety criteria 
A process is considered flexible in a scenario when all process specifications and safety 
criteria are satisfied (gn(d,z,θ) ≤ 0). Let rewrite the safety criteria in an equivalent form: 
g’n(d,z,θ) ≤ C (where C is constant). C can be referred to as limits of the safety criteria.  
Importantly, one should understand that C is not limits of design system. Value of C 
is set by evaluators, therefore subjective, and is not necessary equal to design limits (say 
D). For example, a piece of equipment is design to withstand a maximum temperature of 
500o Celsius (i.e., D = 500). But evaluators may specify that the equipment should not 
operate over 300o Celsius (i.e., C = 300) to avoid mechanical failure in flexibility 
analysis. The value of 300o Celsius is a safety criterion in the flexibility analysis. 
If D is increased while C is fixed, operation of the equipment is safer but its 
flexibility level is unchanged because the level is calculated from C. If C is increased 
while D is fixed, the operation is concluded more flexible; however, the operation is 
likely less safe because operating temperature is closer to the limits. Therefore, 
evaluators should choose suitable values of safety criteria. 
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CHAPTER VIII  
CASE STUDY: EVALUATION OF RESILIENCE DESIGN FACTOR IN 
ETHYLENE PRODUCTION ALTERNATIVES 
Ethylene is the most produced organic compound in the world with a global production 
of ethylene expected to reach 162 million tonnes in 2012 including both current and 
planned new construction projects.65 Due to the important but hazardous characteristics 
of ethylene product and its production processes, and due to the data availability, 
ethylene production alternatives were chosen in this work to demonstrate the proposed 
methodology in evaluating the Design index.  
There are some criteria to choose case studies for this work. To be able to 
demonstrate the methodology well, the design alternatives in producing the same 
product were preferred to have very different main pathways and different operating 
conditions, and to involve at least typical equipment such as pump, reactor, heat 
exchanger, vessel, column etc. Most importantly, their information or data (i.e.  PFD) are 
available in publications.   
In Eupore and Asia, ethylene is produced mainly from steam cracking naphtha, 
gasoil and condensates. While in US, Canada, and Middle East, ethylene is obtained 
from the steam cracking of ethane. Recently, oxydehydrogenation technology is being 
developed to compete with the conventional steam-cracking technology and attracts 
more attention by a number of researches.66-71 In the meantime, another ethylene 
production pathway, bioethanol dehydration, also has the support from the industry and 
researchers motivated by the growth of renewable chemicals and by the low carbon 
footprint of the product obtained.72-74 With their satisfaction on the criteria above, they 
were chosen for demonstration of resilience evaluation and comparison. 
In this case study, the quantitative methodology to obtain resilience Design index is 
applied for the two following processes producing ethylene via: 
 Catalytic dehydration of bio-ethanol (Process 1) 
 Oxydehydrogenation of ethane (Process 2) 
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8.1 Process description 
Both of the processes are designed at a capacity of 20,000 tonnes per year ethylene. The 
ethylene product meet chemical grades which requires ethylene molar composition at 
least 95%. The feedstock compositions are given in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Molar fraction of the two process feedstocks. 
Component Dehydration process Oxydehydrogenation process 
Ethanol 0.990  
Ethane  0.997 
Carbon dioxide 0.010 0.003 
Total 1.000 1.000 
 
 
8.1.1 Catalytic-dehydration of bio-ethanol 
The production of ethylene from bio-ethanol employs some key processing steps as 
shown in Figure 23. First, ethanol is preheated before being converted into the main 
product ethylene in an endothermic dehydration reaction. Then, because the output of 
the reactor contains some impurities, it must go through downstream purification steps, 
including water wash, caustic wash, absorption, and drying, to obtain desired chemical-
grade ethylene. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Conversion of bio-ethanol to ethylene via dehydration 
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There have been four technologies available for commercialization, including 
Lummus fixed-bed, Lummus fluidized-bed, Syndol75 and Petrobras72 (APPENDIX B). 
The design of Petrobras (Figure 24) is chosen for this case study investigation as it is the 
latest technology among those available and a plant using the technology has been built 
in Brazil  
 
 
 
Figure 24. Simplified flow diagram of the Petrobras dehydration process.72 
 
 
The bio-ethanol feedstock is preheated to the reaction conditions (330 – 380 oC) 
through an evaporator, steam mixing, and a furnace. The Petrobras design uses a single 
isothermal reactor for the ethanol-to-ethylene conversion. Bio-ethanol is dehydrated 
using the endothermic reaction as follows: 
C2H5OH  C2H4 + H2O + 46 kJ/mol Eq. 37 
The reaction occurs in an isothermal fixed-bed reactor in which catalysts are packed 
inside multi-tubes. The temperature is maintained by circulation of a heating fluid 
between the reactor shell and the furnace. For this design, it is important to control the 
operating temperature keep reaction rate and selectivity of main product high.   
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After the reactor, the product stream is quenched by water to remove the produced 
water, non-reacted ethanol and some of other by-products such as acetaldehyde and 
acetic acid. Then, the ethylene product with remaining gaseous contaminants (e.g., acid 
acetic, carbon dioxide, water) exits the top of the quench tower and passes the scrubber 
to remove the contaminants. Finally, remaining water vapor in the product stream is 
removed in drying packed-bed columns.  
8.1.2 Oxydehydrogenation of ethane 
The feedstock of this process is ethane which is an important petroleum derivative. 
Oxydehydrogenation of ethane is a technology that is still in research phase focusing on 
development of catalysts. It is expected to be in competition with the conventional 
naphtha steam-cracking technology thanks to its higher yield. The main reaction 
(oxydehydrogenation) is as follows: 
C2H6 + ½O2 C2H4 + H2O - 105 kJ/mol  Eq. 38 
The only commercial technology that is available from the literature is the design 
created by Union Carbide. Figure 25 shows the process blow diagram with its key 
conversion and separation steps. Figure 26 depicts the simplified flow diagram which is 
adapted from Manyik et al.66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Block diagram of ethane to ethylene via oxydehydrogenation. 
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Figure 26. A simplified flow diagram adapted from the Union Carbide 
oxydehydrogenation process 66 
 
 
In this process, the ethane and oxygen that is supplied from an air separation unit are 
compressed, mixed, and preheated before fed to the reactors. The oxygen concentration 
must be less than about 6 mole percent of the total input gaseous stream. The 
oxydehydrogenation reaction occurs in a series of reactors in which ethane is introduced 
to the first reactor and oxygen is fed in parallel (to every reactor inlet). In every stage, 
the feed streams are preheated to around 250 °C, converted into ethylene in free-radical 
reactions at 300 – 400 oC, and partially condensed to remove acid acetic and water. In 
this case study, a configuration of three reactors in a series is investigated. 
The product stream from the final stage comprises of ethylene, acetic acid, water, 
unreacted ethane, unreacted oxygen, gases produced by side reactions (such as carbon 
monoxide and carbon dioxide), and other gases which are present in commercial ethane. 
The final stage is followed by a scrubber to separate out the remaining aqueous acetic 
acid. Then, the gases from the scrubber go through an amine adsorption system to 
remove carbon dioxide. Next, the gas stream is compressed and introduced to the 
distillation column where ethylene is distillated in the top product; ethane and other 
gases are in the bottom product. The ethane from the distillation column is recycled to 
the reaction system.  
80 
 
 
In this process, the introduction of oxygen into a gaseous stream containing ethane, 
and possibly ethylene, poses a safety issue. To prevent the occurrence of unwanted 
situations (i.e. explosion, fire), the introduction of oxygen into a gaseous hydrocarbon 
must be carried out at a temperature lower than the auto-ignition temperature of the 
mixed gas stream. Based on their study, Manyik et al66 suggested that temperature of the 
gaseous stream is less than 250 oC and oxygen composition is less than 6% mol.. 
8.2 Results and discussions 
8.2.1 Inherent safety index 
8.2.1.1 Material hazard index 
The chemical substances in both processes are all flammable and/ or toxic in varying 
degrees. The hazards are posed according to the type and quantity of chemicals present.  
Table 6 summarizes the substances potentially presented in the processes.  
 
 
Table 6. Substances involving in the processes 
Pathway Dehydration process Oxydehydrogenation process 
Raw Material Ethanol Ethane 
Main reaction: 2CH3CH2OH  H2C=CH2 + 
2H2O + (CH3CHO by-product) 
CH3CH3 + 1/2O2 H2C=CH2 + 
H2O 
Raw material  Ethanol Ethane, O2 
Desired product  Ethylene Ethylene 
Main by-product  Acetaldehyde and Acetic acid Acetic acid 
Other by-products 
or gases  
 CO and CO2 
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Table 7. Substance characteristics 
Substances  Flash point Boiling point UEL-LEL 
(vol%) 
TLV 
(ppm) 
Ethane  -135.15 °C (-211.3 °F) -88.2 °C (-126.8 °F) 3.0-12.4 1000 
O2  -183.1 °C (-297.6 °F)   
Ethylene  -136 oC (-212.8 oF) -103.8 oC (-154.8 oF) 2.7-36 200 
Acetic acid  39°C (102.2°F) 118.1 °C (244.6 °F) 4-19.9 15 
CO  -119°C -312.7 oF (-191.5 oC) 12.5-74 25 
CO2  -78.55 °C (-109.4 °F)  5000 
Ethanol  16.6°C (61.88°F) 78 °C 3.3-19 1000 
Acetaldehyde  -38°C (-36.4°F) 21 °C (69.8 °F) 4.0-60 25 
 
 
Table 8. The values of sub-factor indices 
Substances  IFL IEX ITOX IFL + IEX + ITOX ICOR 
Ethanol catalytic dehydration 
Ethanol  3 1 2 6  
Ethylene  4 2 2 8  
Acetaldehyde  4 3 3 10  
Acetic acid  2 1 3 6 1 
 
Oxydehydrogenation of ethane 
Ethane  4 1 2 7  
O2   -   
Ethylene  4 2 2 8  
Acetic acid  2 1 3 6 1 
CO  4 3 3 10  
CO2   1 1  
 
 
Based on the flash points and boiling points, the difference between the upper and 
the lower explosion limits, the TLV of the substances in Table 7, the flammability, 
explosiveness, and toxicity indices of each substance are determined, respectively (Table 
8). For the corrosiveness index, the most potential corrosive material of both processes is 
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similar, acetic acid. It is assumed that the need of stainless steel is for both processes. 
Hence, the score of 1 is assigned for the corrosiveness index of both processes. 
Finally, all indices in Table 8 are summed for every substance separately. The 
maximum sum is the sub-index value.  For both processes, the material hazard indices 
are equal:  
                        IMH = (IFL + IEX + ITOX)max + ICOR, max = 10 + 1 = 11 
 
Table 9. Heat release and reaction hazard sub-indices. 
Pathway Dehydration of Ethanol Oxydehydrogenation of ethane 
Main reaction 
∆H   
2CH3CH2OH  H2C=CH2 + 2H2O  
+ 46 kJ/mol (1,000 J/g)  
CH3CH3 + 1/2O2 H2C=CH2 + H2O 
– 105 kJ/mol (-2,283 J/g) 
 
Side reaction 1 
∆H  
CH3CH2OH →CH3CHO + H2  
+ 69 kJ/mol (+1,500 J/g)  
CH3CH3 + 3/2O2 CH3COOH + H2O  
– 591 kJ/mol (-7,577 J/g) 
 
Other side 
reaction  
∆H  
 CH3CH3 + (3/2+x)O2 2COx + 3H2O 
-1,429 kJ/mol (-10,063 J/g, for CO2)  
-863 kJ/mol (-7,845 J/g, for CO)  
 
     IHMR, max 
     IHSR, max 
IINT, max 
IRH 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
4 
1 
8 
 
 
8.2.1.2 Reaction hazard index 
The heat release of the main and possible side reactions are calculated and used to assign 
the scores for IMR and ISR of both processes (Table 9). The chemical interaction 
considers the unexpected reactions among process materials in the process. These 
reactions are not expected to take place in the reactor and hence they are not discussed in 
the side reaction. In the oxydehydrogenation, acid acetic and acetaldehyde which are the 
main by-products can create a potential unwanted reaction. Small amounts of acetic acid 
will cause the acetaldehyde to polymerize, releasing large amounts heat. Since the 
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quantity of by-products could be insignificant, the heat released by this chemical 
interaction may not significant and therefore the chemical interaction sub-index is 
assigned to 1 for the oxydehydrogenation and 0 for the dehydration of ethanol.  
The maximum values of individual indices are summed to obtain the reaction hazard 
index for every process  
Oxydehydrogenation of ethane: IRH = IHRM, max + IHSR, max + IINT, max = 3 + 4 + 1 = 8 
Catalytic dehydration of ethanol: IRH = IHRM, max + IHSR, max + IINT, max = 0 + 0 + 0 = 0 
In these case studies, the reaction hazard index of oxydehydrogenation is high 
because of the exothermic reactions, while that of dehydration case is zero since it 
involves only endothermic reactions. 
8.2.1.3 Inventory index 
The mass flows of the processes are known from the design capacity simulated in Aspen 
simulation. The inventories for each process vessel are estimated based on the maximum 
mass flow among the streams of that vessel and one hour nominal residence time (Table 
10). The total inventory, the sum of inventories of all process vessels, is used to identify 
the inventory index. 
The mass flows of both processes are on the basis of the production capacity of 
20,000 tonnes of ethylene/ year. Since the conversion of ethane to ethylene in the 
oxydehydrogenation reactions (once-through yield in the reaction system is 59%) is 
lower than in the dehydration of ethanol (95%), the oxydehydrogenation process needs 
to recycle a large volume of unreacted ethane. Thus, the inventory of the 
oxydehydrogenation process is significantly larger than that of the dehydration of 
ethanol. This issue can be clearly seen in Table 10 and therefore the inventory hazard 
index of the oxydehydrogenation is 4 while that of the dehydration is 2. 
8.2.1.4 Process condition index 
The process condition index includes the process temperature and pressure indices which 
are identified on the basis of the maximum temperature and pressure in the process. 
Table 11 shows the temperature and pressure for each process vessel obtained in 
publications and Aspen simulations. Later, the process temperature and pressure sub-
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indices which are determined based on the obtained maximum temperature and pressure 
are summed to obtain the process condition indices.  
 
 
Table 10. Process vessel inventories and inventory sub-indices 
Process vessels Mass flow 
(kg/hr) 
Inventory 
(tonnes) 
Inventory Indices 
(IIH) 
Dehydration of Ethanol  
Reactor   
Quench 
Scrubber 
6406 
6406 
4165 
6.5 
6.5 
4.2 
 
Dryer  
Evaporator 
3832 
4604 
3.8 
4.6 
 
Cooler 
Furnace 
6406 
6406 
6.4 
6.4 
 
Total  38.4 2 
  
Oxydehydrogenation of ethane  
Reactor 1 
Reactor 2 
Reactor 3 
20069 
20706 
20461 
20 
21 
20 
 
Scrubber 
Absorber 
20461 
18968 
20 
19 
 
Stripper 
Flash drum 
Distillation column 
Compressor 
Cooler 1 
Cooler 2 
Cooler 3 
Cooler 4 
15312 
18968 
17145 
19376 
21637 
21102 
20856 
14879 
15 
19 
17 
19 
22 
21 
21 
15 
 
Total  249 4 
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Table 11. Process temperature/ pressure and process condition sub-indices 
 Temperature 
(oC) 
Pressure 
(bar) 
Process condition 
index (IPC) 
Dehydration of Ethanol    
Reactor 
Quench 
Scrubber 
350 
77 
77 
3 
1 
1 
 
Dryer 
Evaporator 
77 
108 
1 
3 
 
Cooler 
Furnace 
350 to 105 
116 to 350 
3 
3 
 
Process temp./ pres., max 350 3  
Process temp/ pres. indices 3 0 3 
   
Oxydehydrogenation of ethane   
Reactor 1 
Reactor 2 
Reactor 3 
244 
299 
304 
10 
10 
10 
 
Scrubber 
Absorber 
43 
42 
1.5 
45 
 
Stripper 
Flash drum 
Distillation column 
Compressor 
Cooler 1 
Cooler 2 
Cooler 3 
Cooler 4 
93 
20 
-28 
318 
85 
85 
75 
44 
1.3 
44 
43 
44 
10 
10 
10 
1 
 
Process temp./ pres., max 318 44  
Process temp/ pres. indices 3 2 5 
 
 
8.2.1.5 Process equipment index 
The process safety also depends on what type of equipment existing in the process. From 
engineering practice and recommendations on layout spacing between the equipment 
and from incident reports and database on the equipment involved in the incidents, 
Heikkila et al. suggested a scoring system to identify the process equipment index based 
on the types of equipment. Table 12 summarizes the main equipment present in the 
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processes. Finally, the process equipment index is determined on the basis of worst case 
of different equipment in the process under investigation. 
 
Table 12. Equipment present in the processes 
Process Type of equipment Process equipment 
indices (IPE) 
Dehydration Reactor, Quench, Scrubber, 4 
 Dryer, Evaporator, Cooler, Furnace  
  
Oxydehydrogenation Reactor 1, 2 and 3, Scrubber 3 
 Absorber, Stripper, Flash drum  
 Distillation column, Compressor 
Cooler 1, 2, 3, and 4 
 
 
 
Among different equipment in the oxydehydrogenation process, compressor is the 
most unsafe equipment since it is subject to vibration, very vulnerable process 
equipment and can release flammable gas in case of failure.41 As a result, the process 
equipment of the oxydehydrogenation is assigned to 3, while that of the dehydration of 
ethanol is assigned to 4 due to the furnace in the process. Furnace is a source of ignition 
for flammable leaks from other equipment.  
8.2.1.6 Process structure index 
The process structure index looks at the process from a system engineering point of view 
and therefore it is much more difficult to estimate. One potential approach is to depend 
on experience based data (standards, design recommendations and accident report). 
Hence, firstly, an experience based data which contains the base cases for the ethylene 
production needs to be developed by applying CBR method. CBR is applied in different 
incident databases such as HSEES, RMP, OSHA, MARS as well as many other useful 
websites such as hse.gov.uk, Kolmetz.Com, and csb.gov to retrieve the relevant cases for 
the ethylene production process. Proceedings of the Ethylene Producers Conference also 
provided a good source of information on several safety incidents.  
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According to CBR method, there must be input data and output requirements to 
retrieve the base cases. Due to the lack of the details of the incident itself in the database, 
the base cases are retrieved based on several input variables: the involved substance 
including ethylene (desired product); and ethane or ethanol (required raw material); type 
of industry (ethylene production, not polyethylene process); and type of system (fixed 
facility, not transportation). Despite of limited input variables, a few base cases for CBR 
are found and shown in APPENDIX A.  
All of the base cases in APPENDIX A occurred in ethylene unit or ethylene 
production plant; however, there is no clue to identify if any of them was in the ethanol 
dehydration process. Moreover, the design of Petrobras (Figure 24) chosen for this case 
study is quite new technology. Therefore, no incident has been found for the dehydration 
of ethanol so far. From the reasoning on the process level, the score of 2 (no data or 
neutral) is assigned for the Process Structure Index of the ethanol dehydration process. 
It is also very difficult to conclude if any of the base cases in APPENDIX A 
occurred in the ethane oxydehydrogenation process due to the lack of the details of those 
incident data. Those incidents could happen in a common ethylene production process, 
the dehydrogenation process with the raw materials of ethane, naphtha, or condensate. 
The ethane oxydehydrogenation is a new technology which has a similar flow diagram 
and basic equipment as the naphtha dehydrogenation. Both of them have absorber, 
compressor, flash drum and distillation or purification unit (different in catalyst).69,76 
Even incidents could not identify or have not occurred yet; the process configuration of 
the oxydehydrogenation is probably questionable on the basis of safety due to its similar 
process equipment and configuration to the naphtha dehydrogenation process which 
used to have a major incident. Therefore, the score of 3 corresponding to the fourth 
configuration group is assigned for the Process Structure Index of the ethane 
oxydehydrogenation process. 
8.2.1.7 Process complexity index 
To obtain the process complexity index, the complexity values need to be calculated 
from the values of many complexity factors using Equation 10. Most of these values are 
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quite straightforward to estimate since they are i.e. based on the P&ID of the process. 
For instance, degree of freedom is the number of variables that can be controlled. The 
mathematical approach in evaluating the degree of freedom is to subtract the number of 
independent equations from the total number of variables. In practice, to identify the 
degree of freedom for a process, an experienced and easier method is to simply add the 
total number of properly placed control valves. One factor, the interaction in the process 
requiring operator intervention (Q), would require more detail design information to be 
estimated. In this case study, the interactions requiring operator intervention in both 
processes are assumed to be 0 due to the unavailable data. The other parameters 
calculated straightforward based on P&ID are provided in the ensuing paragraphs.  
For the dehydration process, the number of equipment (M) is 8 including evaporator, 
furnace, reactor, cooler, quench, scrubber, 2 dryer. The degree of freedom (S) is 6 since 
there are 6 control valves as evaluated in controllability index for dehydration process. 
The number of measurement readings (O) is 10 (5 temperature, 1 flowrate, 2 
concentration, 1 pressure, and 1 level measurement readings). Number of input and 
output streams (P) is 10 which include energy streams as recommended by Koolen 
(ethanol + steam + fuel + water + NaOH + cooling water in and out + aqueous effluent + 
caustic effluent + ethylene). The number of external disturbances asking for action from 
an operator (R) is 6 (feed stream (ethanol flow), and heating and cooling media (steam 
flow, fuel flow, cooling water temperature, water flow, NaOH flow). So, the complexity 
value for the dehydration process is: COXd = 8 + 6 + 10 + 10 + 0 + 6 = 40.  
For the oxydehydrogenation process, the number of equipment (M) = 17 (3 reactors, 
3 condensers, scrubber, cooler, absorber, compressor, stripper, 2 reboiler, flash drum, 
distillation column, condenser, drum). The degree of freedom is 10 since there are 10 
control valves as evaluated in controllability index for oxydehydrogenation process. The 
number of measurement readings is 28 (9 temperature, 5 flowrate, 3 concentration, 5 
pressure, and 6 level measurement readings). The number of input and output streams is 
30 (ethane + 3 oxygen + water + 5 cooling water in and out + 2 steam in and out + 1 
refrigerant in and out + 3 acetic acid/ water + acetic acid solution + CO2 + CH lights + 
89 
 
 
non-condensibles + ethylene + unreacted ethane). The number of external disturbances 
asking for action from an operator (R) is 13 (feed stream (ethane flow, 3 oxygen flow), 
and heating and cooling media (5 cooling water temperature, water flow, 2 steam 
temperature, 1 refrigerant flow) need the action from an operator if there is any 
disturbance). So, the complexity value for the dehydration process is: COXo = 17 + 10 + 
28 + 30 + 0 + 13 = 98. 
The value of the oxydehydrogenation is higher corresponding to the complexity 
index of 5 resulting in the score system in Table 13. The values of the different terms 
and complexity indices for two processes have been summarized in  
This case study was given only to demonstrate the suggested methodology in 
calculating Complexity Index. In the real industry, equipment complexity, or piping 
complexity should be considered as well. Other equipment such as pumps, blinds, safety 
devices, vents, and drains should be included in evaluating number of equipment. 
Manual/ actuated valves/ switches and set points of control loops can be included in 
Table 14. 
 
 
Table 13. Scoring system for the process complexity index (ICOX) 
Process complexity value (COX) Score of ICOX 
1-16 0 
17-33 1 
34-49 2 
50-65 3 
66-82 4 
83-98 5 
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Table 14. Complexity factor index for both processes 
 Dehydration  Oxydehydrogenation 
Number of equipment 8 17 
Number of DOFs 6 10 
Number of input and output streams (P) 10 30 
Number of measurement readings (O) 10 28 
The interaction in the process requiring an 
operator intervention (Q) 
0 0 
The number of external disturbances asking 
for action from an operator (R) 
6 13 
Complexity values (WFs = 1 for each) 
(COX) 
40 98 
ICOX 2 5 
 
 
8.2.1.8 Discussion 
Table 15 shows the results of all indices of inherent safety index. The results showed 
that the oxydehydrogenation seems to have higher values which contribute negative to 
inherent safety aspect. This observation seems logically since in the dehydration process 
the material in use is less hazardous and the process is simpler and requires more 
moderate conditions. 
All indices in Table 15 are combined to achieve the final inherent safety index as 
follows:  
For the ethanol dehydration process, IIS = 33 
For the ethane oxydehydrogenation process, IIS = 68 
To be able to combine all indices for an overall resilience Design index, inherent 
safety indices of both processes are normalized in the scale of 0 to 10. The normalized 
inherent safety indices (ISI) were calculated as follows:  
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For the ethanol dehydration process 
 = 33 ∙ 10114 = 2.9 
 
 
Table 15. Inherent safety sub-indices of two ethylene production processes 
Pathway Dehydration of 
Ethanol 
Oxydehydrogenation 
of Ethane 
(IFL + IEX + ITOX)max 10 10 
ICOR, max  1 1 
Material Hazard Index, IMH 11 11 
Inventory Hazard Index, IIH 2 4 
IHMR, max 0 3 
IHSR, max 0 4 
IINT, max 0 1 
Reaction Hazard Index, IRH 0 8 
IM = IMH · IIH + IRH 22 52 
   
Process temperature index 3 3 
Process pressure index  0 2 
Process condition index 3 5 
   
Process equipment index 4 3 
Process Structure Index 2 3 
Process Complexity Index 2 5 
IP 11 16 
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For the ethane oxydehydrogenation process 
< = *∙L = 6.0The lower the inherent safety index is, the more resilient the 
process design achieves. Therefore, the ethanol dehydration process is more resilient 
with regard to the inherent safety design perspectives. 
8.2.2 Controllability index 
This section demonstrates how to perform the proposed controllability analysis via 
evaluation of relative gain matrix, its singular value, and condition number. The 
controllability index indicates how easy to control the process in response to 
disturbances 
For the demonstration purpose, the case study only investigates typical feedback 
control configurations (Section 8.2.2.1). Although not all pairs of controlled and 
manipulated variables are considered in the analysis, the variations of the investigated 
pairs significantly affect production specifications and therefore are critical to the control 
performance.  
Simulation models in Aspen Plus were constructed in Section 8.2.2.2. Those models 
are able to simulate not only base-case operations but also sensitivity of the processes to 
variations of manipulated variables. 
The latter advantage allows testing how controlled variables are affected and 
interacted by the variations on manipulated variables. Multiple scenarios of variations 
were simulated. The manipulated variables were varied by ±0.1%, ±0.2%, ±0.5%, ±1%, 
±2%, ±5%, ±10%, ±20%, ±30%. Responses in values of controlled variables were 
recorded to construct the relative gain matrices (Section 8.2.2.3).  
In the next calculation step, singular values of the relative gain matrices were 
determined with the aid of the numerical computing software MATLAB77 (Section 
8.2.2.4). The controllability index is scored from the calculated values of the condition 
numbers. 
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Table 16. Analyzed pairs of manipulated and controlled variables in the dehydration process. 
Manipulated variables Controlled variables 
No. Parameter Value No. Parameter Value 
MV1 Evaporator steam flow rate (kg/h) 2,425 CV1 Evaporator outlet temperature of cold stream (kg/h) 108.4 
MV2 Furnace fuel flow rate (kg/h) 66.58 CV2 Furnace outlet temperature of cold stream (oC) 350.0 
MV3 Reactor heating fluid flow rate (kg/h) 11,047 CV3 Reactor temperature (oC) 350.0 
MV4 Cooler cooling water flow rate (kg/h) 37,041 CV4 Cooler outlet temperature of hot stream (oC) 160.0 
MV5 Quench water flow rate (kg/h) 34,000 CV5 Quenched vapor phase temperature (oC) 83.1 
MV6 Scrubber caustic inlet flow rate (kg/h) 1,755 CV6 OH-molar fraction in scrubber caustic effluent () 0.00112 
 
Table 17. Analyzed pairs of manipulated and controlled variables in the oxydehydrogenation process. 
Manipulated variables Controlled variables 
No. Parameter Value No. Parameter Value 
MV1 Heater steam flow rate 6,611 CV1 Heater outlet temperature of cold stream(oC) 149.7 
MV2 Condenser C-1 CW flow rate (kg/hr) 245,737 CV2 Condenser C-1 outlet temperature of hot stream (oC) 396 
MV3 Condenser C-2 CW flow rate (kg/hr) 211,529 CV3 Condenser C-2 outlet temperature of hot stream (oC) 90 
MV4 Condenser C-3 CW flow rate (kg/hr) 161,025 CV4 Condenser C-3 outlet temperature of hot stream (oC) 160 
MV5 Scrubber water flow rate (kg/hr) 34,000 CV5 Scrubbed vapor temperature (oC) 71.0 
MV6 Compressor power (kW) 1,140 CV6 Compressed pressure (bar) 46.02 
MV7 Absorber lean stream flow rate (kmol/h) 1,679 CV7 Molar fraction of MDEA in effluent stream 0.0670 
MV8 Flash drum refrigerant flow rate (kg/hr) 133,940 CV8 Flash drum temperature (oC) -24.0 
MV9 Deethane reflux flow rate (kmol/hr) 704 CV9 Ethylene concentration in distillate stream (%mol.) 96.7 
MV10 Dethane bottom flow rate (kmol/h) 380 CV10 Ethane concentration in bottom stream (%mol.) 99.3 
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8.2.2.1 Control systems 
Since detailed information on the investigated processes (such as process flow diagrams 
and pipe & instrument diagrams) is not available in the literature, simplified process 
flow diagrams with control systems were developed for this case study based on 
published operating conditions and performance.  
The control systems were designed from the common arrangement of feedback 
control. They did not result from a design optimization which usually involves much 
more effort not related to the objective of this research. Optimization should include, for 
example, alternative evaluation for optimal selection of control type (P, PI, or PID),26 
manipulated variables, and controlled variables, and detailed interaction analysis for 
optimal pairing controlled variables with manipulated variables. APPENDIX B sketches 
the control configurations used in the case study of the key processing units. The 
controlled variables are temperature, pressure, flow rate, and concentration of the 
process streams and utility streams. The manipulated variables are flow rates of those 
streams. Some of fast-response control loops (e.g. level control, reflux rate control of 
distillation and absorption units) are excluded to simplify the controllability analysis 
without sacrificing the conclusion because control performance is usually limited by 
slow response. 
In this case study, the analyzed multivariable control configurations are 6×6 (i.e., 
there are 6 controlled variables and 6 manipulated variables) and 10x10 for the 
dehydration and oxydehydrogenation processes, respectively. Those controlled and 
manipulated variables are paired in the chosen designs are shown in Table 16. 
8.2.2.2 Simulation models 
In this work, process controllability evaluation relies on the use of mathematical models 
although it can be performed with online tests on practical plants. These models are 
developed to describe the steady-state operation under various scenarios for both 
controllability and flexibility analyses. 
Optimization was performed in some units, including quench, absorber, stripper, and 
deethanizer to determine the optimal flow rates of supporting streams such as quench 
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water, caustic solution, stripper reboiler steam, deethanizer reflux. It is necessary to 
determine those optimal conditions which are usually close to practical operation and 
fall in transition region of linearity. For example, rate of caustic solution is optimal when 
it is just enough to saturate carbon dioxide in the rich stream; that means, less carbon 
dioxide is absorbed for less caustic rates but no more carbon dioxide is available to react 
with excess sodium hydroxide.  
The models were built in Aspen Plus78 The simulation flowsheets, input data 
summary, and specifications are reported in APPENDIX C. Except the Dryer unit of the 
dehydration process is simulated as a “black box”, all other units are simulated with 
thermodynamic models to predict their performance. The global property method is 
NRTL – a non-ideal gas equation of state. Specifically in some units involving ionized 
component, a more appropriate method – ELECTNRTL – was employed. Also in those 
units, multiple equilibrium and dissociation equations were involved in absorbing and 
desorbing reactions. They are simulated using special add-on packages for accurate 
prediction. The equations and associating parameters are shown in APPENDIX C.  
The two plants are designed at a capacity of 20,000 tonnes per year. Product 
concentrations are required not lower than 95% mol ethylene. The simulation results for 
the base cases are given in the Tables 16 and 17. Those results were compared to the 
published data66,72 for reasonable conversion, yields, and operating conditions (if 
available).  
8.2.2.3 Controllability analysis 
Scenarios of variations of manipulated variables were investigated without any 
controllers in place (i.e., all loops were open).  It can be referred to as the natural 
response of the process to changes in the manipulated variables. Open-loop tests were 
performed to calculate the relative gain analysis once the manipulated and controlled 
variables are chosen. Those tests were done using Sensitivity Analysis tool of Aspen 
Plus. 
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For open loop tests, disturbances have been made to the process by changing the 
input values of all manipulated variables out of their base-case values (Table 16 and 
Table 17), one at a time.  
The following disturbances ranges were performed: ±0.1%, ±0.2%, ±0.5%, ±1%, 
±2%, ±5%, ±10%, ±20%, and ±30%. Changes in controlled variables were calculated 
accordingly in the Sensitivity Analysis tool.  
Figure 27 plots the effects of manipulated variable disturbances to the values 
controlled variables in the dehydration process when all the control loops were open 
(i.e., no control actions). All the cases are reported in the same scale for comparison. 
Controlled variables that were not affected are represented by horizontal straight lines 
through the origin. From MV1 to MV6, less controlled variables were affected by 
disturbances because the positions of manipulated variables locate more towards the 
back-end of the process which has no recycle loops. 
The most affected controlled variable of MV1 (evaporator steam flow rate) 
disturbances was CV1 (evaporator outlet temperature of the cold stream) as shown in 
Figure 27a. This relationship was partially proportional with positive disturbances 
(+0.1%, +0.2%, +0.5%, and +10%) but it was independent with negative disturbances 
and large positive disturbances (+20% and +30%). The reason is explained as follows. 
The outlet cold stream was at saturated vapor condition in base case operation. When 
more steam was introduced due to the positive disturbances, the vapor is superheated 
and therefore its temperature was proportionally increased. When the vapor temperature 
reaches steam temperature, it does not change due to the second law of thermodynamics 
no matter how much more steam was added. This constant temperature obviously 
resulted in unchanged temperatures in the downstream units, including the tracked 
temperatures of Furnace (CV2), Reactor (CV3), and Cooler (CV4) (Figure 27a). When 
the steam rate was shortened due to the negative disturbances, the saturated vapor was 
condensed at a constant temperature. 
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Figure 27. Relative changes of controlled variables in open-loop with respect to 
disturbances of manipulated variables in the dehydration process. a) Evaporator steam 
flow rate (MV1); b) Furnace fuel flow rate (MV2); c) Reactor heating fluid flow rate 
(MV3) d) Cooler cooling water flow rate (MV4); e) Quench water flow rate (MV5); and 
f) Scrubber caustic flow inlet rate (MV6). 
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Figure 27. (Continued) 
 
Similarly, the reactor temperature (CV3) reached associating heating utility 
temperature at the +20% disturbance (Figure 27c). That resulted in unchanged 
temperature in the downstream cooler (CV4).  
The Cooler temperature (CV4) was significantly affected by the heat duty 
perturbation due to the disturbances on upstream manipulated variables (MV1 – MV4). 
Positive disturbances of MV1 – MV3 (on heating utility) result in more heat supply to 
the process streams while positive disturbance of MV4 (on cooling utility) results in less 
heat supply. Therefore, CV4 changes with respect to MV4 are in opposite direction to 
those with respect to MV1 – MV3 (Figure 27a – d). In all of the cases, the CV4 lines 
turned horizontal for because of isothermal condensation at large negative disturbances 
of MV1 – MV3 and at large positive disturbance of MV4. 
Controlled variable CV5 in general did not change much compared to other 
controlled variables. Its changes were within the range of -0.1% and 0.1%.  
Molar fraction of ion OH- (CV6) which corresponds to pH of scrubber effluent was 
sensitive to all manipulated variable disturbances, especially for MV5 (Quench water 
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rate) and MV6 (Caustic inlet rate). Quench water rate directly and linearly affects 
amount of CO2 physically absorbed in liquid phase of the quench vessel, and therefore in 
the stream going to the absorber. Caustic soda reacts with CO2. If caustic rate is reduced, 
unreacted CO2 amount increased until it reached the inlet CO2 concentration 
corresponding to certain pH, which represents by a horizontal line between -10% and -
30% in Figure 27f. However, if caustic rate increases, the pH keeps increase because 
more base is introduced to the column. There is also an upper limit of the pH; however, 
it has not been reached in the investigated disturbance ranges. 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Relative changes of controlled variables in open-loop with respect to 
disturbances of manipulated variables in the oxydehydrogenation process. a) Heater 
steam flow rate (MV1); b) Condenser C -1 CW flow rate (MV2); c) Condenser C-2 CW 
flow rate (MV3); d) Condenser C-3 CW flow rate (MV4); e) Scrubber water flow rate 
(MV5); f) Compressor power (MV6); g) Absorber lean stream flow rate (MV7); h) Flash 
drum CW flow rate (MV8); i) Deethane reflux flow rate (MV9); and j) Dethane bottom 
flow rate (MV10). 
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Figure 28. (Continued) 
c) d)
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Figure 28. (Continued) 
 
 
Figure 28 shows the effects of manipulated variable disturbances to controlled 
variables in the oxydehydrogenation process. Similar to the dehydration process, the 
upstream MVs interacted with more CVs than the downstream MVs did.  
In general, the ith MV affected most on the ith CV, which indicates that the controlled 
and manipulated variables were reasonably paired. One exception was found for MV10 
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disturbance where CV9 was affected most (Figure 28j) because they both were part of 
the distillation column – highly integrated equipment. 
The line of CV1-MV1 is not straight at -30% disturbance of MV1 (Figure 28a) as the 
feed stream was partially condensed. The condensation was not at constant temperature 
because the stream contained multiple components. 
The disturbance of cooling water rate in Cooler 1 (MV2) linearly affected the hot 
stream outlet temperature (CV2) and other controlled variables downstream until the rate 
reached +20% disturbance (Figure 28b). At the disturbance of +20% or more, the outlet 
temperature was close to the cooling water temperature; therefore, it was independent on 
the cooling water rate. 
The line of CV3-MV3 (Figure 28c) is not straight because multiple-component 
condensation occurred in the whole investigated range of MV3 disturbance. This is 
different from the straight line CV4-MV4 (Figure 28d) where the condensation only 
occurred at cooling water rate disturbance of +20% or more. 
In Figures 28e – i, the CVs shows their nearly dependence on their paired MVs.  
Figure 28j shows special relationships of ethylene molar fraction in distillate (CV9) 
and ethane molar fraction in bottom stream (CV10) with respect to bottom rate (MV10). 
They all belonged to control system of the distillation column. When bottom rate was 
reduced (from 0 to -30%), composition of main component in bottom stream was 
unchanged (i.e., it reached its separable limit by distillation), and composition of main 
component in distillate was decreased because other components were additionally 
recovered. O the other side, when the bottom rate was increased (from 0 to 30%), a 
reverse observation was expected, i.e., the components were more directed to the bottom 
stream, which decreased CV10 and kept CV9 unchanged. However, the ethylene 
composition (CV9) was reduced at +30% disturbance of MV10 because too much 
ethylene was lost in the bottom while the light component carbon monoxide stayed in 
the distillate and diluted the ethylene. 
The special relationships in Figure 28j showed two insightful facts about the design 
of the oxydehydrogenation process. Firstly as a result of the steady-state optimization 
mentioned earlier, the distillation reflux rate (MV9) and bottom rate (MV10) were 
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optimal because both of the compositions reached their limits at the base case. Secondly, 
the design would be better (more controllable) if a vapor outlet was added in the top 
section of the column to remove light carbon monoxide and keep the ethylene 
concentration at its best. This shows the benefits of the controllability analysis to the 
ability of the process to bounce-back the disturbance. 
8.2.2.4 Relative gain matrices and condition numbers 
The tracked values of controlled variables (CV) and manipulated variables (MV) 
obtained from the simulation results in the previous section were used to construct the 
relative gain matrices. Using Equation 22, the components of the gain matrices were 
calculated straightforward for every disturbance scenario. Table 18 is an example of 
what the relative gain matrices are. Elements zero indicate no interaction between the 
associating controlled and manipulated variables.  
The property of those relative gain matrices was investigated by calculating their 
singular values and condition numbers, the results are reported in Tables 19 and 20. The 
singular values were calculated using the command “svd([matrix name])” in the Matlab 
software while the condition numbers for various disturbance scenarios were derived 
using  Equation 17. 
Figure 29 plots the values of condition numbers with respect to different disturbance 
ranges for both processes. The ranges of the disturbances do affect the values of the 
relative gain matrices, and therefore condition numbers, which has been confirmed by 
McAvoy.50 Larger condition number  indicates the matrix is more poorly conditioned and 
hence the process is more difficult to control with the chosen controlled and manipulated 
variables.26 The results show that the dehydration process was very sensitive to small 
negative changes of the manipulated variables; that means, it is difficult to control the 
process. In other words, it requires a very large change in one or more manipulated 
variables, or controlled variables change largely for a small variation of one or more 
manipulated variables. The condition numbers in those scenarios were up to more than 
8,000 which were much higher than those in other scenarios. The condition numbers in 
the positive disturbances for both processes were low and generally stable, indicating 
that it is easy to control the processes. 
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Table 18. Relative gain matrix of dehydration process for disturbance +10% 
 Controlled variables (VC) 
  CV1 CV2 CV3 CV4 CV5 CV6 CV7 CV8 CV9 CV10 
M
a
n
i
p
u
l
a
t
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
(
M
V
)
 
MV1 1.93925067 1.15263493 1.11960915 0.44405069 0.71895047 -0.39082861 -0.03576057 -0.20344217 -0.19838619 -0.00010760 
MV2 0.00000000 -2.30721881 -2.19013841 -0.88214812 -1.01128644 0.64508695 0.05328795 0.49790787 0.25304046 -0.07438346 
MV3 0.00000000 0.00000001 -2.01106659 -0.82738129 -0.93833223 0.52210988 0.04842960 0.27116078 0.25104524 -0.00357882 
MV4 0.00000000 0.00000000 -0.00000112 -1.59718163 -0.66283796 0.29294880 0.03306556 0.00301303 -0.00133990 0.00001744 
MV5 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000007 0.00000000 -0.38827866 0.17622991 0.02382504 0.00455842 -0.00060204 0.00002276 
MV6 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 1.57476704 0.00383629 -0.00182854 0.00275811 -0.00001653 
MV7 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.05458784 0.01948252 -0.01517357 0.00017238 
MV8 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 3.73112881 -0.17729597 0.00458663 
MV9 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000129 0.01285987 0.00387143 
MV10 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.22394831 -0.83785975 
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Table 19. Singular values (SV) and condition numbers of the dehydration process with manipulated variable disturbances 
MVs Changes -30% -20% -10% -5% -2% -1% -0.5% -0.2% -0.1% 
Maximum SV 3.736 5.090 9.122 14.293 16.319 16.530 16.619 16.651 16.657 
Minimum SV 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
CN 1167.469 2036.160 3966.130 6806.095 7770.857 8265.000 8309.550 8325.700 8328.400 
          
MVs Changes 0.10% 0.2% 0.5% 1% 2% 5% 10% 20% 30% 
Maximum SV 16.644 16.651 16.651 16.650 16.625 16.406 15.858 14.683 13.624 
Minimum SV 0.165 0.165 0.162 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.164 0.165 0.164 
CN 100.688 100.731 102.528 102.462 102.310 100.587 96.754 89.040 83.326 
Table 20. Singular values (SV) and condition numbers of the oxydehydrogenation process with manipulated variable 
disturbances. 
MVs Changes -30% -20% -10% -5% -2% -1% -0.5% -0.2% -0.1% 
Maximum SV 4.718 4.186 4.176 4.232 4.291 4.319 4.331 4.342 4.365 
Minimum SV 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 
CN 512.804 589.549 732.614 829.784 893.938 899.708 941.522 943.935 992.000 
          
MVs Changes 0.10% 0.2% 0.5% 1% 2% 5% 10% 20% 30% 
Maximum SV 4.356 4.360 4.362 4.359 4.380 4.485 4.711 5.471 4.518 
Minimum SV 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.005 
CN 1405.194 927.702 948.217 751.517 429.441 327.387 365.186 511.346 1405.194 
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Figure 29. Condition numbers with respect to disturbance ranges 
 
Most of the investigated manipulated variables were utility flow rate. Hence, the 
results also indicate that both processes are vulnerable to reduction of either heating or 
cooling utility flow rates as the condition numbers were high in negative disturbance. 
The effects of utility rate reduction will be further investigated in Section 8.2.3 in the 
viewpoint of flexibility. 
8.2.2.5 Calculation of controllability indices 
In the last step, the controllability index was quantified. The indices are based on values 
of the condition numbers which were varied in different scenarios as shown in the 
previous section. To evaluate the general controllability of the processes, it was desired 
to use averaged values of those condition numbers. 
For the dehydration process, the averaged valued of the condition numbers from the 
18 scenarios of manipulated variable disturbance is: 
CNd = 3,103 
For the oxydehydrogenation, the averaged condition number is: 
CNo = 800 
The averaged condition number for both processes is: 
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G = G + G<2 = 1952 
Using Equation 23, the controllability indices of the dehydration and 
oxydehydrogenation are, respectively: 
(Ic)d = 8.0 
(Ic)O = 2.0 
The final results show that the oxydehydrogenation process is significantly more 
controllable than the dehydration process. That result implies a relative difference in 
controllability between the two processes rather than whether the control systems are 
acceptable or not. However, the controllability analyses indicate some insights on the 
processes.  
8.2.3 Flexibility index 
To evaluate the flexibility indices of the two processes, many impacts should be 
investigated to make reliable conclusions. However, only one impact is considered in 
this case study for the purpose of demonstrating the approach. A rupture is assumed to 
occur on a supply pipeline of the utility systems. The rupture may make the flow rate 
through the pipe reduce to zero due to loss or local shut-down. 
For simplification, only utility systems that can cause significant consequences under 
the impact are considered. Particularly, dehydration is an endothermic reaction; 
therefore, heating utility is critical to keep high conversion of the reaction of the 
dehydration process to satisfy production specifications. Scenarios of losing steam, 
heating oil, and quench water flow rates are evaluated for this process.  
On the other hand, the process using oxydehydrogenation which is an exothermal 
reaction is vulnerable to the lack of cooling utility. Uncontrolled exothermic reaction can 
lead to severe violation of safety criteria such as run-away reactions, overheated and 
overpressure reactors. Mixture of ethane and oxygen in the feed stream can be 
overheated and violate its flammability limits. This process is investigated in scenarios 
of losing cooling water and quenching water. 
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8.2.3.1 Flexibility index of the dehydration process 
Four pieces of equipment using steam, heating oil, or boiling feed water are affected by 
the impact of the pipeline rupture. The effects of impact are transformed into the flow 
reduction of those utility streams. Their ranges are given in Table 21. 
 
Table 21. Ranges of impact utility flow rates in dehydration process. 
Impact utility Equipment using 
the utility supply 
Lower limit 
(kg/h) 
Nominal rate 
(kg/h) 
Upper limit 
(kg/h) 
Steam Evaporator 0  2,425  2,425  
Heating oil Reactor  0  35,578 35,578 
Boiler feed water Boiler  0  1,136  1,136  
Steam Mixer  0  1,802  1,802  
 
 
Under the impact, all the control system can be used to tune operating conditions to 
bounce back the effect. However, assume only three following control variables are 
effective to tackle the impact: furnace fuel rate, valve opening position, and water for the 
quench unit. For controllable flow rates, they are assumed to be able to vary from zero to 
a maximum of 130% of the nominal values. For throttle valve, it can be adjusted all the 
way of position. Their values are shown in Table 22. 
 
Table 22. Ranges of adjustable control variables in the dehydration process. 
Variables (unit)  Lower bound (by %)  Nominal value  Upper bound (by %)  
Furnace fuel (MCal/h)  0 (-100%)  732 952 (+30%)  
Valve opening (%)  0 (-100%) 46.3  100 (+116%)  
Quenching water(kg/h)  0 (-100%) 30,000  39,000 (+30%)  
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The product specifications are ethylene purity (minimum purity level: 95% mol) and 
production rate (minimum flow rate of ethylene: 80% of nominal value). Because the 
dryer can not be simulated in Aspen Plus, it was assumed that dryer can process satisfied 
purity from a wide range of inlet purity. It was further assumed that the reaction 
conversion is assumed too low and therefore production rate is not met if reactor 
temperature is lower than 100oC. For this reason, reactor temperature was the only 
specification of the simulation. The process specifications are given in Table 23. 
 
Table 23. Production specifications of the dehydration process. 
Parameter Minimum value 
Product (ethylene) purity 95% mol. 
Production rate 80% of nominal value 
Reactor temperature 100oC 
 
 
Table 24. Safety criteria of the dehydration process. 
Equipment Tnominal (oC) Tdesign  (oC) Pdesign (bar) 
Pump 25 120 10 
Evaporator 108 250 10 
Mixer 116 250 10 
Furnace 350 700 10 
Reactor  350 700 10 
Boiler  350 500 10 
Throttling valve 160 250 10 
Quench  83 250 10 
Scrubber  81 150 10 
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Safety criteria are the ranges of operating temperature and pressures not to cause 
mechanic failure of equipment. Highest normal operating pressure of the process is 3 
bar. All pieces of equipment were designed to withstand a maximum pressure of 10 bar. 
Table 24 lists the design temperatures and design pressures which are specified as upper 
limits of the safety criteria. 
The simulation results are reported in APPENDIX E. The calculation procedure was 
performed as follows: 
 First, the base case was simulated. It is referred to as Scenario 1 in the report. 
 Second, the Sensitivity Analysis tool in Aspen Plus was used to simulate 16 
cases corresponding to the combination number of two extreme values of the 
four external impact parameters. Those simulation results are marked as Scenario 
2-17 in the report. 11 cases out of them were converged and met all the 
specifications and criteria. The flexibility indices for those 11 cases were 1. 
 Third, the control variables were adjusted in the remaining 5 cases (Scenarios 7 
and 10 – 13) violating the minimum temperature requirement of reactor or 
yielding unreasonable simulation results. Because their linear relationships, 
furnace fuel duty was preferred maximized to increase reactor temperature. There 
was no need to adjust valve openings and quench water rate as the related units 
operated within accepted specifications and criteria. With the furnace duty 
adjustment, 3 out of the 5 cases satisfied the constraints; therefore, their 
flexibility index is 1. 
 Next, the remaining 2 cases still violating reactor temperature limits need 
reduction of impact levels. The search for the threshold level was performed until 
reactor temperature is at 100oC. The result shows that the minimum mixer steam 
the plant can withstand is 487 kg/h, i.e., if the steam is lost more then reactor 
temperate can not be met for any values of the control variables. The flexibility 
index of this case is 
x∗(q) = |q − q]|∆q = |487 − 1802||0 − 1802| = 0.73 
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Compared all the found indices, the flexibility index of the dehydration process is 
0.73, which is the smallest of indices from all cases. Figure 30 tracks the number of 
cases in the calculation steps. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Tracking number of cases in calculation of dehydration flexibility index. 
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8.2.3.2 Flexibility index of the oxydehydrogenation process 
As discussed at the beginning of Section 8.2.3 the oxydehydrogenation process is 
vulnerable to loss of cooling utility because of its highly exothermic reaction and oxygen 
presence in the feed mixed streams. In this case study, it was assumed that three pieces 
of equipment using cooling water are affected by the impact of the pipeline rupture. 
Their ranges of the impact are given in Table 25. 
 
Table 25.Ranges of impact utility flow rates in oxydehydrogenation process. 
Impact utility Equipment using 
the utility supply 
Lower limit 
(kg/h) 
Nominal rate 
(kg/h) 
Upper limit 
(kg/h) 
Cooling water Reactor 1 cooler 0  245,737 245,737 
Cooling water Reactor 2 cooler 0  211,529 211,529 
Cooling water Recycle amine 0  161,025 161,025 
 
 
Among the control variables, assume only two following control variables are 
effective to tackle the loss of the cooling utility: steam rate of the heater, and water for 
the scrubber unit. (Process flow diagram with the control systems is shown in 
APPENDIX B.) As in the other process, controllable flow rates are assumed to be able to 
vary from zero to a maximum of 130% of the nominal values, which are shown in Table 
26. 
 
Table 26. Ranges of adjustable control variables in the oxydehydrogenation process. 
Variables (unit)  Lower bound (by %)  Nominal value  Upper bound (by %)  
Heater HP steam (kg/h)  0 (-100%)  6,611 8,594 (+30%)  
Quenchingwater(kg/h)  0 (-100%) 34,000  43,000 (+30%)  
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The product specifications are ethylene purity and production rate. Minimum flow 
rate of the product stream is 80% of the nominal value). The process specifications are 
given in Table 27. They can be checked directly from Aspen simulation results. 
 
Table 27. Production specifications of the oxydehydrogenation process. 
Parameter Unit Nominal value Minimum value 
Product purity % mol. 96.7 95.0 
Production rate kg/h 3,301 2,641 
 
 
Safety criteria in this process are not only equipment design temperature and 
pressures but also temperature of the reactor feeds to reduce flammability hazards. The 
reactor inlet stream is a mixture of ethane, ethylene, and oxygen. Flammability limits of 
a mixture of ethane and oxygen at atmosphere pressure is 3-12.4%, while that of 
ethylene and oxygen is 2.7-36%. These flammability limits are affected by the 
temperature and pressure of the ethane and ethylene stream. Higher temperature results 
in lower LFL and higher UFL, while greater pressure increases both values. As 
recommended in the patent66, to avoid the flammability region under high temperature 
and pressure operating condition, the conversion of ethane to ethylene was divided into 
three stages (three reactors in series). Oxygen was introduced to the inlet of every stage 
such that the oxygen content is less than 6%mol.66  The temperature of that inlet gaseous 
stream is also limited at 250oC.66 
Because pressure-changing valve was not involved in this analysis, the criteria on 
maximum pressures were not considered. In the simulation, pressures were specified 
inputs.  
To avoid the excess vaporization of water in the scrubber which may result in failure 
of the following compressor, the scrubber temperature must be less than 95oC. The 
maximum temperature of compressor outlet is 300oC to avoid upset and failure in the 
absorber. Table 28 lists the safety criteria.  
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Table 28.Safety criteria of the oxydehydrogenation process. 
Equipment and stream Tnominal (oC) Tmaximum (oC) 
Reactor 1 cooler 396 500 
Reactor 2 mixed inlet 90 250 
Reactor 2 cooler 368 500 
Reactor 3 mixed inlet 90 250 
Reactor 3 cooler 375 500 
Scrubber temperature 71 95 
Compressor temperature 193 300 
 
 
The simulation results are reported in APPENDIX E. Similar to the dehydration 
calculation procedure, the calculation procedure was performed as follows: 
 First, the base case was simulated. It is referred to as Scenario 1 in the report. Its 
operation satisfied all the requirements. 
 Second, the Sensitivity Analysis tool in Aspen Plus was used to simulate 8 cases 
corresponding to the combination number of two extreme values of the four 
external impact parameters. Those simulation results are marked as Scenarios 1 – 
8 in the report (One of the scenarios is identical to base case). Only two of those 
8 cases (Scenarios 1 and 2) met all the specifications and criteria. The flexibility 
indices for those 2 cases were noted as 1. The violated safety criteria were 
temperatures of Reactor 2 feed, Reactor 3 feed and cooler, and Scrubber. The 
specification of product concentration was also not met. 
 Third, the control variables were adjusted in the violating 6 cases (Scenarios 9 – 
14). Because their linear relationships, heater duty was minimized and quench 
water is maximized to reduce the violated temperatures. With those adjustments, 
all the 6 cases still did not satisfied the constraints; therefore, their impact ranges 
must be reduced. 
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Figure 31. Tracking number of cases in calculation of oxydehydrogenation flexibility 
index. 
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x∗(q) = |q − q]|∆q = |90,925 − 245,737||0 − 245,737| = 0.63 
Compared all the found indices, the flexibility index of the oxydehydrogenation 
process is 0.63, which is the smallest of indices from all cases. Figure 31 tracks the 
number of cases in the calculation steps. 
The methodology leads to the higher the obtained flexibility index is, the more 
resilient the process design achieves. As a result, the ethanol dehydration process is more 
resilient with regard to the flexibility perspectives. Then, to evaluate an overall resilience 
index, flexibility index needs to be in the same scale and consistent with other indices 
which are in the score of 0 to 10 and in the form that the lower is the better. Therefore, 
the obtained flexibility indices of both processes were normalized as below: 
For the ethanol dehydration process: (FI)d = (1-0.73) ·10 = 2.7 
For the ethane oxydehydrogenation process: (FI)O = (1-0.63) ·10 = 3.7 
8.2.4 Weighting factors 
The AHP method in Section 4.2.2 was applied for this case study to obtain the 
relative weights of inherent safety, controllability, and flexibility sub-factors with regard 
to the resilience factor of the ethylene production design. The questionnaire in  
Table 2 was sent to a safety expert who has a lot of years of working experience in 
process safety and knowledge about resilience in chemical processes. The answers or the 
selection of a number shown in Table 29 was done in accordance with the expert’s 
experienced opinion. 
The above preferences or priority of each factor in terms of how contributes to 
resilience of a design is demonstrated into the following comparison matrix: 
 
¡ 1 7 31/7 1 11/3 1 1¡ 
     Column sums:  1.48    9     5 
The following steps were performed to obtain the weighting factors of Inherent 
Safety, Controllability, and Flexibility to the resilience of a design. 
  IS     F    C 
IS 
F  
C 
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Table 29. The expert’s judgments on pair-wise comparison 
 Questions Answers 
Q1. How important is Inherent Safer Design when it is compared to 
Flexibility? 
 
 
7 
Q2. How important is Inherent Safer Design when it is compared to 
Controllability? 
 
 
3 
Q3. How important is Flexibility when it is compared to Controllability? 
 
 
1 
 
 
 Normalizing the pair-wise comparison matrix is performed by dividing each cell of 
the matrix by is column total. 
 
¡0.677 0.778 0.6000.097 0.111 0.2000.226 0.111 0.200¡ 
                  Column sum:       1.00       1.00       1.00 
 Obtain the eigenvector by averaging the normalized scores of all the cells in the 
same row to determine the final score of an alternative  
¡0.6850.1360.179¡ 
  IS          F           C 
IS 
F  
C 
Inherent  
Safety Design Flexibility 
1 3 5 7 9 
Inherent  
Safety Design 
Controllability 
1 3 5 7 9 
Flexibility Controllability 
1 3 5 7 9 
IS 
F  
C 
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 Estimate the consistency ratio to check the consistency of the pair-wise comparison 
matrix to check whether the responder’s comparison were consistent or not. 
Consistency ratio is estimated through several steps as follows: 
 Obtain the weighted sum matrix: 
0.685Y 11/71/3^ + 0.136 Y
711^ + 0.179 Y
311^ = Y
2.1740.4130.543^ 
 Dividing all the elements of the weighted sum matrices by their respective 
eigenvector element, we obtain: 
2.1740.685 = 3.174; 0.4130.136 = 3.037; 0.5430.179 = 3.034 
 Then, computing the average of the above values to obtain λmax 
 = 3.174 + 3.037 + 3.0343 = 3.082 
 Calculating the consistency index, CI, as follows 
 =   −  − 1 = 3.082 − 33 − 1 = 0.041 
 From the work of Saaty, the appropriate value of random consistency ratio, 
RI, for a matrix size of three is 0.58. The consistency ratio, CR, for this case 
is:  
 =  =  0.0410.58 = 0.071 
 As the value of CR is less than 0.1, the judgment on the weights of the contribution 
factors is acceptable.  
 Hence, the relative weights of inherent safety, controllability, and flexibility are 
0.685, 0.179 and 0.136, respectively. 
Since the contribution of Flexibility to Design was assessed as being inferior to that 
of Inherent Safety by a value of 7 i.e., Inherent Safety is favored very strongly over 
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Flexibility, this factor also has the lowest computed weight 0.136. The contribution of 
Controllability was assessed as being inferior to that of Inherent Safety by a factor of 3 
i.e., the latter are favored slightly, and its weight computed as 0.179. It is evident that 
with 68.5%, Inherent Safety is leading sub-factors of the Design factor. 
8.2.5 Discussions 
The indices of each contribution factors to a resilience design including Inherent Safety, 
Controllability, and Flexibility as well as their important weights have been calculated. 
The final resilience design index is obtained by adding the products of the normalized 
indices and their weighting factors. Table 30 summarizes all indices in a scale of 0 to 10 
and the final resilience design indices of two processes.   
 
Table 30. Normalized values of all indices to scale of 0 to 10 
Contribution factors Ethanol 
dehydration 
Ethane 
dehydrogenation 
Weighting 
factors (%) 
Normalized Inherent 
Safety index 
2.9 6.0 68.5 
Normalized 
Controllability index (CI) 
8 2 17.9 
Normalized Flexibility 
index (FI) 
2.7 3.7 13.6 
Overall resilience Design 
index (IRD) 
3.8 5.0  
 
 
The final results show that the ethanol dehydration process design is more resilient 
than the ethane oxydehydrogenation process design. This index methodology can also be 
used to compare each individual index for the resilience improvement purpose. For 
instance, the ethanol dehydration process is more resilient with regard to the inherent 
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safety and flexibility perspectives. In the other hand, the ethane oxydehydrogenation 
process is more resilient with regard to the controllability perspectives. That means, the 
dehydration process has a wider operation range (more flexible) but it is more difficult to 
change the operation from one state to another (lower controllability index). To improve 
overall resilience for the oxydehydrogenation, the inventory should be reduced by 
finding a way to increase the product yield.  
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CHAPTER IX  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
9.1 Conclusion 
This work revealed the importance of resilience characteristics in the chemical process, 
an undeveloped research area. The aim of this work is to develop new principles and 
contributing factors that constitute resilience, and propose a new method for resilience 
evaluation of the chemical processes.  
In the pursuit of the first objective, analyzing transitions of system states unveiled 
that resilience is characterized by multiple factors or measures. These measures work 
and interact together to improve the ability of chemical processes to bounce back. In 
developing this area of research, the principles of resilience were proposed to be 
Flexibility, Controllability, Early Detection, Minimization of Failure, Limitation of 
Effects, and Administrative Controls/ Procedures. These principles act as guidelines to 
help develop the multiple contribution factors for numerically evaluating resilience. The 
first layer of factors contributing to resilience was proposed to include Design factor, 
Detection Potential factor, Emergency Response Planning factor, Human factor, and 
Safety Management factor. 
As for the second objective, multi-level multi-factor approach was proposed to 
quantify resilience of a chemical process. Among five main contribution factors to 
resilience, the Design factor was further developed to demonstrate the applicability of 
the multi-factor approach in evaluating Design index. Its sub-factors were proposed to be 
Inherent Safety, Controllability, and Flexibility.  
 The Inherent Safety index accounted for the effects of material and process 
design on the process’ resilience from an inherent safety viewpoint. The 
proposed framework showed that the Inherent Safety index takes into account all 
the aspects of process safety design via various sub-indices.  
 The calculation procedure of the Controllability index, using proposed relative 
gain matrix analysis, is systematic and applicable for controllability evaluations. 
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The index values indicate a reliable comparative conclusion on the controllability 
between two or more processes.  
 New approach was developed to quantify flexibility of chemical process. The 
theory is based on optimization programming. With a few assumptions on the 
function characteristics, the solution approach can be performed in a process 
simulator like Aspen Plus. 
The proposed quantification methodology was demonstrated in a case study of 
evaluating and comparing resilience of two processes producing ethylene via 
dehydration of bio-ethanol and oxydehydrogenation of ethane. It was found in the results 
that the dehydration process was inherently safer and more flexible yet less controllable 
in the viewpoints of safety-oriented resilience. At the bottom line, the dehydration 
process design has index values that are more positive to resilience characteristics than 
those of the oxydehydrogenation process.  
The case study results for resilience Design factor showed the applicability of the 
propose method for assessment and comparison of resilience levels of chemical 
processes, and at the same time to guide effort to achieve a more resilient design. The 
method can be further developed at different levels including process, sub-process, 
subsystem level, or sub-levels of the factors in order to find least resilient points in the 
design.  
It is also very important to understand that process may be resilient with respect one 
criteria, but not resilient in another point of view or the other criteria. Two processes 
may seem equally resilient in terms of the final index, but the scores of the sub-indices 
can be significantly different. By this way, the improvement opportunities can be 
identified to increase the resilience of chemical processes by modify early the process 
designs. 
It should be noted that this method is not designed for estimating resilience level for 
a single process because no zero-absolute resilience was established. In that case, a 
reference level which refers to a standard similar process can be used. In addition, the 
proposed method is applicable for different types of unexpected situations. 
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9.2 Recommendations for future work 
The proposed methodology can be further improved. The proposed multi-level multi-
factor approach has been developed to evaluate the resilience index in terms of the 
design aspect. Evaluation of other sub-indices including Emergency Response Planning 
factor, Human factor, and Safety Management factor in terms of resilience point of view 
should be studied and developed to have better understanding resilience in chemical 
processes.  
The approach to assess controllability is simple but lacks full insights on the control 
system. It may not hinder many other aspects of process control.  
To achieve a higher resilient design, it may require to invest more equipment, piping, 
interconnections (which lead to complexity) and oversized equipment (which leads to 
operational problems) and resulting in more capital with none or very limited pay-back. 
In economic view point, the whole plant should be analyzed not only from the process 
viewpoint but also from the capital and operating cost viewpoint to understand where 
and how resilience has been reduced (or increased) and the economic impact of the 
changes.  
 
 
 
Figure 32. Expected curve of a resilience level Ψ and cost. 
 
 
Cost
Ψ
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Figure 32 shows an expected relationship of a resilience level Ψ and process costs. In 
general, cost increases as more resilient is gained. From this expectation, the following 
problems arise to incorporate costs into resilience optimization problem. 
 Maximize resilience index and impose a cost limitation (i.e., COST ≤ Budget). 
The solution will be the most resilience design within a budget. 
 Replace object by a minimization of COST which is a function of resilience 
index. The solution is a least costly design with an acceptable resilience level. 
Specifically, the process complexity of inherent safety factor can be done in more 
details if additional data is available. For instance, the factors of equipment complexity 
can be different when detailed designs of heat exchangers are considered (spiral heat 
exchanger can be scored more complex than sign-pass steel-tube heat exchanger.) Piping 
is the other issue needs to be considered in complexity term when possible since it can 
make the overall system complicated, and affect the inherent safety of the process. 
Fewer lines and connections improve safety because it can lead to less operational 
errors. The piping complexity factors can be number of lines plant, number of 
connections modeling, number of piping items. The relationship between complexity 
and weighting factors can also be done to address more accurately. 
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APPENDIX A 
INCIDENT DATABASE FOR CBR METHOD 
Table 31.Incident database for CBR 
Outlet components Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 
I
n
p
u
t
 
d
a
t
a
 Database MARS RMP RMP RMP HSEES HSEES HSEES 
Type of 
industry 
Ethylene 
Production 
Plant 
Ethylene unit Ethylene Unit Ethylene 
Producer 
 2869 
ethylene 
production 
2869, mfg 
ethylene 
SYSTEM Fixed facility    Fixed 
facility 
Fixed facility Fixed facility 
 Substance 
involved 
Ethylene, 
Propylene, 
Ethylene Ethylene Ethylene Ethylene 
Ethane 
Ethylene Ethylene 
 
   
 
   
O
u
t
p
u
t
 
d
a
t
a
 ID  9122 7678 6510 4871 LA20011807 LA20020828 
Location  Sunoco, Inc. 
Marcus Hook 
Refinery, Marcus 
Hook, PA 
Sunoco, Inc. 
Marcus Hook 
Refinery, Marcus 
Hook, PA 
Westlake 
Petrochemic
als, Sulphur, 
LA 
Calcasieu, 
LA 
LA Baton rouge, 
LA 
 Date 18/01/1985 May 17 2009 Aug 18 2000 Jan 05 2002 2001 12/2/2001 6/26/2002 
 Incident Release and 
explosion 
   Air 
Emission 
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Table 31. (Continued) 
 Cause  Unused by-
pass failure  
Equipment 
failure 
Equipment 
failure 
Equipment 
failure 
System 
startup 
and 
shutdown 
Equipment 
failure 
Deliberate 
damage/inten
tional 
 Consequences 43 people 
injured 
      
 Details The accident 
occurred 
during normal 
operation in a 
distillation 
unit of the 
Ethylene 
Production 
Plant in a 
petrochemical 
industry. 
 10lbs 1,300lbs 
ethylene 
released 
  System start-
up.  
Release 
amount 
unknown. 
Exact end 
time 
unknown. 
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APPENDIX B 
PROCESS DIAGRAMS 
 
B.1 Commercial ethylene production process diagrams 
 
Figure 33. Petrobras process for ethanol dehydration.72 
 
 
Figure 34. Lummus fixed-bed process for ethanol dehydration.75 
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Figure 35. Lummus fluidized-bed process for ethanol dehydration.75 
 
Figure 36. Halcon SD process for ethanol dehydration.75  
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B.2 Typical control system investigated in the case study 
 
    
(a) Flowrate control     (b) Reactor temperature control  
 
   
(c) Flash drum control     (d) Cooler control 
 
   
(e) Evaporator control     (f) Condenser control 
 
Figure 37. Typical feedback control systems. 
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(g) Furnace control 
 
  
 
(h) Distillation column control 
 
Figure 37. (Continued) 
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B.3 Ethylene process diagram with control systems 
 
 
 
Figure 38.Dehydration of bioethanol to ethylene process with designed control systems 
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Figure 39. Dehydration of bioethanol to ethylene process with the slow and fast response pairs of control. 
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Figure 40. Oxydehydrogenation of ethane to ethylene process with designed control systems. 
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Figure 41. Oxydehydrogenation of ethane to ethylene process with the slow and fast response pairs of control. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASPEN MODELS AND INPUT DATA FOR THE CASE STUDY OF ETHYLENE PRODUCTION PROCESSES 
C.1 Aspen model 
Equipment Aspen model Property method Equilibrium package Specified parameter 
Pump PUMP NRTL (none) Outlet pressure 
Evaporator, cooler, 
condenser 
HEATER NRTL (none) Outlet pressure 
Heat duty 
Furnace HEATER NRTL (none) Outlet pressure 
Heat duty 
Reactor RSTOIC NRTL (none) Conversion 
Outlet pressure 
Heat duty 
Flash drum, , quench FLASH NRTL (none) Pressure drop 
Heat duty 
Valve  VALVE NRTL (none) Outlet pressure 
Scrubber FLASH ELECNRTL CAUSTIC Pressure drop 
Heat duty 
Dryer Separation NRTL (none) Split fractions 
Absorber RADFRAC ELECNRTL KEMDEA Pressure profile 
Stripper RADFRAC ELECNRTL KEMDEA Pressure profile 
Bottom rate 
Distillation RADFRAC NRTL (none) Bottom rate 
Reflux rate 
Compressor COMPRESSOR NRTL (none) Duty 
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C.2 Aspen flowsheets 
 
Figure 42. Aspen flowsheet of the dehydration process. 
 
Figure 43. Aspen flowsheet of the oxydehydrogenation process. 
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C.3 Input summary in Aspen Plus 
C.3.1 Dehydration process 
DYNAMICS 
    DYNAMICS RESULTS=ON 
 
IN-UNITS MET VOLUME-FLOW='cum/hr' ENTHALPY-FLO='Gcal/hr'  & 
        HEAT-TRANS-C='kcal/hr-sqm-K' PRESSURE=bar TEMPERATURE=C  & 
        VOLUME=cum DELTA-T=C HEAD=meter MOLE-DENSITY='kmol/cum'  & 
        MASS-DENSITY='kg/cum' MOLE-ENTHALP='kcal/mol'  & 
        MASS-ENTHALP='kcal/kg' HEAT=Gcal MOLE-CONC='mol/l' PDROP=bar  
 
DEF-STREAMS CONVEN ALL  
 
SIM-OPTIONS OLD-DATABANK=NO  
 
DESCRIPTION " " 
 
DATABANKS 'APV72 PURE24' / 'APV72 AQUEOUS' / 'APV72 SOLIDS' /  & 
        'APV72 INORGANIC' / 'APV72 ASPENPCD' / 'APV72 PURE856' 
 
PROP-SOURCES 'APV72 PURE24' / 'APV72 AQUEOUS' / 'APV72 SOLIDS' & 
         / 'APV72 INORGANIC' / 'APV72 ASPENPCD' /  'APV72 PURE856' 
 
COMPONENTS  
    ETHANOL C2H6O-2 / ETHYLENE C2H4 / H2O H2O / ACETAL C2H4O-1 /  
    HYDROGEN H2 / ACETIC C2H4O2-1 / ETHYLACE C4H8O2-3 /  
    ACETONE C3H6O-1 / METHANOL CH4O / METHANE CH4 / ETHANE C2H6 /  
    PROPANE C3H8 / PROPYLEN C3H6-2 / N-BUTANE C4H10-1 /  
    I-BUTANE C4H8-5 / CO CO / CO2 CO2 / NH3 H3N / H2S H2S /  
    NAOH NAOH / NA+ NA+ / H3O+ H3O+ / NH4+ NH4+ / OH- OH- /  
    HCO3- HCO3- / CO3-2 CO3-2 / HS- HS- / S-2 S-2 / NH2COO- NH2COO- /  
    CH3COO- CH3COO- / NA2CO3 NA2CO3 / NAHCO3 NAHCO3  
 
HENRY-COMPS ESOURO NH3 H2S CO2 ETHYLENE  
 
SOLVE  
    PARAM  
 
CHEMISTRY CAUSTIC  
 
CHEMISTRY ESOURO  
 
FLOWSHEET  
    BLOCK EVAPORAT IN=1 OUT=2  
    BLOCK MIXER IN=2 3 OUT=4  
    BLOCK FURNACE IN=4 OUT=5  
    BLOCK REACTOR IN=5 OUT=6  
    BLOCK BOILER IN=6 OUT=7  
    BLOCK PUMP IN=ETHANOL OUT=1  
    BLOCK VALVE IN=7 OUT=8  
    BLOCK QUENCH IN=8 9 OUT=11 10  
    BLOCK SCRUBBER IN=11 12 OUT=14 13  
    BLOCK DRYER IN=14 OUT=15 16  
PROPERTIES NRTL TRUE-COMPS=YES  
    PROPERTIES ELECNRTL / PENG-ROB  
 
STREAM 3  
    SUBSTREAM MIXED PRES=3. VFRAC=1. MOLE-FLOW=100.  
MASS-FRAC H2O 1. 
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STREAM 7B  
    SUBSTREAM MIXED TEMP=105. PRES=3.  
    MOLE-FLOW ETHANOL 1.98 / ETHYLENE 94.05 / H2O 194.05 /  & 
ACETAL 2.97 / HYDROGEN 2.97 / ACETIC 0. / ETHYLACE 0. /  
ACETONE 0. / METHANOL 0. / METHANE 0. /  ETHANE 0. /  
PROPANE 0. / PROPYLEN 0. / N-BUTANE 0. / & 
I-BUTANE 0. / CO 0. / CO2 1.  
 
STREAM 9  
    SUBSTREAM MIXED TEMP=35. PRES=1.2 MASS-FLOW=30000.  
MOLE-FRAC H2O 1. 
 
STREAM 12  
    SUBSTREAM MIXED TEMP=25. PRES=1.15 MOLE-FLOW=95.  & 
        SOLVENT=H2O FREE-WATER=NO NPHASE=1 PHASE=L  
    MOLE-CONC NAOH 1.19 <kmol/cum> 
 
STREAM ETHANOL  
    SUBSTREAM MIXED TEMP=25. PRES=1. MOLE-FLOW=100.  
    MOLE-FRAC ETHANOL 0.99 / CO2 0.01  
 
BLOCK MIXER MIXER  
 
BLOCK DRYER SEP  
    FRAC STREAM=16 SUBSTREAM=MIXED COMPS=ETHANOL ETHYLENE H2O  & 
        ACETAL HYDROGEN ACETIC ETHYLACE ACETONE METHANOL  & 
        METHANE ETHANE PROPANE PROPYLEN N-BUTANE I-BUTANE CO  & 
        CO2 NH3 H2S NAOH NA+ H3O+ NH4+ OH- HCO3- CO3-2 HS-  & 
S-2 NH2COO- FRACS=0. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.  
 
BLOCK BOILER HEATER  
    PARAM PRES=0. DUTY=-0.615275  
    HCURVE 1 INDEP-VAR=VFRAC LIST=0. 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5  & 
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1. PROPERTIES=HXDESIGN  
    UTILITY UTILITY-ID=CW  
 
BLOCK EVAPORAT HEATER  
    PARAM PRES=0. DUTY=1.16584412  
    UTILITY UTILITY-ID=HPSTEAM  
 
BLOCK FURNACE HEATER  
    PARAM PRES=0. DUTY=0.73236908  
    UTILITY UTILITY-ID=N-GAS  
 
BLOCK QUENCH FLASH2  
    PARAM PRES=0. DUTY=0.  
 
BLOCK SCRUBBER FLASH2  
    PARAM PRES=0. DUTY=0.  
    PROPERTIES ELECNRTL HENRY-COMPS=ESOURO CHEMISTRY=CAUSTIC  & 
        FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
 
BLOCK REACTOR RSTOIC  
    PARAM PRES=0. DUTY=1.10470283  
    STOIC 1 MIXED ETHANOL -1. / ETHYLENE 1. / H2O 1.  
    STOIC 2 MIXED ETHANOL -1. / ACETAL 1. / HYDROGEN 1.  
    CONV 1 MIXED ETHANOL 0.95  
    CONV 2 MIXED ETHANOL 0.03  
    UTILITY UTILITY-ID=HEAT-OIL  
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BLOCK PUMP PUMP  
    PARAM PRES=3. NPHASE=2  
    PROPERTIES PENG-ROB FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=TRUE-COMPS=YES  
    BLOCK-OPTION FREE-WATER=NO  
 
BLOCK VALVE VALVE  
    PARAM P-OUT=1.1  
 
BLOCK VALVE-B VALVE  
    PARAM CALC-CV=YES P-OUT=1. CHECK-CHOKE=NO  
    VALVE-DEF VAL-TYPE="GLOBE" MFGR="NELES-JAMESBURY" SERIES= & 
        "V500_EQUAL_PERCENT_FLOW" SIZE="10-IN"  
    VAL-PARAM VP-DAT=10 CV-DAT=17 XT-DAT=0.79 FL-DAT=0.97 /  & 
        VP-DAT=20 CV-DAT=29 XT-DAT=0.79 FL-DAT=0.97 / VP-DAT=30  & 
        CV-DAT=42 XT-DAT=0.79 FL-DAT=0.97 / VP-DAT=40 CV-DAT=62  & 
        XT-DAT=0.79 FL-DAT=0.97 / VP-DAT=50 CV-DAT=98  & 
        XT-DAT=0.78 FL-DAT=0.96 / VP-DAT=60 CV-DAT=170  & 
        XT-DAT=0.76 FL-DAT=0.95 / VP-DAT=70 CV-DAT=293  & 
        XT-DAT=0.74 FL-DAT=0.94 / VP-DAT=80 CV-DAT=566  & 
        XT-DAT=0.71 FL-DAT=0.92 / VP-DAT=90 CV-DAT=840  & 
        XT-DAT=0.69 FL-DAT=0.91 / VP-DAT=100 CV-DAT=950  & 
        XT-DAT=0.68 FL-DAT=0.9  
 
UTILITY CW GENERAL  
    COST PRICE=0. <$/kg> 
    PARAM UTILITY-TYPE=WATER PRES=1. PRES-OUT=1. TIN=90. <F>& 
        TOUT=120. <F> CALOPT=FLASH  
 
UTILITY HEAT-OIL GENERAL  
    COST PRICE=0. <$/kg> 
    PARAM UTILITY-TYPE=OIL COOLING-VALU=100.  
 
UTILITY HPSTEAM GENERAL  
    COST PRICE=0. <$/kg> 
    PARAM UTILITY-TYPE=STEAM PRES=10. PRES-OUT=10. VFRAC=1.  & 
        VFR-OUT=0. CALOPT=FLASH  
 
UTILITY N-GAS GENERAL  
    COST PRICE=0. <$/kg> 
    PARAM UTILITY-TYPE=GAS COOLING-VALU=11000.  
 
EO-CONV-OPTI  
 
CONV-OPTIONS  
    PARAM TOL=1E-010  
 
STREAM-REPOR MOLEFLOW MOLEFRAC  
 
PROPERTY-REP NOPARAM-PLUS 
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C.3.2 Oxydehydrogenation process 
DYNAMICS 
    DYNAMICS RESULTS=ON 
 
IN-UNITS MET VOLUME-FLOW='cum/hr' ENTHALPY-FLO='Gcal/hr'  & 
        HEAT-TRANS-C='kcal/hr-sqm-K' PRESSURE=bar TEMPERATURE=C  & 
        VOLUME=cum DELTA-T=C HEAD=meter MOLE-DENSITY='kmol/cum'  & 
        MASS-DENSITY='kg/cum' MOLE-ENTHALP='kcal/mol'  & 
        MASS-ENTHALP='kcal/kg' HEAT=Gcal MOLE-CONC='mol/l' PDROP=bar  
 
DEF-STREAMS CONVEN ALL  
 
SIM-OPTIONS  
    IN-UNITS MET MASS-FLOW='tonne/hr' MOLE-FLOW=MMscmh  & 
        VOLUME-FLOW='cum/hr' ENTHALPY-FLO='Gcal/hr'  & 
        HEAT-TRANS-C='kcal/hr-sqm-K' MASS=tonne PRESSURE=bar  & 
        TEMPERATURE=C VOLUME=cum DELTA-T=C HEAD=meter  & 
        MOLE-DENSITY='kmol/cum' MASS-DENSITY='kg/cum'  & 
        MOLE-ENTHALP='kcal/mol' MASS-ENTHALP='kcal/kg'  & 
        MOLE-VOLUME='cum/kmol' MOLES=MMscm HEAT=Gcal  & 
        MASS-CONC='kg/cum' MOLE-CONC='kmol/cum' PDROP=bar  & 
        VOL-HEAT-CAP='kcal/cum-K'  
    SIM-OPTIONS OLD-DATABANK=NO  
 
DESCRIPTION "" 
 
DATABANKS 'APV72 PURE24' / 'APV72 AQUEOUS' / 'APV72 SOLIDS' /  & 
        'APV72 INORGANIC' / 'APV72 ASPENPCD' / 'APV72 PURE856' 
 
PROP-SOURCES 'APV72 PURE24' / 'APV72 AQUEOUS' / 'APV72 SOLIDS' & 
         / 'APV72 INORGANIC' / 'APV72 ASPENPCD' /  'APV72 PURE856' 
 
COMPONENTS  
    C2H6 C2H6 / O2 O2 / CO2 CO2 / C2H4 C2H4 / ACETIC C2H4O2-1 /  
    H2O H2O / CO CO / N2 N2 / CH4 CH4 / MDEA C5H13NO2 / H2S H2S /  
    HCO3- HCO3- / MDEA+ / CO3-2 CO3-2 / HS- HS- / S-2 S-2 /  
    H3O+ H3O+ / OH- OH-  
 
HENRY-COMPS C2 C2H6 C2H4  
 
HENRY-COMPS CO O2 CO  
 
HENRY-COMPS KEMDEA CO2 H2S C2H6 C2H4  
 
CHEMISTRY KEMDEA  
 
FLOWSHEET  
    BLOCK COOLER1 IN=PRODUCT1 OUT=FEED2 CONDEN1  
    BLOCK SCRUBBER IN=WATER 3 OUT=4 CONDEN3  
    BLOCK COMPRESS IN=4 OUT=5  
    BLOCK COOLER2 IN=PRODUCT2 OUT=FEED3 CONDEN2  
    BLOCK REACTOR1 IN=OXYGEN-1 2 OUT=PRODUCT1  
    BLOCK ABSORBER IN=5 7 OUT=9 RICH  
    BLOCK COOLER3 IN=PRODUCT3 OUT=3  
    BLOCK VALVE-2 IN=RECYCLE OUT=RECYCL-B  
    BLOCK STRIPPER IN=RICH-HT OUT=6 8  
    BLOCK COOLER4 IN=13 OUT=LEAN-B  
    BLOCK FLASH IN=9 OUT=10 11  
    BLOCK DEETHANE IN=11 OUT=ETHYLENE RECYCLE  
    BLOCK MIXER IN=RECYCL-C ETHANE OUT=1  
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    BLOCK REACTOR2 IN=OXYGEN-2 FEED2 OUT=PRODUCT2  
    BLOCK REACTOR3 IN=OXYGEN-3 FEED3 OUT=PRODUCT3  
    BLOCK VALVE-1 IN=RICH OUT=RICH-LP  
    BLOCK PUMP IN=LEAN OUT=7  
    BLOCK HEATER IN=1 OUT=2  
    BLOCK HX IN=8 RICH-LP OUT=13 RICH-HT  
 
PROPERTIES ELECNRTL HENRY-COMPS=KEMDEA CHEMISTRY=KEMDEA  & 
        TRUE-COMPS=YES  
    PROPERTIES NRTL / PENG-ROB  
 
PROP-SET XAPP XAPP SUBSTREAM=MIXED COMPS=MDEA CO2 PHASE=L  
 
STREAM ETHANE  
    IN-UNITS MET VOLUME-FLOW='cum/hr' ENTHALPY-FLO='Gcal/hr'  & 
        HEAT-TRANS-C='kcal/hr-sqm-K' PRESSURE=bar TEMPERATURE=C  & 
        VOLUME=cum DELTA-T=C HEAD=meter MOLE-DENSITY='kmol/cum'  & 
        MASS-DENSITY='kg/cum' MOLE-ENTHALP='kcal/mol'  & 
        MASS-ENTHALP='kcal/kg' HEAT=Gcal MOLE-CONC='mol/l'  & 
        PDROP=bar  
    SUBSTREAM MIXED TEMP=25. PRES=10. MOLE-FLOW=162.9  
MOLE-FLOW C2H6 140. / CO2 0.37  
 
STREAM LEAN  
    SUBSTREAM MIXED TEMP=44. PRES=5. MOLE-FLOW=1679.22357  
MOLE-FLOW C2H6 0. / O2 0. / CO2 0.00025556 / C2H4 0. /  & 
ACETIC 1.15403682 / H2O 1555.20467 / CO 0. / N2 0. / & 
CH4 0. / MDEA 122.310958 / H2S 0. / HCO3- 0.1515002 / & 
MDEA+ 0.28377867 / CO3-2 0.0139036 / HS- 0. / S-2 0. / & 
H3O+ 6.8626E-009 / OH- 0.10447126  
 
STREAM OXYGEN-1  
    SUBSTREAM MIXED TEMP=80. PRES=10. MOLE-FLOW=41.76  
    MOLE-FLOW O2 6.6  
 
STREAM OXYGEN-2  
    IN-UNITS MET VOLUME-FLOW='cum/hr' ENTHALPY-FLO='Gcal/hr'  & 
        HEAT-TRANS-C='kcal/hr-sqm-K' PRESSURE=bar TEMPERATURE=C  & 
        VOLUME=cum DELTA-T=C HEAD=meter MOLE-DENSITY='kmol/cum'  & 
        MASS-DENSITY='kg/cum' MOLE-ENTHALP='kcal/mol'  & 
        MASS-ENTHALP='kcal/kg' HEAT=Gcal MOLE-CONC='mol/l'  & 
        PDROP=bar  
    SUBSTREAM MIXED TEMP=80. PRES=10. MOLE-FLOW=41.76  
    MOLE-FLOW O2 6.3  
 
STREAM OXYGEN-3  
    SUBSTREAM MIXED TEMP=80. PRES=10. MOLE-FLOW=41.76  
    MOLE-FLOW O2 6.3  
 
STREAM RECYCL-C  
    SUBSTREAM MIXED TEMP=-30.7 PRES=45. MOLE-FLOW=432.4  
    MOLE-FRAC C2H6 0.86 / C2H4 0.034 / H2O 0.105  
 
STREAM RICH  
    SUBSTREAM MIXED TEMP=36.44 PRES=1.  
    MOLE-FLOW C2H6 0.00152307 / O2 0.00083602 / CO2  & 
        0.0005689 / C2H4 0.00098885 / ACETIC 0.05490114 /  & 
H2O 85.0982413 / CO 0.00650914 / N2 0. / CH4 0. /  & 
        MDEA 5.75716338 / H2S 9.3059E-029 / HCO3- 0.75922157 /  & 
        MDEA+ 1.17264905 / CO3-2 0.20666536 / HS- 9.3059E-029 / & 
        S-2 1.3176E-018 / H3O+ 1.5075E-009 / OH- 9.6746E-005  
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STREAM WATER  
    SUBSTREAM MIXED TEMP=25. PRES=10. MASS-FLOW=34000.  
MOLE-FRAC H2O 1. 
 
BLOCK MIXER MIXER  
    PROPERTIES NRTL FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
 
BLOCK COOLER3 HEATER  
    PARAM PRES=0. DUTY=-2.3549519  
    UTILITY UTILITY-ID=CW  
 
BLOCK COOLER4 HEATER  
    PARAM TEMP=44. PRES=0.  
    PROPERTIES NRTL FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
    UTILITY UTILITY-ID=CW  
 
BLOCK HEATER HEATER  
    PARAM PRES=0. DUTY=2.83188741  
    UTILITY UTILITY-ID=HPSTEAM  
 
BLOCK COOLER1 FLASH2  
    PARAM PRES=0. DUTY=-4.0771789  
    PROPERTIES NRTL FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
    UTILITY UTILITY-ID=CW  
 
BLOCK COOLER2 FLASH2  
    PARAM PRES=0. DUTY=-3.5096161  
    PROPERTIES NRTL FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
    UTILITY UTILITY-ID=CW  
 
BLOCK FLASH FLASH2  
    PARAM PRES=0. DUTY=-1.3736872  
    HCURVE 1 INDEP-VAR=VFRAC LIST=0. 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5  & 
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1. PROPERTIES=VLE  & 
        PRES-PROFILE=CONSTANT  
    PROPERTIES NRTL HENRY-COMPS=CO FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA  & 
        SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
    UTILITY UTILITY-ID=PROPANE  
 
BLOCK SCRUBBER FLASH2  
    PARAM PRES=0. DUTY=0.  
    PROPERTIES NRTL HENRY-COMPS=C2 FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA  & 
        SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
 
BLOCK HX HEATX  
    PARAM T-COLD=110. U-OPTION=PHASE F-OPTION=CONSTANT  & 
        CALC-METHOD=SHORTCUT  
    FEEDS HOT=8 COLD=RICH-LP  
    PRODUCTS HOT=13 COLD=RICH-HT  
    HOT-SIDE DP-OPTION=CONSTANT  
    COLD-SIDE DP-OPTION=CONSTANT  
 
BLOCK ABSORBER RADFRAC  
    PARAM NSTAGE=21 ABSORBER=NO MAXOL=200  
    COL-CONFIG CONDENSER=NONE REBOILER=NONE  
    PROP-SECTION 1 21 ELECNRTL HENRY-COMPS=KEMDEA CHEMISTRY=KEMDEA  
    FEEDS 5 21 ON-STAGE / 7 1 ON-STAGE  
    PRODUCTS 9 1 V / RICH 21 L  
P-SPEC 1 650.<psig> 
    COL-SPECS  
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    REAC-STAGES 1 21 KEMDEA  
    HOLD-UP 1 21 MOLE-LHLDP=0.  
 
BLOCK DEETHANE RADFRAC  
    PARAM NSTAGE=40  
    COL-CONFIG CONDENSER=TOTAL  
    RATESEP-ENAB CALC-MODE=EQUILIBRIUM  
    FEEDS 11 25  
    PRODUCTS ETHYLENE 1 L / RECYCLE 40 L  
P-SPEC 1 43. 
    COL-SPECS MOLE-B=380. MOLE-L1=704.036282  
    PROPERTIES NRTL FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
 
BLOCK STRIPPER RADFRAC  
    PARAM NSTAGE=21 MAXOL=200  
    COL-CONFIG CONDENSER=NONE  
    FEEDS RICH-HT 1 ON-STAGE  
    PRODUCTS 6 1 V / 8 21 L  
    P-SPEC 1 18.5 <psig> 
    COL-SPECS B:F=0.975  
    REAC-STAGES 1 21 KEMDEA  
UTILITIES REB-UTIL=LPSTEAM  
 
BLOCK REACTOR1 RSTOIC  
    PARAM PRES=10. DUTY=0.  
    STOIC 1 MIXED C2H6 -1. / O2 -0.5 / C2H4 1. / H2O 1.  
    STOIC 2 MIXED C2H6 -1. / O2 -1.5 / ACETIC 1. / H2O 1.  
    STOIC 3 MIXED C2H6 -1. / O2 -2.5 / CO 2. / H2O 3.  
    STOIC 4 MIXED C2H6 -1. / O2 -3.5 / CO2 2. / H2O 3.  
    EXTENT 1 34.8  
    EXTENT 2 6.98  
    EXTENT 3 3.336  
    EXTENT 4 1.108  
    PROPERTIES NRTL FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
 
BLOCK REACTOR2 RSTOIC  
    PARAM PRES=10. DUTY=0.  
    STOIC 1 MIXED C2H6 -1. / O2 -0.5 / C2H4 1. / H2O 1.  
    STOIC 2 MIXED C2H6 -1. / O2 -1.5 / ACETIC 1. / H2O 1.  
    STOIC 3 MIXED C2H6 -1. / O2 -2.5 / CO 2. / H2O 3.  
    STOIC 4 MIXED C2H6 -1. / O2 -3.5 / CO2 2. / H2O 3.  
    EXTENT 1 34.8  
    EXTENT 2 6.98  
    EXTENT 3 3.336  
    EXTENT 4 1.108  
    PROPERTIES NRTL FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
 
BLOCK REACTOR3 RSTOIC  
    PARAM PRES=10. DUTY=0.  
    STOIC 1 MIXED C2H6 -1. / O2 -0.5 / C2H4 1. / H2O 1.  
    STOIC 2 MIXED C2H6 -1. / O2 -1.5 / ACETIC 1. / H2O1.  
    STOIC 3 MIXED C2H6 -1. / O2 -2.5 / CO 2. / H2O 3.  
    STOIC 4 MIXED C2H6 -1. / O2 -3.5 / CO2 2. / H2O 3.  
    EXTENT 1 34.8  
    EXTENT 2 6.98  
    EXTENT 3 3.336  
    EXTENT 4 1.108  
    PROPERTIES NRTL FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
 
BLOCK PUMP PUMP  
    PARAM PRES=45.9 NPHASE=2  
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    PROPERTIES ELECNRTL FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
    BLOCK-OPTION FREE-WATER=NO  
 
BLOCK COMPRESS COMPR  
    PARAM TYPE=ISENTROPIC POWER=1140.52832  
    PROPERTIES NRTL FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
 
BLOCK VALVE-1 VALVE  
    PARAM CALC-CV=YES P-OUT=5.  
    VALVE-DEF VAL-TYPE="GLOBE" MFGR="NELES-JAMESBURY" SERIES= & 
        "V500_EQUAL_PERCENT_FLOW" SIZE="4-IN"  
    PROPERTIES NRTL FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
 
BLOCK VALVE-2 VALVE  
    PARAM CALC-CV=YES P-OUT=10.1 CHECK-CHOKE=NO  
    VALVE-DEF VAL-TYPE="GLOBE" MFGR="NELES-JAMESBURY" SERIES= & 
        "V810_EQUAL_PERCENT_FLOW" SIZE="0.5-IN"  
    PROPERTIES NRTL FREE-WATER=STEAM-TA SOLU-WATER=3 TRUE-COMPS=YES  
 
UTILITY CW GENERAL  
    COST PRICE=0. <$/kg> 
    PARAM UTILITY-TYPE=WATER PRES=20. PRES-OUT=20. TIN=90. <F>& 
        TOUT=120. <F> CALOPT=FLASH  
 
UTILITY HPSTEAM GENERAL  
    COST PRICE=0. <$/kg> 
    PARAM UTILITY-TYPE=STEAM PRES=30. PRES-OUT=30. VFRAC=1.  & 
        VFR-OUT=0. CALOPT=FLASH  
 
UTILITY LPSTEAM GENERAL  
    COST PRICE=0. <$/kg> 
    PARAM UTILITY-TYPE=STEAM PRES=3. PRES-OUT=3. VFRAC=1.  & 
        VFR-OUT=0. CALOPT=FLASH  
 
UTILITY PROPANE GENERAL  
    COST PRICE=0. <$/kg> 
    PARAM UTILITY-TYPE=REFRIGERATIO COOLING-VALU=10.256 CALOPT=DUTY  
 
EO-CONV-OPTI  
 
CONV-OPTIONS  
    PARAM TOL=1E-010  
 
STREAM-REPOR MOLEFLOW MASSFLOW MOLEFRAC PROPERTIES=GASPROPS XAPP  
 
REACTIONS MDEA-ACI REAC-DIST  
    IN-UNITS SI MOLE-ENTHALP='cal/mol' VFLOW-RPM='cuft/hr/rpm'  & 
        F-FACTOR='(lb-cuft)**.5/hr'  
    DESCRIPTION "LIQUID PHASE REACTION"  
    REAC-DATA 1 EQUIL PHASE=L KBASIS=MOLE-GAMMA  
    REAC-DATA 2 EQUIL PHASE=L KBASIS=MOLE-GAMMA  
    REAC-DATA 3 EQUIL PHASE=L KBASIS=MOLE-GAMMA  
    REAC-DATA 4 KINETIC PHASE=L CBASIS=MOLAR  
    REAC-DATA 5 KINETIC PHASE=L CBASIS=MOLAR  
    REAC-DATA 6 EQUIL PHASE=L KBASIS=MOLE-GAMMA  
    REAC-DATA 7 EQUIL PHASE=L KBASIS=MOLE-GAMMA  
    K-STOIC 1 A=-9.41650 B=-4234.980 C=0.0 D=0.0  
    K-STOIC 2 A=132.8990 B=-13445.90 C=-22.47730 D=0.0  
    K-STOIC 3 A=216.0490 B=-12431.70 C=-35.48190 D=0.0  
    K-STOIC 6 A=214.5820 B=-12995.40 C=-33.54710 D=0.0  
    K-STOIC 7 A=-9.7420 B=-8585.470 C=0.0 D=0.0  
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    RATE-CON 4 PRE-EXP=4.31520E+13 ACT-ENERGY=13249.0  
    RATE-CON 5 PRE-EXP=3.74860E+14 ACT-ENERGY=25271.560  
    STOIC 1 MDEA+ -1.0 / H2O -1.0 / MDEA 1.0 / H3O+ 1.0  
    STOIC 2 H2O -2.0 / H3O+ 1.0 / OH- 1.0  
    STOIC 3 HCO3- -1.0 / H2O -1.0 / H3O+ 1.0 / CO3-2 1.0  
    STOIC 4 CO2 -1.0 / OH- -1.0 / HCO3- 1.0  
    STOIC 5 HCO3- -1.0 / CO2 1.0 / OH- 1.0  
    STOIC 6 H2O -1.0 / H2S -1.0 / HS- 1.0 / H3O+ 1.0  
    STOIC 7 H2O -1.0 / HS- -1.0 / S-2 1.0 / H3O+ 1.0  
    POWLAW-EXP 4 CO2 1.0 / OH- 1.0  
    POWLAW-EXP 5 HCO3- 1.0  
 
REACTIONS MDEA-CO2 REAC-DIST  
    IN-UNITS SI MOLE-ENTHALP='cal/mol' VFLOW-RPM='cuft/hr/rpm'  & 
        F-FACTOR='(lb-cuft)**.5/hr'  
    DESCRIPTION "LIQUID PHASE REACTION"  
    REAC-DATA 1 EQUIL PHASE=L KBASIS=MOLE-GAMMA  
    REAC-DATA 2 EQUIL PHASE=L KBASIS=MOLE-GAMMA  
    REAC-DATA 3 EQUIL PHASE=L KBASIS=MOLE-GAMMA  
    REAC-DATA 4 KINETIC PHASE=L CBASIS=MOLAR  
    REAC-DATA 5 KINETIC PHASE=L CBASIS=MOLAR  
    K-STOIC 1 A=-9.41650 B=-4234.980 C=0.0 D=0.0  
    K-STOIC 2 A=132.8990 B=-13445.90 C=-22.47730 D=0.0  
    K-STOIC 3 A=216.0490 B=-12431.70 C=-35.48190 D=0.0  
    RATE-CON 4 PRE-EXP=4.31520E+13 ACT-ENERGY=13249.0  
    RATE-CON 5 PRE-EXP=3.74860E+14 ACT-ENERGY=25271.560  
    STOIC 1 MDEA+ -1.0 / H2O -1.0 / MDEA 1.0 / H3O+ 1.0  
    STOIC 2 H2O -2.0 / H3O+ 1.0 / OH- 1.0  
    STOIC 3 HCO3- -1.0 / H2O -1.0 / H3O+ 1.0 / CO3-2 1.0  
    STOIC 4 CO2 -1.0 / OH- -1.0 / HCO3- 1.0  
    STOIC 5 HCO3- -1.0 / CO2 1.0 / OH- 1.0  
    POWLAW-EXP 4 CO2 1.0 / OH- 1.0  
    POWLAW-EXP 5 HCO3- 1.0  
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APPENDIX D 
GAIN MATRICES, SINGULAR VALUES 
AND CONDITION NUMBERS 
Table 32. Singular values and condition numbers of dehydration process with manipulated variable disturbances. 
MVs Changes -30% -20% -10% -5% -2% -1% -0.5% -0.2% -0.1% 
S
i
n
g
u
l
a
r
 
V
a
l
u
e
s
 
(
S
V
)
 
Max SVs 3.736 5.090 9.122 14.293 16.319 16.530 16.619 16.651 16.657 
 2.294 2.904 4.264 4.256 4.241 4.236 4.233 4.231 4.230 
 0.967 0.856 0.762 0.759 0.758 0.757 0.757 0.757 0.757 
 0.589 0.555 0.407 0.409 0.410 0.410 0.410 0.410 0.410 
 0.143 0.152 0.158 0.161 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.164 0.164 
Min SVs 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
CNs 1167.469 2036.160 3966.130 6806.095 7770.857 8265.000 8309.550 8325.700 8328.400 
          
MVs Changes 0.10% 0.2% 0.5% 1% 2% 5% 10% 20% 30% 
S
i
n
g
u
l
a
r
 
V
a
l
u
e
s
 
(
S
V
)
 
Max SVs 16.644 16.651 16.651 16.650 16.625 16.406 15.858 14.683 13.624 
 6.621 6.584 6.556 6.534 6.500 6.410 6.278 4.091 3.301 
 2.859 2.853 2.848 2.844 2.837 2.817 2.787 2.503 1.962 
 0.536 0.536 0.536 0.536 0.535 0.535 0.534 0.526 0.490 
 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.402 0.402 0.395 0.299 
Min SVs 0.178 0.178 0.175 0.175 0.174 0.175 0.176 0.176 0.161 
CNs 100.688 100.731 102.528 102.462 102.310 100.587 96.754 89.040 83.326 
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Table 33. Singular values and condition numbers of oxydehydrogenation process with manipulated variable disturbances. 
MVs Changes -30% -20% -10% -5% -2% -1% -0.5% -0.2% -0.1% 
S
i
n
g
u
l
a
r
 
V
a
l
u
e
s
 
(
S
V
s
)
 
Max SVs 4.718 4.186 4.176 4.232 4.291 4.319 4.331 4.342 4.365 
 3.018 3.178 3.371 3.460 3.519 3.541 3.553 3.558 3.561 
 1.881 1.954 2.397 2.716 2.948 3.032 3.075 3.102 3.108 
 1.637 1.815 1.845 1.850 1.855 1.857 1.858 1.862 1.861 
 1.317 1.293 1.354 1.390 1.423 1.438 1.445 1.450 1.455 
 1.184 1.195 1.312 1.371 1.399 1.406 1.410 1.412 1.413 
 1.146 0.769 0.890 0.960 1.006 1.023 1.031 1.037 1.042 
 0.399 0.363 0.361 0.358 0.362 0.361 0.360 0.359 0.359 
 0.084 0.074 0.066 0.063 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 
Min SVs 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 
CNs 512.804 589.549 732.614 829.784 893.938 899.708 941.522 943.935 992.000 
          
MVs Changes 0.10% 0.2% 0.5% 1% 2% 5% 10% 20% 30% 
S
i
n
g
u
l
a
r
 
V
a
l
u
e
s
 
(
S
V
s
)
 
Max SVs 4.356 4.360 4.362 4.359 4.380 4.485 4.711 5.471 4.518 
 3.569 3.571 3.577 3.545 3.548 3.594 3.666 3.777 3.726 
 3.127 3.135 3.157 2.543 1.862 1.868 1.885 1.962 1.816 
 1.861 1.860 1.858 1.859 1.510 1.535 1.612 1.766 1.727 
 1.454 1.454 1.460 1.464 1.431 1.454 1.498 1.622 1.438 
 1.414 1.415 1.417 1.422 1.369 1.129 1.232 1.354 1.099 
 1.041 1.043 1.048 1.056 1.074 0.938 0.866 0.800 1.054 
 0.358 0.358 0.353 0.353 0.352 0.349 0.343 0.325 0.292 
 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.059 0.059 0.058 0.056 0.052 0.048 
Min SVs 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.005 
CNs 1405.194 927.702 948.217 751.517 429.441 327.387 365.186 511.346 982.152 
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APPENDIX E 
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR CALCULATION OF FLEXIBILITY INDICES 
Table 34. Simulation results of the dehydration process. 
Variable 
type Variables and parameters Unit 
Scenarios 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Impact 
variables 
Evaporator steam kg/h 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 
Reactor heating oil kg/h 35,578 0 0 0 0 35,578 35,578 35,578 35,578 
Boiler feed water kg/h 1,136 0 0 1,136 1,136 0 0 1,136 1,136 
Mixer steam kg/h 1,802 0 1,802 0 1,802 0 1,802 0 1,802 
            
Control 
variables 
Furnace duty Gcal/h 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 
Valve opening % 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 
Quench water kg/h 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 
            
Specified 
parameters 
Pump temperature C        25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 
Evaporator outlet temperature C        108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Mixer outlet temperature C        116 108 116 108 116 108 116 108 116 
Furnace outlet temperature C        350 418 350 418 350 418 350 418 350 
Reactor temperature C        350 102 117 102 117 419 350 419 350 
Boiler outlet temperature C        160 102 117 63 110 419 350 170 160 
Quench outlet temperature C        83.1 55.9 76.9 39.3 66.2 77.7 -68.1 67.0 83.1 
Scrubber outlet temperature C        81.3 53.2 74.6 39.4 63.3 75.5 -65.5 64.2 81.3 
Dryer inlet temperature C        81.3 53.2 74.6 39.4 63.3 75.5 -65.5 64.2 81.3 
Boiler pressure BAR     3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Valve outlet pressure BAR     1.9 2.7 2.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 0.0 2.6 1.9 
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Table 34. (Continued) 
Variable 
type Variables and parameters Unit 
Scenarios 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Impact 
variables 
Evaporator steam kg/h 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Reactor heating oil kg/h 0 0 0 0 35,578 35,578 35,578 35,578 
Boiler feed water kg/h 0 0 1,136 1,136 0 0 1,136 1,136 
Mixer steam kg/h 0 1,802 0 1,802 0 1,802 0 1,802 
           
Control 
variables 
Furnace duty Gcal/h 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 
Valve opening % 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 
Quench water kg/h 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 
           
Specified 
parameters 
Pump temperature C        25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 
Evaporator outlet temperature C        20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Mixer outlet temperature C        20 110 20 110 20 110 20 110 
Furnace outlet temperature C        108 112 108 112 108 112 108 112 
Reactor temperature C        -54 97 -54 97 100 117 100 117 
Boiler outlet temperature C        -54 97 -130 52 100 117 53 109 
Quench outlet temperature C        22.6 54.0 4.0 37.8 54.4 76.0 37.5 65.0 
Scrubber outlet temperature C        29.5 51.3 22.8 38.3 51.8 73.6 38.2 62.1 
Dryer inlet temperature C        29.5 51.3 22.8 38.3 51.8 73.6 38.2 62.1 
Boiler pressure BAR     3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Valve outlet pressure BAR     2.9 2.6 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.9 2.5 
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Table 34. (Continued) 
Variable type Variables and parameters Unit Scenarios 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Impact 
variables 
Evaporator steam kg/h 2,425 2,425 0 0 0 0 659 655 
Reactor heating oil kg/h 0 35,578 0 0 0 0 9,667 9,606 
Boiler feed water kg/h 1,136 0 0 0 1,136 1,136 309 829 
Mixer steam kg/h 0 1,802 0 1,802 0 1,802 490 487 
           
Control 
variables 
Furnace duty Gcal/h 0.952 0 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.952 
Valve opening % 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 
Quench water kg/h 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 
           
Specified 
parameters 
Pump temperature C        25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 25.2 
Evaporator outlet temperature C        108 108 20 20 20 20 103 103 
Mixer outlet temperature C        108 116 20 110 20 110 108 108 
Furnace outlet temperature C        494 116 108 113 108 113 158 157 
Reactor temperature C        108 120 -11 104 -11 104 101 100 
Boiler outlet temperature C        85 120 -11 104 -107 76 94 76 
Quench outlet temperature C        45.5 81.8 29.4 59.1 9.7 43.9 50.8 43.1 
Scrubber outlet temperature C        44.1 79.9 33.1 56.2 24.4 42.7 48.6 42.2 
Dryer inlet temperature C        44.1 79.9 33.1 56.2 24.4 42.7 48.6 42.2 
Boiler pressure BAR     3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Valve outlet pressure BAR     2.8 2.1 2.9 2.6 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.8 
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Table 35. Simulation results of the oxydehydrogenation process. 
Variable 
type 
Variable and parameter Unit Scenarios 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Impact 
variables 
Cooler 1 Cooling water rate kg/h 245,737 245,737 245,737 245,737 0 0 0 0 
Cooler 2 Cooling water rate kg/h 211,529 211,529 0 0 211,529 211,529 0 0 
Cooler 4 Cooling water rate kg/h 161,025 0 161,025 0 161,025 0 161,025 0 
           
Control 
variables 
Heater steam rate kg/h 6,611 6,611 6,611 6,611 6,611 6,611 6,611 6,611 
Quench water rate kg/h 34,000 34,000 34,000 34,000 34,000 34,000 34,000 34,000 
           
Specified 
parameters 
Reactor 1 cooler temperature C 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 
Reactor 2 mixed inlet temperature C 90 90 90 90 396 396 396 396 
Reactor 2 cooler temperature C 368 368 368 368 586 586 586 586 
Reactor 3 mixed inlet temperature C 90 90 368 368 343 343 586 586 
Reactor 3 cooler temperature C 375 375 570 570 538 538 750 750 
Scrubber temperature C 71 71 122 122 126 126 148 148 
Compressor temperature C 193 193 223 223 223 223 226 226 
Product concentration %mol 96.7 96.7 94.1 94.1 90.7 90.7 89.7 89.7 
Production rate kg/h 3,301 3,301 3,409 3,409 3,550 3,550 3,579 3,579 
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Table 35. (Continued) 
Variable 
type 
Variable and parameter Unit Scenarios 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Impact 
variables 
Cooler 1 Cooling water rate kg/h 245,737 245,737 0 0 0 0 90,925 
Cooler 2 Cooling water rate kg/h 0 0 211,529 211,529 0 0 78,268 
Cooler 4 Cooling water rate kg/h 161,025 0 161,025 0 161,025 0 59,578 
          
Control 
variables 
Heater steam rate kg/h 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Quench water rate kg/h 43,000 43,000 43,000 43,000 43,000 43,000 43,000 
          
Specified 
parameters 
Reactor 1 cooler temperature C 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 
Reactor 2 mixed inlet temperature C -33 -33 152 152 152 152 78 
Reactor 2 cooler temperature C 1,479 1,479 394 394 394 394 364 
Reactor 3 mixed inlet temperature C 1,479 1,479 123 123 394 394 251 
Reactor 3 cooler temperature C 1,244 1,244 374 374 581 581 479 
Scrubber temperature C 30 30 92 92 132 132 95 
Compressor temperature C 30 30 92 92 132 132 95 
Product concentration %mol 0.0 0.0 91.3 91.3 90.7 90.7 95.8 
Production rate kg/h 10,909 10,971 3,526 3,526 3,551 3,551 3,342 
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